RELIGIOUS FAITH:
SOME CONTEMPORARY VIEWS

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PREFACE

In 1962 I wrote a paper of some forty pages for a seminar in epistemology. My concern in that paper was whether or not there is any way to show that religious faith is intellectually respectable in spite of the generally accepted fact that it is not possible to prove the existence of a deity.

In that paper I considered several ways in which one might argue that it is not irrational to believe in spite of the absence of proof. My original intention here was to expand on the discussion of each of these types of argument and, thereby, to produce a thesis of some one hundred and fifty pages. The work that follows is a monument to just how far wrong our seemingly carefully-made plans can go.

One type of argument referred to above was that given by John Hick, an argument to the effect that we must, necessarily, place an 'interpretation' on 'the facts' which we experience and that the discrimination between conflicting interpretations cannot be based on an examination of the facts; further, the basic questions of religion, says Hick, should be construed as questions of interpretation, rather than as questions of straightforward fact. It was in examining this view, a view that took up only about eight pages of that paper, that the original plans proved to be so unrealistic. It was found, that, within the area of religion, many other writers had put forth arguments similar to that of Hick, but differing in respects important enough to demand examination. Further, it was found that Hick's distinction between questions of 'interpretation' and questions of 'fact' is closely paralleled by distinctions made by writers concerned, not with religion, but with the structure of science and philosophy itself. Examination of these contributes, I believe, in crucially important ways, to the understanding and strengthening of the arguments of the 'religious writers'.

As a result of these discovered inter-connections, the essay that follows is, perhaps, over-long, but, in some respects, not long enough. For, due to the far-reaching scope of the problem (i.e., due to its involving science and philosophy as well as religion), many points could bear further examination, and two or three of what may be the most important are avowedly left as no more than mere suggestions, pending further development.

The general topic is, I think, of crucial importance. In the Western world today, dominated as it seems to be by the inventions and methods of science, is it possible, rationally possible, to accept a religious faith which is at all like the faith which was possible prior to the scientific revolution? While no definitive answer to this question is attempted here, some suggestions are made, and it is hoped that, at least, what follows will help to clarify the nature of the problem.

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The forms adopted for the bibliography and 'footnotes' require some explanation. Each entry in the bibliography is numbered, and, *if* there is *more than one* article cited from a given anthology-type volume, that volume is listed separately. The citation for the articles, then, includes only the *author* of the volume in which the article appears and the number assigned to that volume.

Page references for quotations are given in the text in parentheses whenever the reference is brief enough to allow this. When a work is first cited, the author, title and bibliography number are given (generally in a footnote). Subsequent references give page number, author, and bibliography number; or author and page number; or only page number. Just what information is given is decided 'pragmatically', i.e., sufficient information is given to make it clear just what the source is. (Note: This system is not unprecedented. Anthony Flew, in *Hume's Philosophy of Belief* uses one much like it.)

The basic purpose of this system is to make all references as clear as possible while avoiding constant bothersome glances at the bottom of the page and the necessity of frequent references to the bibliography (as is required, for instance, if the title of the book is not given at its first citation).

Concerning the use of quotation marks: Standard "double quotes" are used only for direct quotations. If a word or phrase itself is referred to or if a word or phrase is used in an unusual or specialized sense (including in just the sense used by an author referred to), then 'single quotes' are used.

Italics within a quoted passage are those of the original author unless otherwise stated.

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I should like to thank my advisor, Professor Richard Rorty, for his prompt and careful reading of each section of this work as it progressed. His painstaking comments have prevented my falling into many egregious blunders. The errors that remain are, of course, to be attributed only to me.

I should also like to thank Professor Kaufmann from whom I learned much of what I know of the general area of the philosophy of religion, first when I was an undergraduate, and then as a graduate student, at Princeton University. Even though I suspect that Professor Kaufmann would disagree with the general approach of this work, my indebtedness remains.

Finally, my debt to my wife, Pat, cannot be overemphasized. Not only has she put up with my preoccupation with this thesis for the past few years with some degree of cheerfulness, but she also undertook the monumental task

of typing some of the later sections of the 'draft', then the final version. All of this she did in her 'spare time', i.e., time left over from her already full-time job of wife and mother-of-a-toddler. Such a supererogatory performance can hardly be praised sufficiently.

Erratum: There is no page numbered '161'.

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CHAPTER I

Introduction: Belief and Faith

I suspect that if one were to take a poll, asking Christians what 'faith', as used in "I have faith in God" means, far and away the most frequent reply would run somewhat as follows: "'Faith in God'; it means 'belief in God'; it means that I believe that God exists, that he watches over us, that he comforts us in time of need, etc." That is, for the average Christian, the Christian who is not a theologian, religious faith is belief that some propositions are true.

Again, considering the relationship between faith and belief from the standpoint of 'what we say' (when we are not analyzing) in non-religious contexts, the following conversation would be very odd indeed: "I have faith that I can do it." "You really believe you can?" "No, I just have faith that I can." One can say then that there is a strong _prima facie_ assumption that faith is a kind of belief.

On the other hand, some recent philosophers and theologians have maintained that faith, far from being a type of belief, is to be _contrasted_ with belief. Tillich, for instance, says,

> The most ordinary misinterpretation of faith is to consider it an act of knowledge that has a low degree of evidence. Something more or less probable or improbable is affirmed in spite of the insufficiency of its theoretical substantiation. This situation is very usual in daily life. If this is meant, one is speaking of _belief_ rather than of faith.*

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* Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith [81], p. 31.

Faith, for Tillich, does not involve a "theoretically formulated content" (p. 35) at all; i.e., it is not a matter of accepting or not accepting propositions.

In somewhat the same vein, R. B. Braithwaite presents what is probably, to English-speaking philosophers at any rate, the best-known attempt to construe Christian faith in a thoroughly non-cognitive manner.* In his celebrated essay "An Empiricist's View of the Nature of Religious Belief,"** he assumes the validity of the positivists' doctrine of meaningfulness and then proceeds to the natural conclusion that religious statements cannot be meaningful (cognitive) since they are neither (I) "Statements about particular empirical facts [which] are testable by direct observation," (II) "scientific hypotheses," nor (III) "logically necessary" statements (pp. 229-334).

He continues, however, in a spirit of tolerance, to note that moral statements are equally unverifiable and yet they undeniably have a *use*, a "use in guiding conduct" (p. 235). But any statement which has a legitimate use, must, it would seem, "have a meaning--in some sense of meaning" (*ibid.*). It follows, therefore, that religious statements must be said to have a

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* That is, in a manner that would make it not a matter of belief, of accepting propositions which are either true or false. Tillich does talk about the 'truth of faith' (Ch. V), but this does not refer to 'truth' in the sense in which propositions are either true or false (cf., for instance, pp. 95-98). The scope and complexity of Tillich's work makes it impossible to use him as the main example of Christian non-cognitivism. Therefore, Braithwaite's much more simple (and much less acceptable) discussion will be so used. A fairly large part of the discussion that follows above, however, is relevant to the topic: "Tillich as 'Christian'".

** [7], in *The Existence of God*, John Hick (ed.) [36].

'meaning' if, in fact, they have a use; in particular, if religious assertions are essentially moral assertions, clearly they 'have a meaning', since, as moral assertions, they *ipso facto* have a use. He then sets out to show that, indeed, religious assertions are actually used as a type of moral assertion.

This naturally raises a question concerning the meaning of moral assertions. Rejecting the emotive theory of ethical statements,* he adopts the 'conative' theory, which "makes the primary use of a moral assertion that of expressing the intention of the assertor to act in a particular sort of way specified in the assertion" (p. 237). Religious assertions are "primarily declarations of commitment to a way of life" (p. 239). Therefore,

> the meaning of a religious assertion is given by its use in expressing the assertor's intention to follow a specified policy of behavior. To say that it is belief in the dogmas of religion which is the cause of the believer's intending to behave as he does is to put the cart before the horse: it is the intention to behave which constitutes what is known as religious conviction (*ibid*.).

Religious assertions, then, are assertions of intentions to pursue a certain way of life. Specifically Christian assertions state a commitment to live an "agapeistic way of life" (p. 241).

Could not, however, this desire to live an agapeistic life be equally true of a Jew or a Buddhist? If so, how can we distinguish between the 'meaning' of, say, Christianity and Judaism? Braithwaite's answer is that "the behavior policies, which may be the same for different religions, are associated with thinking of different *stories*" (p. 244). Such stories supply concrete examples of the type of life to be lived. The Jew might have as his model the life of Moses, the Christian the life of Jesus.

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* The standard 'pure' emotive theory is given by A. J. Ayer in *Language, Truth, and Logic* [2].

These stories do have literal meaning, for they are told by means of "straightforward historical statements about [e.g.] the life and death of Jesus of Nazareth" (p. 246). They need not, however, be believed. For Braithwaite, believing the stores is completely inessential for using them as guides to conduct. But,

> If the religious stories need not be believed, what function do they fulfill in the complex state of mind and behavior known as having a religious belief? How is entertaining the story related to resolving to pursue a certain way of life? My answer is that the relation is a psychological and causal one. It is an empirical psychological fact that many people find it easier to resolve upon and to carry through a course of action which is contrary to their natural inclinations if this policy is associated in their minds with certain stories. And in many people the psychological link is not appreciably weakened by the fact that the story associated with the behavior policy is not believed. Next to the Bible and the Prayer Book the most influential work in English Christian religious life has been a book whose stories are frankly recognized as fictitious--Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress; and some of the most influential works in setting the moral tone of my generation were the novels of Dostoevsky (pp. 246-7).

We have, then, two possible, and diametrically opposed, views: Faith just is belief; faith does not involve belief in any way. But few theologians or philosophers (whether they are critics or defenders of faith) are willing to accept either of these extremes. Christian faith, or, more generally, theistic faith, necessarily involves belief but is, nonetheless, much more than mere belief. Or putting this only slightly differently, faith is much more than holding beliefs, but the 'much more' does not make much sense in the absence of the beliefs. 'Faith' is a complex whole which cannot be equated with belief, with adopting certain attitudes, or with acting in certain ways.

Nicholas Wolterstorff has recently presented an account of the nature of faith which includes these diverse aspects.* He approaches the problem by simply asking, "What changed?" in the case of a conversion, taking as his specific example that of St. Paul.**

First, at least some of Paul's beliefs changed: Some of these beliefs were about straightforward empirical facts ("Jesus Christ, after being dead for three days, arose from the dead"); others were beliefs about supernatural or partially supernatural facts. He now believed that "in the risen person of Jesus Christ God had revealed himself and the way of salvation for men, and that the message of this Jesus was the message of God" (p. 22). Around this central belief his prior beliefs were radically re-organized. This re-organization involved dropping some of his previous beliefs (God had not yet sent His Messiah), adding others (Faith in Jesus is essential for salvation). But, more, the "whole structure was seen in a different light," due to the central belief in Jesus as God's messenger (and, indeed, as God).

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* Nicholas P. Wolterstorff, "Faith and Philosophy" [91], in Faith and Philosophy, Alvin Plantinga (ed.).

** Frederick Ferré similarly attempts to explicate the nature of faith, but, instead of examining faith as it appears, as a phenomenon in the world, he attempts to give an analysis of 'the language of faith'. He goes to great lengths in attempting to spell out all of the 'jobs', that religious alnguage does, all of the 'functions' it serves. He wishes to emphasize that much religious language does jobs other than fact-starting. He lists and explains the ceremonial function, the self-commital function, the liturgical function, the reassuring function, the judging function, the challenging function, the ethical function, and the existential function of religious language (Frederick Ferré and Kent Bendall, Exploring the Logic of Faith [19], pp. 49-66). When religious language is being used wholly in any one of the above ways, no statements are being made; there is nothing which may be judged to be true or false (anymore than, say, "Pass the butter," is true or false). Since the above are functions of the language of faith, one may say that faith is much more than belief (p. 68).

Ferré, however, definitely over-states this idea of language having different functions. As Bendall puts it, "we should make a distinction between the linguistic functions of an utterance and certain further effects of this functioning" (p. 81). For instance, the utterance, "He'll be fine,"

But certainly not only St. Paul's beliefs were changed. His 'ultimate concern', the things he most cared about, were also changed.

> Prior to his conversion, Paul had devoted his life to the cause of the Jews...Now all this was changed. He no longer cared about the Jewish nation; his message was to all peoples (p. 23).*

His moral outlook as a whole was manifested in his actions. "Where once he had persecuted Christians, he now tried with even greater zeal to persuade men to become Christians" (*ibid.*).

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spoken by a doctor to a concerned mother certainly will be reassuring, but to say that reassurance is its function (and thereby, apparently, part of its meaning) radically misrepresents the situation. The reassurance is, instead, a *result* of the fact that is stated. (This remains true, I *think*, even in cases where everyone knows that he will *not* be fine. If the words have any comforting results this *is because of* the meaning; it is not part of the meaning.)

* Wolterstorff realizes that a change in actions may result from a change in belief without a change in moral outlook. But, says Wolterstorff, in St. Paul's case, it is perfectly clear, from his letters that this was not what happened. (cf. R. M. Hare, "Religion and Morals" [31], in *Faith and Logic*, Basic Mitchell (ed.), pp. 182-3).

His mode of worship and the rituals he followed were also changed. Finally, his 'religious experience' was changed. In fact, the cause of his conversion was a religious experience.

Wolterstorff does not claim that all of these necessarily take place when there is a change of faith.

> Is it not the case that sometimes a religious conversion is a very localized change in a person's life, and not at all so comprehensive and pervasive as it was in Paul's? Yes, indeed it is. But it is also the case that in some conversions the changes are even more pervasive; this would be the case if, let us say a Buddhist or a Logical Positivist became a Christian. The point I wish to make is not that a change in faith is always thus pervasive, but rather that it may be. And more strongly, that there is apparently, no facet whatsoever of a person's existence, provided it lies in some way within his control, which might not be changed in some conversion or other. In this sense, no part of human life is immune to faith (pp. 24-5).

It is clear that the changes which took place in Paul's life had a sort of unity. There was a definite relationship between the various changes. First what led to most of the changes was his experience on the Damascus road. It is not clear what the force of 'led to ' is here.* The experience in no way shows (or even makes probable) the truth of Christianity. "So far as the Character of the experience is concerned, Paul, instead of saying 'Who are you, Lord?' might instead have said, 'Good heavens, the heat and exhaustion are making my mind reel.'" Is the 'led to', then, causal? Wolterstorff says simply, "I do not know" (pp. 25-6).

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* On the 'non-logical' relationship between certain experiences and faith, compare "The Logical Status of Religious Belief," by Alasdair MacIntyre" [39], in A. MacIntyre (ed.), Metaphysical Beliefs, pp. 200-201.

The second 'foundation' for his faith is his belief that Jesus arose from the dead. It seems (from his writings) that if he had "given it up, he would have given up his Christian faith as a whole." But the resurrection (given that it were 'proven') still would not make Christianity even probable. So again we have a 'ground' for his faith, but not a reason.* (Many do hold to much of 'traditional Christianity' without this ground; Tillich and Bultmann are the most obvious examples.)

If the above served as 'grounds' for his belief in Christ, the latter belief does the same for his moral beliefs, his feelings and attitudes, and his mode of worship. Again, however, the relationship is not a 'logical' one. "It does not seem that a man would be irrational, in any specifiable sense, if he agreed with Paul on all other matters but disagreed with some of his moral convictions. Still, 'by their works ye shall know them'" (p. 26). There seems to be a certain appropriateness in the moral beliefs, feelings, and attitudes which are held, but explicating this is highly difficult.* (That the relationship between beliefs and attitudes is neither inductive nor deductive is, of course,to be expected.)

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* Wolterstorff doesn't explain why Jesus arising from the dead does not increase the probability of the truth of Christianity. Intuitively, it would seem that it would doso. A hint of what he has in mind may be given in what he says concerning St. Paul's experience on the Damascus road: "it is obvious that the experiences neither entail nor lend probability to the 'truth' of Christianity; they are not relevant to the existence of God and the divinity of Christ in the way in which a person's claim that he seems to be seeing something is relevant to the claim that a physical object exists"(p. 25). Similarly, "Jesus rose from the dead" does not immediately increase the probability of "Jesus is the Christ" in anything like the way in which "Of one hundred sawns examined, each has been white" seems to increase the probability of "all swans are white." What one needs in the former case is a 'rule of inference' to connect the resurrection and the divinity of Jesus. And, indeed, such a rule of inference (e.g., "If a person arises from the dead, it is probable thathe is divine") does seem to be intuitively plausible, and hence the probability of the truth of Christianity is increased. (Wolterstorff is probably wrong also in assuming that no such rule of inference is necessary in the case of the 'seeing' example he gives. On this, and on rules of inference in general, cf. Roderick Chisholm, *Perceiving: A Philosophical Study* [11], *passim*). Finally, what is correct about Wolterstorff's point here is that no one must accept that rule of inference ("if a person arises..."). Instead, he might find more plausible such a rule as: "If a person arises from the dead, then science has failed to discover the ability of the human heart to reconstitute itself."

A final element of unity is that there seems to be a peculiar sort of inverse relationship between Paul's belief in the resurrection and his faith in Christ. Before, it was noticed that the former was a 'ground' for the latter; but equally, the latter seems to serve as a ground for the former.

> Paul seems to have come to believe in the resurrection *at the same time* that he came to have faith in Jesus; *he did not go out* first to conduct elaborate historical investigations. One gets the impression that Paul would have believed in the resurrection even if all the historical evidence were against it. And, indeed, what kind of historical research would lead Christians in general to abandon their faith? Suppose some historian would claim, on good grounds, that the New Testament was a sixth-century forgery. No doubt many Christians, if they believed this, would give up their faith. But would they believe it? For that matter, how long must capitalism survive to persuade the Communist that Marxism is a tissue of errors? And how often must science disappoint us to persuade the Positivist that his hopes are misplaced? Has it not done so often enough already? (p. 27)**

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* MacIntyre makes essentially the same point: "Conversion is, of course, at once conversion to a belief and to a way of living. But these are not related as theory is related to practice. Religious morality is not applied religious belief. To believe is to behave differently because it is to see the whole of one's life in a new and different light" ([39], p. 210).

** Compare this quote both to MacIntyre's argument concerning the irrelevance of historical beliefs to faith and to his conception of the 'difficulties' in Christian belief (cf. below, pp. 24 f. and Ch. V).

One final point in this section: Is there a 'core' of faith? Wolterstorff takes 'ultimate trust and loyalty' as such a core. He does not claim that this need be the core of each person's religious faith but only that it very often is (and it was in the case of Paul).

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Wolterstorff's discussion of faith brings out two important points: First, the various elements which make up faith in its complete form, beliefs, actions, attitudes, clearly seem to be inter-related, but the inter-relationships are of types which are very difficult to characterize. Somehow, they seem, intuitively, to be 'appropriate' to one another, but, further than this, it is difficult to know what to say.*

Second, and of considerably more importance, is his insight that there is the "peculiar sort of inverse relationship between Paul's belief in the resurrection and his faith in Christ." This, I think, is a part of the reason that "all religions look quaint from the outside but are all things to the believer."** To the non-believer the resurrection is a supposed fact, but a 'fact' insufficiently evidenced. Therefore, he cannot understand how the believer can base his religion on such a tenuous hypothesis. What he does not see is that, for the believer, the relationship between the resurrection and his faith is not so simple. In some way, his faith (in its entirety) 'backs up' his belief in the resurrection, even while his belief in the resurrection serves as ground for his faith. Hence, the believer is unable to consider the resurrection in quite the way in which he would consider any other historical 'fact'.*

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* I am not saying (and I do not believe Wolterstorff is saying) that nothing more definitive can be said. Whether or not more could be said is left here (as with Wolterstorff) an open question.

** Walter Kaufmann, Critique of Religion and Philosophy [47], p. 178.

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Wolterstorff is arguing from 'what is the case' in his account of faith ,i.e., describing what he takes to be a representative case of a change of faith. If one envisages him as replying to Braithwaite, then he is, in effect, saying, "But just as a sheer matter of fact what you call faith is not what everyone else in the 'community of believers' means by faith."**

Braithwaite would, I suspect, be unimpressed with such an argument. For, even though he seems to think of himself as relying on what believers do say and do, he also seems to be aware that he is prescribing rather than describing in his discussion of faith. That is, he knows that traditionally, and even today, most believers think that the essence of their faith is belief that a supreme being exists, but he thinks that such purported beliefs are literally nonsense. Therefore, he looks for a way of interpreting Christianity which is compatible with the bulk of what *is* said and done by the faithful, but which does not involve actually attempting to believe what he is convinced is nonsense.

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* This is a relatively small, but, I think, important part of the seeming failure of the believer and the sceptic to 'communicate'. This failure will be discussed at greater length in Ch. V.

** The same comments apply to Ferré (above, p. 5n), since he is arguing from what we actually say (and do) in religious contexts.

What could be said that would count directly against Braithwaite if his intentions are construed in this way? The most frequently encountered criticism is that Christianity, when construed as Braithwaite does construe it, is simply not *Christianity*.

> The *Christian* surely cannot acquiesce in limiting the purpose of talk about God to this fortifying of morality by parable. The language of 'transcendence', the thought of God as a personal being, wholly other to man, dwelling apart in majesty--this talk may well collapse into meaninglessness in the last analysis. And yet to sacrifice it seems at once to take one quite outside Christianity. (In saying that I do not feel guilty of making an arbitrary definition of what Christianity is.)*
>
> This view [i.e., the view of Braithwaite] solves the present difficulty [the problem of the relation between religion and morality] at the cost of renouncing traditional religion all together [*sic*]. For it omits from religion all reference to the reality of God, to God's real creating and redemptive acts. It preserves the name of religion while believing exactly what athiests believe.**

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* Ronald Hepburn, *Christianity and Paradox* [34], pp. 193-4.

** Alasdair MacIntyre, *Difficulties in Christian Belief* [57], pp. 104-5. See, also, C.B. Martin, *Religious Belief* [62], p. 11. Like Hepburn, Martin thinks that ultimately talk about God (when it is "used to make a kind of claim about the nature of the world") collapses into nonsense. Braithwaite, he says, has simply picked out one unconfused function of such talk and has claimed that that is *the* function. Martin, like Hepburn and Kaufmann ([47], *passim*, but in particular, Ch. VI), prefers simply to say, "That talk is confused, so stop using it," instead of re-interpreting it to make it sensible.

While I think these criticisms are basically well-founded, they do not make clear what the important issue is: Is it just an arbitrary question of by what name we should call a given religion? (Or even whether or not we should call it a 'religion' at all?) Before attempting to elucidate the importance of the question, however, a prior one must be considered: If it is possible to say, as Hepburn does, that a certain way of construing religious assertions takes us "quite outside Christianity" and to go on to say that such a statement does not amount to relying on an arbitrary definition of Christianity, then, we must ask, what 'non-arbitrary' definition is he relying on? i.e., just what _are_ the necessary conditions for saying that a given set of beliefs, attitudes, etc. add up to Christianity?

I think that merely to ask this question in this bald form is sufficient to make one suspect that there can be no answer to it. Surely one can be a Christian without believing that Jesus was born of a virgin; or that he turned the water into wine; or that the world was created _ex nihilo_ exactly such and such years ago. But is it notnecessary at least to believe that God (a theistic god) exists and that Jesus was his representative on earth? Even here I am not certain that one can say, as a general rule, that such beliefs are necessary. It is conceivable that we might be willing to call a person a Christian if he broke from the traditional conception of God as _a_ being but maintained most other beliefs, modes of action, attitudes, etc. of traditional Christianity. As for

Jesus being God's representative on earth, this seems to allow of so many different interpretations that it is not clear just what would have to be believed for one to call himself a Christian.*

The point is that 'Christianity' is a complex, multiple-criteria term and that this makes a decision as to just what the necessary conditions are for being a Christian impossible to make _in_ _abstracto_.

Does this mean that Hepburn should not have said that he is, without assuming a non-arbitrary definition of Christianity, justified in claiming that Braithwaite has actually abandoned Christianity? On the contrary, I think that Hepburn (MacIntyre, etc.) is quite justified in his claim that Braithwaite's 'analysis' quits the area of Christianity. What cannot be said is that Braithwaite is not a Christian because he has abandoned this or that _particular_ characteristic of the religion. That is, it is necessary to weigh the many facets of Christianity against what Braithwaite says and reach a _decision_ as to whether or not it would be _misleading_ if his position were represented as Christianity.

This brings us back to the question: What is the real _point_ of the type of criticism that says that Braithwaite has essentially abandoned Christianity? The point is, I think, that it is misleading to call oneself a Christian if he has abandoned *too much* of what has traditionally been thought of as Christianity. In essence, one is finally confronted with a *moral* question, the answer to which requires judgment, judgment concerning the point at which one is deviating so far from traditional Christianity that others are *misled* by one's claims to be a Christian. In the case of Braithwaite, it seems clear that a person who held *his* version of Christianity, attended church regularly, took part in the ceremonies, etc. would be radically misleading others as to his true convictions.

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* It seems plausible to say that, in some sense, a Christian must hold that Jesus was God's representative on earth, but this could be taken to mean that Jesus was God, and/or Jesus was God's son, or that Jesus was a man ~~but~~ was divinely inspired in a unique way; etc.

One might be tempted to say that there is no moral question as to whether one calls oneself a Christian, but only a question of good or bad judgment. For instance, 'art', like 'religion' and 'Christianity', would seem to be a multiple-criteria term,* but if a person decided to call the last load of garbage dropped carelessly at the city cump 'art', he would not be accused of immorality, only of exercising bad judgment. Why is it different if one chooses to call himself a Christian when he rejects virgually all of the traditional tenets of Christianity?

The essential difference may be brought out by considering the fact that a person on the 'left' of the political spectrum in the United States today (let's imagine that he always agrees with the *New Republic*)would not be correctly described as a communist or even a socialist, and indeed, he is highly unlikely to so refer to himself. But, a person who holds Braithwaite's views concerning Christianity is at least as far from traditional Christianity as the 'New Republic liberal' is from Marxism, and yet Braithwaite (and many Unitarians and 'liberal' members of other denominations) do call themselves Christians. What is the difference? Clearly it is that to be considered a Christian is socially beneficial* in the Western world (and in the U.S. in particular). It is just this factor which makes the question essentially a moral one.

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* cf. Morris Weitz, "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics" [87], in *Philosophy Looks at the Arts*, Joseph Margolis (ed.).

In sum, I am suggesting that it is not possible to state necessary conditions for 'being a Christian', that 'Christianity' is a multiple-criteria concept, and therefore judgment, a decision, is necessary as to whether or not a given individual (or intellectual construal of religion) is 'Christian'. And, finally, the crucial 'guidepost' in making such a judgment, arriving at such a decision, is whether or not it would be seriously misleading to others, particularly to a society which, at least verbally, holds that 'being a Christian' is a virtue, to claim that one is a Christian.

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I have argued so far that there are no necessary conditions for 'being a Christian', but that, nonetheless, it is legitimate to assert that certain over-all positions (e.g. that of Braithwaite) may legitimately be said to go beyond the area properly described as 'Christianity'.

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* It is probably too 'simple' just to say that it is 'socially beneficial' to be a Christian in this society. The point is not so much that it is beneficial (e.g., that one can obtain a better job, although this might be true also) but that most people (church-goers or not) tend to disapprove of the non-Christian; in short, "I'm not a Christian," affects people much as "I'm in favor of free love" affects them. Whatever their practice, the listeners' reaction is far from favorable to the statements.

On the other hand, I think that it is also legitimate to say that there is at least a strong presumption that Christianity requires some 'metaphysical' beliefs, even though the requirement leaves a great leeway as to what the content of such beliefs must be. We have seen that Wolterstorff holds that St. Paul's beliefs concerning Jesus changed radically; he ceased to see him as an agent of the Devil and came to see him as an agent of God.

Further, most contemporary authors seem to think that there would be something decidedly odd in some types of attitudes, in some 'uses of language', apart from certain types of 'metaphysical' beliefs. Ferré puts it this way:

> It is logically possible...to make use of the utterances of Christian faith on their ceremonial function...(etc.) without necessarily believing that the language utilized is "true"...But...though it is a logical possibility that one use the utterances of faith apart from the dimension of belief, it may be rightly doubted that this is a particularly viable or rationally justifiable possibility. What is the point of wishing to associate oneself with the church or to accept its authority unless it is believed to be the guardian of something in some sense true? ([19], pp. 67-9).
>
> The activities of "worship" which we have noted as characteristic of the theological language-using society are radically misunderstood apart from reference to belief about the nature of reality beyond the acts and actors themselves.*

MacIntyre is in complete agreement.

> It would be possible to make myths directive of one's behavior without believing that they told one anything about the universe. But the religious believer commits

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* Frederick Ferré, Logic, Language, and God [18], p. 159.

> himself in his use of myth to the view that these stories are in some way or other stories about a real thing, God, acting in the world that we are acquainted with in ordinary experience. This particular use of myth stands therefore in need of justification...([59], p. 193).*

Finally, the point has been put perhaps as well as it can be put by Bernard Williams.

> Religious observance and prayer stand for nothing, so far as I can see, unless there are also behind them some beliefs aboutGod, some statements about him...Something must be believed, if religious activities are not just to be whistling in the dark without even the knowledge that what one is whistling is a tune...**

* * * * *

Are the practices, attitudes, etc. of Christianity, then, sensible in absence of metaphysical beliefs? The answer we have just given is a tentative, No. The proviso must be made, however, that in the eyes of most of 'the faithful', whether they be 'everyday believers', or philosophers, or theologians, is most probably a resounding--No!***

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* John Hick also agrees: "In order to render a distinctive style of life both attractive and rational, religious beliefs must be regarded as assertions of fact, not merely as imaginative fictions" (*Philosophy of Religion* [41], p. 93).

** "Tertullian's Paradox" [90], in *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*, A. Flew and A. MacIntyre (eds.) [24] p. 210.

*** To avoid misunderstanding, it should be stated here that, while there may seem to be an imcompatibility between my prior claim that there are no necessary conditions for ' being a Christian' and the present claim that some beliefs are necessary, there is not actually any such incompatibility. For, (a) the earlier claim was that no *particular* beliefs are required, while the present claim is that *some* beliefs (or the other) do seem to be required; (b) before, we were concerned with what is (analytically) required if the term 'Christian' is to be properly applied, whereas the present concern is whether it is reasonable to 'be a Christian' (where this refers to performing certain actions, having certain attitudes, etc.) without holding some beliefs. In short, the latter case has nothing to do with the *meaning* of 'Christianity'; the question is, rather, what it is reasonable to do in the absence of certain beliefs.

A reasonable case can, then, be made for the claim that 'metaphysical beliefs' are a necessary part of Christianity. But are there not other beliefs which also enter into faith? In particular, are there not certain historical and scientific facts (e.g. that leprosy may be cured by seven dips in the River Jordan) which must be accepted 'on faith'?

In spite of the prima facie plausibility of the claim that they are important, many of our contemporaries do not think that they actually are.* First Ferré-- "Would it be religiously significant to affirm that Pekabiah ruled Israel later than Jeroboam II, or that Amminadab was the father of Nahsbon - even with the most secure historical evidence to back up these assertions?" ([19] 71). Clearly it would not. So historical claims are not at all important for their own sake.

As for the supposed scientific facts claimed by Christianity, virtually all such claims must be adjudged false by modern sciences (p. 70). But, again, this is of little importance For, properly understood, they should not be treated as scientific claims at all. "Rather, they might be considered to have functions to which questions of truth or falsity would not arise: ceremonial, reassuring, challenging, liturgical, or like functions" (p. 151). They are to be considered rather in the way that historically false statements are considered within the context of an historical novel; "the novelist relates his fictional elements for the sake of other effects than historical scholarship" (ibid.). Apparently, Ferré means that the 'over-all point' of the novel is made clear by the use of such devices. Similarly, the scientifically false 'claims' of Christianity contribute to the overall Christian world view. But in neither case is one expected to believe, as literal truth, that which is plainly false. To so believe would be to misunderstand the 'intent' which is implicit in the context.*

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*Wolterstorff may be one exception. As we have seen he takes St. Paul's belief in the resurrection to be a part (but a necessary part?) of his faith.

Whether scientific and historical beliefs are necessary or superfluous for religious faith raises a host of complex questions. We may, however, comment briefly on the above claim that they are superfluous.

First, it is I think, evident that if one is willing to adopt a non-cognitive view of the supposed metaphysical assertions of a religion then no special problems are created if one holds that the scientific and historical statements of the religion need not be believed.**

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* "Advancing knowledge has made it possible and necessary to distinguish between [Biblical writers'] record of the divine presence and calling, and the primitive world-view which formed the framework of their thinking" (Hick [41], pp. 36-7). See also Bultmann's famous formulation of this distinction in "New Testament and Theology" [8] in Kerygma and Myth, Hans Bartsch (ed.) [5].

** That is, if no claim is made that a religion is in any way descriptive of the ultimate constitution of the world, if, instead, it is just a matter of providing 'inspiration' (or some such), then surely it cannot be necessary to hold any historical or scientific beliefs.

The question which is relevant for our purposes, however, is whether or not one can maintain that metaphysical beliefs are a necessary condition of faith and simultaneously hold that scientific and historical beliefs are not.

One point should be noticed at the outset: It is not possible, in all cases, to separate completely beliefs which may be scientifically dubious from those which may be historically dubious. For instance, the claim that Jesus was born of a virgin may be dounted, not just because of the lack of historical evidence for the claim, but also because it is 'impossible' (from the point of view of science) for such an event to take place.*

To simplify this problem, then, let us consider the scientific claims of Christianity which can be divorced from questions of historical happenings (i.e., those scientific claims, which if valid then, should be valid today).** For instance, the Biblical writers believed in the "three-storied universe..., with heaven in the sky above our heads, hell in the ground beneath our feet, and the sun circling the earth but halting in its course at Joshua's command..." (Hick [41], p. 37).

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* "Inherently less likely claims must be supported by stronger evidence to win our credence" (Kaufmann [47], p. 88).

** It is the failure of Bultmann to make just this distinction (i.e., between propositions which science says could not have happened in the past [such as those asserting the virgin birth] and those which science says have 'always been' false [such as the 'three-deckered' universe]) which has led to much criticism of his 'de-mythologizing' project, criticism which could have easily been avoided by making this very simple distinction. (cf. Hepburn, in "Demythologizing and the Problem of Validity" [35], in Flew and MacIntyre [24], and Austin Farrer, "An English Appreciation", in Bartsch [5] both give such criticisms.)

It would, I think, be only the 'fanatical atheist' who would think that the wrongness of such beliefs *eo ipso* shows that Christianity is false in its main contentions. There is, however, a sense in which such beliefs on the part of the Biblical writers rather seriously count against the *credibility* of the over-all story they have to tell. After all, we must bear in mind that, unlike the historical novelist, they apparently *believed* that their cosmology (etc.) *was true*. While we can read these scientific elements of their accounts as we would read an historical novel, they did not (we can assume) intend that they should be read in that way.

The point here is that if the Biblical writers were wrong about such basic facts concerning the structure of the universe (etc.), does this not increase the probability that they were wrong in other matters? In short, the errors made concerning scientific facts has only one major effect on the credibility of the *kerygma* -- such errors seem to undermine (to some extent) the over-all credibility of the authors who are the main sources of our information. On the other hand, the truth of the content of such 'universal' scientific facts does not seem crucial for the plausibility of a given religion.*

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* While I think that it is correct that such beliefs are not necessary conditions for Christianity, they have been, through-

The question of the necessity of holding certain *historical* beliefs is more complex, however. We should here distinguish (as indicated just above) between historical beliefs which seem to involve a scientific 'impossibility' and those which do not. "Jesus was born of a virgin," for instance, belongs to the former category, while "Jesus was trained to be a carpenter" belongs to the latter.

Notice, first, that what Ferre says about the importance of historical facts is hardly to the point. Certainly the order of the rulers of Israel does not seem to be of great religious significance, but that Jesus arose from the dead, or even that there ever was a person who corresponds to the Jesus of the Bible does seem relevant, crucially relevant.

The reason for this is that if the story of Jesus is to be relevant for theism it would seem to be so in that through this person God chose to reveal himself to mankind. But, then, it is necessary that such a person actually existed; otherwise such revelation simply has not occurred,* and those who think

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out much of the history of that religion, regarded as necessary. As a result, innovations, such as that of Copernicus, were stoutly resisted by the church (cf. T.S. Kuhn, *Copernican Revolution* [53]). To what extent the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth century churchmen were correct in regarding the Ptolemaic universe as crucially important for Christianity must remain an open question here. We can now only mention that an earth-centered universe (in which the earth was surrounded by spheres turned by the angels) certainly made theism a *necessity* in a way in which it is not today, i.e., a necessity if one was to make *any* sense at all of the universe (cf. Ch. VI, below, for further discussion of this point).

* I am assuming here that God would not have chosen to reveal himself by making up a story and perpetuating it on the gullible public as truth when in fact it is pure fancy. (This assumption is justified by the manner-content argument: If God is as revelation says He is, then He would not reveal Himself in such an 'underhanded' manner.)

it has are simply mistaken. This seems, then, to make it a necessary condition of Christianity (or, indeed, of any form of theism that is dependent at all on revelation) that a person corresponding, in general, to the Jesus of the Bible actually existed.

What though, of the supposed supernatural aspects of these historical beliefs, i.e., those aspects which conflict with scientific knowledge? While we argued above (p. 8n) that such occurrences as Jesus being born of a virgin or rising after three days from the dead may be taken as increasing the probability of the truth of Christianity, of the central claim that Jesus was God's emmisary on earth, I fail to see how one could argue that it is necessary for God to 'break natural laws' in order to reveal himself through a concrete historical figure. Why could Jesus not have the special status of being God's messenger without also being a 'miracle-man'?

In sum, it seems that, if one is to be a theist in any sense that involves revelation, it is necessary to hold at least some minimal number of beliefs about history although it is not necessary to hold to any which belong to the category 'scientifically impossible'.

Before leaving this topic, it should be noted that MacIntyre also gives explicit consideration to the role of historical facts in religious beliefs. He attempts to establish a conclusion which is neither as 'extreme' as Ferré's nor quite as straightforward as that which I have just reached. Since, he says, one is dealing with historical events, it would seem that they should be justified by historical inquiry and until such inquiry is completed we would be dealing with hypotheses. Also, of course, if such an inquiry were "successful, part at least of our belief would have been converted into an objectively justified doctrine" ([39], p. 206).

Such a conclusion would run counter to MacIntyre's whole point, however, and he therefore undertakes to show that it is mistaken.

> What I want to suggest is that everything of historical importance to religious faith is outside the reach of historical investigation. That, for instance, in asking whether the Resurrection happened we are not in fact asking a question which future historical investigation might settle is apparent if we consider how any evidence that might be discovered would be assessed (ibid.).

If a document alleging the resurrection to have occurred were discovered, the skeptic could claim it to be a forgery. If a document claiming it did not occur were discovered, the believer would treat this as a forgery.

But even supposing one grants that belief in Jesus arising from the dead after three days may be proven by historical evidence, this would not conclusively decide the question of the resurrection. "Christians certainly believe that Jesus died and left the tomb three days later, but this is only part of the belief that God raised Jesus from the dead. To the reference to an act of God historical inquiry is irrelevant" (p. 207). Arising from the dead is only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for the resurrection.

But, it will be replied, if this is a necessary condition, and it is a historical event, then historical inquiry is relevant. But MacIntyre will not grant even this. For 'historical event' may have one of two meanings: It may mean "event to be investigated by historians," or it may mean "past event." Now ordinarily if the latter sense is meant, the former is also appropriate. In fact, belief in the occurrence of a past event usually is reasonable only if historical inquiry warrants such belief.

> But the essence of the New Testament claim, as we have seen, is that certain past events can be part of a religious belief, that is that they can be believed in on authority. And this means that while historical inquiry as to such events would always be legitimate, its results are not the ground of belief in any way. That this is so can be understood by considering again the nature of religious belief. Since a belief in an historical event is always a factual belief, it is always provisional in the sense that new evidence as to the facts could always turn up. But religious faith, as we have already argued, is never provisional (p. 207).

Hence, as part of religious faith, such historical statements can never be held in a provisional manner, and therefore cannot be subject to historical inquiry, since the latter would necessitate holding them in such a provisional manner.*

This seems to me to be an extraordinarily odd argument. He is disagreeing with Ferré in that he is claiming that historical facts ('past events',even 'supernatural' ones) are crucial for Christianity, but, like Ferré, he wishes to escape the conclusion that Christian faith is therefore dependent upon historical investigation.

The best that can be said about this argument is that it is unconvincing. Actually, what it seems to be is a serious mis-use of what I shall call the manner-content argument. That argument is of the form, "because a statement is of a certain logical type (e.g., a scientific hypothesis) it should be held in a certain way (e.g., 'provisionally')? But here MacIntyre abandons such argument and simply lays it down as a rule that historical statements which relate to religion are not subject to historical investigation even though their 'type' dictates that they are.* Therefore, one must conclude that MacIntyre has not established his point.**

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* MacIntyre goes on, however, to reiterate that this does not mean that belief in the Resurrection is not a belief about history. To claim that it is not would be to "use old words to introduce a completely new belief" (p. 208).

I have, then, in general been disagreeing with our authors concerning the necessity of historical beliefs for religious faith. But their claims on this subject are not unrelated to their more general claims which shall be the primary concern of this essay. We shall have to consider,*** therefore, whether or not their failure to establish the point concerning historical beliefs is a serious failure in terms of their overall positions.

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We can sum up the last few pages of discussion as follows:

(i) No particular belief must, analytically, be held if a person is to be properly described as a 'Christian'. This is because Christianity is a multiple-criteria concept.

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* It might be said that they are of a type to be held 'absolutely' and in the absence of evidence, i.e. of the type 'religious', But this is nonsense. The point of the manner-content argument is to show that religious statements belong to other groups of statements which it is appropriate to hold in a certain way. Just to say 'P' is a religious statement is to beg the question, for that could be said of everything from tautologies through unevidenced theories to self-contradictions.

** On the other hand, there seems to be, in the first part of MacIntyre's argument (above, p. 25) a hint of the point we granted was important (above, pp.10-11); i.e., the historical beliefs of Christianity do have a somewhat peculiar status in that their acceptance is so intimately connected with other beliefs, attitudes, etc. that they cannot be seen (by the believer) as depending purely upon historical evidence.

*** Ch. VI, below.

(ii) Nonetheless, if an individual rejects too many of the traditional tenets of Christianity, it would be proper to deny that he is a Christian. Such a conclusion must be the result of a *decision*, a decision concerning how misleading it would be if this person were to be described as a Christian.

(iii) The basic practices, attitudes, etc. of a religion would appear to be *pointless* were they not believed to be somehow appropriate to the 'ultimate constitution of things'.

(iv) Any religion which purports to be based on revelation (any religion which is not entirely knowable to reason) requires certain beliefs about particular historical facts (and, therefore, research, according to the standards of historical inquiry, is relevant to its truth).

* * * * *

This leaves us with the problems which will be the dominant themes of the following chapters: If metaphysical beliefs are necessary to theism, (a) what grounds are there for thinking that these purported metaphysical 'beliefs' can be meaningful?* (b) assuming that they *are meaningful*, how might one argue that it is intellectually respectable to accept them?

In general, the answer that we shall see given to these questions will be that (a) the positivists have given a criterion of meaning that is so restrictive that even the central contentions of science would be meaningless,** and (b) while basic religious assertions may not be 'justifiable', i.e. supportable by evidence, they are equally not subject to refutation by evidence, and they share these characteristics with the basic assertions of other disciplines (in particular, science and philosophy). As a result, it is said, one must choose a position which, while not being 'provable', is nonetheless intellectually respectable.* Or, to use Hick's very neat formulation: "Religious faith...is a state which it is rational to be in, but which philosophical reasoning cannot put one in".**

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* i.e. In what ways might the challenge of the positivists be overcome?

** Put in this way, the point may sound trivial since it is so well known that any statement of the universal form is not verifiable, and hence, all of the laws of science would be meaningless (cf. C. G. Hempel, "Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning" [33], *Semantics and the Philosophy of Language*, Leonard Linsky [55]). The argument (a) (above), however, will not be that one; rather it will be claimed that the positivists radically misconstrued the nature of science from the very outset.

Such a way of construing religious faith is, of course, by no means original with twentieth century philosophers and theologians. However, it can, I think, be said that there are means available today for developing the sort of argument in a stronger way than it could have been expected to be developed in the past. Unfortunately, though, none of the contemporary thinkers with whom I am acquainted takes full advantage of the means which are available to them.

In attempting to show how this general type of argument may be developed in a stronger form than it has been developed in previously, I shall first consider William James and Søren Kierkegaard, each of whom seems to be, in his own way, a precursor of the contemporary thinkers, and who, in fact, present stronger cases than many of our contemporaries.

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* Again, the point is very greatly over-simplified for the sake of brevity.

** "To Believe or Not to Believe" [37], Saturday Review, Feb. 6, 1965, pp. 39-40.

I shall turn next to recent arguments which clearly are not adequate to establish the points in question and attempt to show just where they fail. Part of the reason for this failure, as we shall see, is the fact that they do not take into account recent discussions of the nature of science and of philosophy. Therefore, Chapter IV will be devoted to an exposition of such recent discussions, and, with these in mind, we shall turn to a discussion of the most plausible arguments for the general point we have just seen Hick stating. We shall see, however, that even these most plausible arguments require emending (and thereby strengthening) in terms of the account of the nature of science and of philosophy in Chapter IV.

Finally (Chapter VI), we shall consider some possible objections to the arguments of the philosopher-theologians discussed earlier and see what answers they might give to such objections. In conclusion, I shall attempt to sketch the lines along which I believe the argument could be profitably continued.

CHAPTER II

Precursors: James and Kierkegaard

Before encountering the contemporary religious philosophers who shall be our primary concern, it will be well to consider two earlier writers whose thought is particularly pertinent to that of the later ones. To conjoin these two, Søren Kierkegaard and William James, may appear strange: 'the father of existentialism' and an early pragmatist certainly might be expected to have little in common. Nonetheless, there are interesting parallels in their work as well as great differences. Both the parallels and the differences will prove instructive when we deal with MacIntyre, Hick, et.al.

> A shipowner was about to send to sea an emigrant-ship. He knew that she was old, and not over-well built at the first; that she had seen many seas and climes, and often had needed repairs. Doubts had been suggested to him that possibly she was not seaworthy. These doubts preyed upon his mind, and made him unhappy; he thought that perhaps he ought to have her thoroughly overhauled and refitted, even though this should put him to great expense. Before the ship sailed, however, he succeeded in overcoming these melancholy reflections. He said to himself that she had gone safely through so many voyages and weathered so many storms that it was idle to suppose she would not come safely home from this trip also. He would put his trust in Providence, which could hardly fail to protect all these unhappy families that were leaving their fatherland to seek for better times elsewhere. He would dismiss from his mind all ungenerous suspicions about the honesty of builders and contractors. In such ways he acquired a sincere and comfortable conviction that his vessel was thoroughly safe and seaworthy; he watched her departure with a light heart, and benevolent wishes for the success of the exiles in their strange new home that was to be; and he got his insurance-money when she went down in mid-ocean and told no tales.

Thus Clifford begins his essay, "The Ethics of Belief ([12], p. 201).* The moral he draws from this story is that the shipowner is guilty of the death of the passengers. Even though by the time the ship went to sea he "sincerely believed" that the ship was sound, "*he had no right to believe on such evidence as was before him*" (p. 202). He lacked this right because "he had acquired his belief not by honestly earning it in patient investigation, but by stifling his doubts" (*ibid.*).

But suppose the ship had not sunk,, but rather had completed that mission and many more. "Will that diminish the guilt of the owner? Not one jot. When an action is once done, it is right or wrong forever; no accidental failure of its good or evil fruits can possibly alter that...The question of right or wrong has to do with the origin of his belief, not the matter of it; ...whether he had a right to believe on such evidence as was before him" (*ibid.*). The accidental fact that what a person believes turns out to be true does nothing to exonerate him from the blame for believing what he had no right to believe at all, i.e. that which was not supported by 'sufficient' evidence (p. 206).**

So far, Clifford has argued that if a person believes in spite of the absence of evidence in a case in which there clearly *could be* evidence, then he is not only being irrational, but is morally blameable for his belief. But Clifford wishes to go further than this. He goes on to say that, even in a case in which there *could be* no evidence, for or against the proposition* one has a duty to refrain from believing. "The goodness and greatness of a man do not justify us in accepting a belief upon the warrant of his authority, unless there are reasonable grounds for supposing he knew the truth of what he was saying. And there can be no grounds for supposing that a man knows that which we, without ceasing to be men, could not be supposed to verify" (p. 212). While the particular reference here is to the acceptance of beliefs on the grounds of the authority of other men, the point is clearly more general: That which *no man* could possibly have grounds for accepting or rejecting should not be accepted. Positive reasons are required if we are to have a *right* to believe in the truth of any proposition.

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* In *Religion from Tolstoy to Camus*, Walter Kaufmann [48]. References to James' "The Will to Believe" [46] are from the same volume. The latter is reprinted in many books but only (to my knowledge) together with Clifford's work in the Kaufmann anthology.

** Cf. Roderick Chisholm, *Perceiving: A Philosophical Study* [11], e.g., pp. 6-8. Just as,in a practical

The sum total of Clifford's essay, then, is: One has a right to believe *only* that which one can give good reasons *for* believing. If reasons are unknown to one, *or* if reasons are

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ethical situation, one must do what *seems to be* the best action (and, hence, one's 'absolute' duty), in a practical 'epistemic' situation he must believe what *seems to be* true. In either case, what one *ought* to do depends not on what *is* the case but on what one has *adequate reason* to believe to be the case.

*At this point, it might be objected that there are no such *genuine* propositions. But, while there is plausibility in this objection, one of the major themes of this essay is that there *are* such propositions, i.e., propositions which are meaningful although not verifiable or falsifiable in any ordinary sense.

impossible by the nature of the case, one has no right either to believe or disbelieve.

It is against this position that James argues. He presents an essay "in justification of faith, a defense of our right to adopt *a* believing attitude in religious matters, in spite of the fact that our merely logical intellect may not have been coerced" ([46], 221).

James presents two* distinguishable arguments to show that we *ought* to believe even if evidence is lacking. First, he says that there are cases "*where faith in a fact can help create the fact*," and in such cases "that would be an insane logic which should say that faith running ahead of scientific evidence is the 'lowest kind of immorality' into which a thinking being can fall" (pp. 234-5). For instance, the man who gains promotions is the man who believes he will be promoted, the man who comes to be loved by the girl is the persistent man who believes she *must* love him. One could add: the man who recovers from cancer is the man who *believes* he will recover, the man who is successful in jumping across a ditch is the man who believes he will be successful with his jump (Kaufmann [47], p. 84), the man who walks the tightrope is he who *believes* he can walk the tightrope.** So faith in the fact helps create the fact; *not* to believe would prevent the fact from coming about. Here James may be correct that only an 'insane logic' would demand one not believe.*

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* At least two. cf. below, p.49ff. for a third argument that seems to be present in James' essay.

** John Hick, *Faith and Knowledge* [38], p. 49.

But what does this have to do with 'the religious hypothesis'? This case seems to be in a different class, and, indeed, it is. "But while James's doctrine of creative faith is thus far well founded,...it is relevant to beliefs about matters which depend wholly or partly upon processes governed by ourselves" (Hick, p. 51). But the existence of God, indeed, any fact which is not concerned just with what the believer is capable of doing, cannot be brought about in this way. Kaufmann makes a similar point: James "blurs the distinction between facts which my belief could at least conceivably bring about -- e.g., that a girl reciprocates my love -- and facts which no belief could help to bring about if they were not facts to begin with-- e.g., that God exists or that Jesus was resurrected on the third day" (p. 86). It seems then that this argument is quite irrelevant to justification of faith in God.

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* I say 'may be' because I am not certain that it is indeed correct. Kaufmann objects to James' point in this way: "It is not even true...that to succeed one must believe one will succeed...What is decisive is not that you believe you will succeed but that you should give it all you have...What matters is not faith but effort; and that effort without faith that we shall succeed is either psychologically impossible or doomed to failure, while faith spells success, that is a myth which most Americans believe--without sufficient evidence" (p. 84). James, of course, may not have been claiming that faith that one will succeed is a necessary condition for success (as Kaufmann seems to imply). The point that Kaufmann is making might, though, be put as follows: "If the chances are that one will not succeed, then he should not believe that he will succeed. Rather, he should just try to do his very best. In this case, he will do his best, and he will or will not succeed depending upon his abilities." Whether James or Kaufmann is correct finally comes down to the psychological question: "Will one perform better if he believes that his performance will be successful?" This question is one that I do not claim to know the answer to; nor is an answer to it important for the purposes of this essay.

While Hick's and Kaufmann's criticism is certainly correct, it may be that James realized that the truth of a fact such as "God exists" is not affected by anyone's belief and that he had a slightly different point in mind. He later says that for the religious believer, "the universe is no longer a mere It..., but a thou..." (p. 236). That is, a sort of personal relationship is involved. But we all know that in some cases personal relationships require reciprocal action, i.e. each 'party' must make advances in order to consumate the relationship. This means that an initial faith is required if we are to succeed in seeing the universe as thou.

> We feel...as if the appeal of religion to us were made to our own active good-will, as if the evidence might be forever withheld from us unless we met the hypothesis half-way...This feeling, forced on us ~~we~~ know not whence, that by obstinately believing that there are gods...we are doing the universe the deepest service we can, seems parts of the living essence of the religious hypothesis. If the hypothesis were true in all its parts, including this one, then pure intellectualism, with its veto on our making willing advances, would be an absurdity; and some participation of our sympathetic nature would be logically required...A rule of thinking which would absolutely prevent me from acknowledging certain kinds of truth if those kinds of truth were really there, would be an irrational rule (pp. 236-7).

Hence, James' point is not that our faith 'creates the fact' but that our faith is a necessary precondition of our knowledge *of* the fact (and so his own analogy was simply misleading).*

James' main argument for his position, however, is that *genuine* options are properly decided by our 'passional nature' (cf. quote above, from p. 227). In his argument for this view, James is, I believe, somewhat more subtle than his critics generally give him credit for being. He begins by distinguishing *hypotheses* ("anything that may be proposed to our belief" [p. 222]) as *living* or *dead*. A live hypotheses is one which "appeals as a real possibility to him to whom it is proposed" (*ibid*.). Clearly, this means that whether an hypothesis is alive or dead depends on to whom it is proposed.

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* Hick criticizes this argument as follows: "But while this consideration, drawn from the character of the "I-thou" world, is both sound and important, it adds little to James' 'right to believe' argument. It merely underlines the fact that *if the theistic hypothesis* thus makes our loss more certain if theism should 'win' without our having backed it. It does not, however, increase the odds in favor of that hypothesis. The argument from the nature of personal relationship is important for the neighboring topic of faith as trust (*fiducia*), but not for that of faith as cognition (*fides*)" (p. 55).

The logic of this completely escapes me. It is of course true that this consideration does not change the 'odds', but it is not intended to do so. Rather, it is an independent argument to show the reasonableness of having faith.

Nor can I see why the argument is relevant only to faith as *fiducia*. James clearly means that from this faith comes knowledge in the form of acquaintance with 'religious realities'. But from such acquaintance comes propositional truth. Hence, Hick's point seems to be of little value.

To one person an hypothesis may be alive while to another it may be dead.

If one is faced with a choice between two hypotheses, it will be said that he has an *option*. Options may be: (1) living or dead (both hypotheses must be life if the option is to be live); (2) forced or avoidable (cf. below); (3) momentous or trivial (a momentous option is one in which one if offered a unique opportunity, i.e. an opportunity which must be embraced 'now or never'). If all three conditions obtain, James chooses to call it a *genuine* option.*

The notion of a *forced* option must be considered at greater length than those explained in the parenthetical clauses above. James initially explicates this as follows:

> If I say to you: "Choose between going out with your umbrella or without it," I do not offer you a genuine option, for it is not forced. You can easily avoid it by not going out at all. Similarly, if I say, "Either call my theory true or call it false," your option is avoidable. You may remain indifferent to me, neither loving or hating, and you may decline to offer any judgment as to my theory. But if I say, "Either accept this truth or go without it," I put you on a forced option, for there is no standing place outside of the alternative. Every dilemma based on a complete logical disjunction, with no possibility of not choosing, is an option of this forced kind (p. 222).

So stated, this supposed distinction between options that are and are not forced is untenable. However, we must avoid discussion of it temporarily. We shall return to it shortly.

James' critics often fail to take account of all of these restrictions. Both Kaufmann and Hick castigate James for providing only "an impressive recommendation of 'wishful thinking'" (Hick, p. 57; cf. Kaufmann, p. 83). But these judgments are based at least partially on a misinterpretation of James. "He is asserting...our right to believe at our own risk whatever we feel an inner need to believe" (Hick, p. 53). "It authorizes us to believe ('by faith') any proposition, not demonstratably false, which it might be advantageous to us, in this world or another, to have accepted" (p. 56). Kaufmann pays more attention to the restrictions on 'free choice', but he says that by the last section James himself seems to have forgotten about his restrictions! "We are no longer /In Section X/ limited to cases which are by their nature undecidable...but may believe in all cases where decision is difficult" (p. 85). Kaufmann is undoubtedly correct in saying that James (at best) hedges on what he means by an intellectually undecidable option (cf. below), but for the moment we must concentrate on the more general charge that James is guilty of 'wishful thinking'. This will involve first, a careful consideration of his arguments directed against Clifford and second, discussion of each of his four restrictions.

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* Having explained what he means by a 'genuine' option, James goes on to discuss an obvious objection: It will be said that a person cannot (psychologically) believe 'at will'. But, James says, it is *not* impossible to believe what one *decides* to believe. It is only 'dead' hypotheses which cannot be believed in this way. (p. 225). For further defense of the view that our 'willing nature' may play a crucial role in our beliefs, cf. Kaufmann, p. 122, and H. H. Price, "Belief and Will" [69], PAS Supplementary Vol., 1954.

It should be emphasized that on almost any actual question James would agree with Clifford. As James explicitly states, "Whenever there is no forced option, the dispassionately judicial intellect with no pet hypothesis, saving us, as it does, from dupery at any rate, ought to be the ideal" (p. 233). He would surely agree with Clifford on such matters as that the ship owner is morally responsible for the death of the emmigrants.*

The only time in which they would disagree with one another is when a person is faced with an alternative which cannot be judged at all on intellectual grounds but which is a 'genuine option'. Clifford would say, suspend judgment; avoid error. James says, choose! Risk error on the chance you may be right. The difference here is essentially a moral one; it is not possible to 'prove' that one is right, the other wrong. James, therefore, resorts to persuasion to bring his reader to his point of view.

> Believe truth! Shun error! -- these, we see are two materially different laws...We may regard the chase for truth as paramount, and the avoidance of error as secondary; or we may, on the other hand, treat the avoidance of error as more imperative, and let truth take its chance. Clifford...exhorts us to the latter course. You, on the other hand, may think that the risk of being in error is a very small matter when compared with the blessings of real knowledge, and be ready to be duped many times in your investigation rather than postpone indefinitely the chance of guessing true.** I myself find it impossible to go with Clifford. We must remember that these feelings of our duty about either truth or error are in any case only expressions of our passional life...I have also a horror of being duped; but I can believe that worse things than being duped may happen to a man in this world: so Clifford's exhortation has to my ears a thoroughly fantastic sound. It is like a general informing his soldiers that it is better to keep out of battle

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* It should also be noted that there is nothing in James which would indicate that we should believe that which we have good reason to think is false. Hence, the following passage from Kaufmann is exceedingly puzzling. "James' appeal depends entirely on blurring the distinction between those who hold out for 100 per cent proof in a matter in which any reasonable person rests content with, let us say, 90 per cent, and those who refuse to indulge in a belief which is supported only by the argument that after all it could conceivably be true" (p. 83).

** If one 'guesses true', can he be said to have 'real knowledge'? We shall return to this in Chapter V.

> forever than to risk a single wound. Not so are victories either over enemies or over nature gained. Our errors are surely not such awfully solemn things. In a world where we are so certain to incur them in spite of all our caution, a certain lightness of heart seems healthier than this excessive nervousness on their behalf (pp. 230-1).

So James argues that it is 'courageous' to choose rather than to remain aloof. But one might argue the opposite: Surely, one may say, it is courageous to remain uncertain, rather than commit oneself to the easy or the pleasant; the man of courage, instead, will accept uncertainty. It is not at all clear how one could resolve such a dispute.* Instead of trying to do so, it would be better now to turn to James criteria restricting the situations in which it is permissable simply to choose even though evidence is lacking.

First, says James, an option must be 'live'. Both Kaufmann and Hick seem to think little of this. Each says he fails to see that the fact that one option may be live for me, another for a Chinese, has anything to do with the truth of that option.

> James tries to narrow our license for gratuitous belief to "live options", i.e., to propositions which we already have some inclination to adopt. But surely such a restriction in unwarranted. For whether or not a belief constitutes a "live option" to a particular mind has no bearing upon its truth or falsity. All sorts of accidental circumstances may predispose us toward a proposition; the mere fact that it is widely held in the society around us is often sufficient...But it would surely be

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* cf. Chisholm [11], pp. 100-101. "If [Clifford] were to say that no demonstration of skeptical consequences would invalidate his principle, our dispute would be like an ethical one and we would have difficulty in settling upon any method of resolving it."

> absurd to suppose that truth varies geographically with the liveliness of the local options (Hick, p. 56).

> One man's live option is another man's dead option: Roman Catholicism does not represent a live option for James...,but for millions it is a living issue. This first criterion can be rephrased in all fairness: the belief must tempt us.

> The second criterion is no less unhelpful (Kaufmann, p. 83).

But surely James was not such an idiot as to think that the fact that a belief tempts me (but not you) has anything to do with its truth. Rather, his entire argument has to do with what we have a right to believe, given that its truth is unknown. So he is not saying that the probability of a proposition is increased if it is live, he is saying only that our right to believe it is increased in such a case. (While this disarms the Hick-Kaufmann point, one may still wonder what James' point is worth. He says we cannot believe a dead hypothesis, so this restriction is not really a restriction at all.)

James exposition of the meaning of his next criterion i.e., the option must be forced, has already been given (above, p. 38). However, as he states it is not very satisfactory. For, as Kaufmann points out, "to satisfy [this] criterion..., all I need is a little skill in phrasing" (p. 83). That is, any option can be phrased in terms of one possibility and its contradictory, and there will be nothing 'outside' of this. However, we can make sense of a 'forced option' by considering the betting situation. If I say, "Either believe that there are cows on Mars or don't believe it," I am offering you a forced option in James' previously stated sense, but not one you would be inclined to take seriously. You 'have to choose' but having no reason to think that there are cows on Mars, you will feel free not to believe it, for nothing turns on your choice except the chance that you might, perchance, choose correctly. Suppose now I offer to make a bet with you, giving you very high odds, if you will bet that there are such cows. Obviously, you can walk away from this bet if you wish, although not so quickly as you could from the previous choice. But the bet on God is not even like this; if you are alive, you must make some bet here. Either you bet on God or you do not. What is 'forced' here is not just believing or not believing, but staking something (over and above the chance of gaining truth) on the outcome of this choice. Now, given that you have to wager (since abstention is itself a wager) it seems ridiculous not to place your stake on the side which promises the greater gain.*

It may be argued that James himself takes care of what I have just said; and, indeed, he does, albeit in a highly slipshod manner. His initial statement of what he means by a forced option is indeed vulnerable to Kaufmann's criticism. But he later gives other formulations which depend not on just a complete logical disjunction but on the necessity of betting one way or another.

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* The assumption here is, of course, that there is something, something very important, to be gained by betting on God. One might say that what is to be gained is 'eternal life' or some other reward which God might choose to bestow on those who believe in Him. Another possibility is that one will simply be a better person for his faith. The latter seems to be James' view (cf. p. 237n). This, in effect, means, that James is really giving his own version of 'the moral argument.'

> What difference, indeed, does it make to most of us whether we have or have not a theory of Röntgen rays, whether we believe or not in mind-stuff, or have a conviction about the causality of conscious states? It makes no difference. Such options are not forced on us. On every account it is better not make them, but still keep weighing reasons *pro et contra* with an indifferent hand (p. 232).

> We see, first, that religion offers itself as a momentous option. We are supposed to gain, even now, by our belief, and to lose by our non-belief, a certain vital good. Secondly, religion is a forced option, so far as that good goes. We cannot escape the issue by remaining skeptical and waiting for more light, because, although we do avoid error in that way if religion be untrue, we lose the good, if it be true, just as certainly as if we psoitively choose to disbelieve (p. 235).

These passages give a completely different view of what James means by a forced option. His initial statement (above p. 38) was simply a mistaken formulation of his own point, for according to that statement, it would put you on a forced option if I said, "Either accept this belief about Röntgen rays or go without it." But now (according to the first passage above) it seems this is not forced, because the answer one chooses will make little if any practical difference to our lives. (This, in effect, implicitly relies on the option being momentous to make it forced.)

The second passage (p. 235) gives still a different picture. It says, first, that the necessity of betting makes the option momentous (whereas above it made it forced), but then goes on to imply that its being forced depends on its being momentous (thus making explicit that the two criteria are not independent).

In either case, however, the result is the same: A genuine option is one in which there is a great practical result from answering either yes or no, and in which suspension of judgment has the same practical effect as one of the definite answers. This effectively disarms Kaufmann's criticism that any option whatsoever may be forced by "a little skill in phrasing."*

We must now turn to the last of James' criteria defining the situations in which a free choice of hypotheses is morally right. The option must be, in some sense, intellectually undecidable. We saw that Hick charges that James would allow us to believe any proposition we like, seemingly ignoring the criteria. Kaufmann makes a similar charge concerning the 'wishful thinking' aspect of James thought, but unlike Hick he backs this up from James' own words. In effect, he is questioning what James means by an 'intellectually undecidable' option.

> In Section IV of his essay, James had argued that "our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds"--and even used italics for these lines. But in the last section he maintains "in abstracto, that we have the right to believe at our own risk any hypothesis that is live enough to tempt our will," and adds: "In concreto, the freedom to believe can only cover living options which the

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* That is, Kaufmann is dead right in saying what he does against James' first formulation. But James' real point has nothing whatever to do with a 'complete logical disjunction'; rather what he has in mind is what might be called 'a complete betting disjunction.' The former is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the latter. "Either call religion true or call it false" is not a complete logical disjunction, but it is forced in James' 'real' sense. On the other hand, the Röntgen ray example is a complete logical disjunction but it is not forced.

> intellect of the individual cannot by itself resolve; and living options never seem absurdities to him who has them to consider." And he adds further that it would be queer and fantastic to suspend belief "till such a time as our intellect and senses working together may have raked in evidence enough." We are no longer limited to cases which are by their nature undecidable--and about which we surely have to ask what the proposition that tempts us means--but may believe in all cases where decision is difficult, even if it is only difficult for us (p. 85).

It might appear at first glance that Kaufmann is merely picking at happenstance vagaries in James' statements toward the end of his essay. But there is much more involved than this, for James never makes a legitimate effort to explain exactly what he does mean by 'intellectually undecidable'. Surely he cannot mean, as Kaufmann correctly points out he implies, that I may believe anything anytime the decision is intellectually difficult for me. For if he meant this, he *would* be giving a license for wishful thinking. Since I have *not yet* managed to collect sufficient evidence, I just believe whatever offers me the greater good. This would even justify Clifford's shipowner in believing the ship to be sound, since he really does not know whether it is safe or not, and by suspending belief and keeping the ship in port he would lose the good (in this case money) as surely as if he believed it to be faulty.*

The case we have just discussed involves an ordinary empirical hypothesis which happens to be difficult to decide in time. It is however decidable in principle. But there are other sorts of cases which are not just 'accidentally undecidable'. First, there are hypotheses about an afterlife. These are not absolutely undecidable, but they are so as long as we are alive. Yet the decision must be made while we are alive, assuming (as, e.g. Christianity generally does) that our situation in the 'next life' is thought to depend on our state of mind in this life.

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* One also needs to assume that there is no quick and easy way to find out whether the ship is safe, so that gathering further evicence would be a lengthy procedure which would cause his 'cargo' to defect to another ship.

Next, there are purely metaphysical hypotheses, i.e., those which could not be decided in this life or another. And finally, there are moral hypotheses, questions about how we ought to live our lives, about what attitudes we ought to take concerning our goals in life.

What sort of hypotheses does James have in mind? Can we perhaps tell by the examples he gives? First, as we have seen, he rejects opting for one scientific hypothesis over another, because the choice is not forced. He gives no hint that, if it were to be forced (as it is in the shipowner example), we should remain uncommitted. Second, moral questions must be decided by the will. "How can your pure intellect decide? If your heart does not want a world of moral reality, your head will assuredly never make you believe in one" (p. 233).*

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* It should be noticed that this third class of undecidable questions is the only class which James seems to regard as in principle undecidable, and also he clearly holds these not to be questions of fact. "Turn now from these wide questions of good to a certain class of questions of fact..." (p. 234).

Third, there is the previously discussed class of questions in which faith creates the fact. And fourth, there is 'the religious hypothesis'.

> Religion says essentially two things. First, she says that the best things are the more eternal things, the over-lapping things, the things in the universe that throw the last stone, so to speak, and say the final word...,which obviously cannot yet be verified scientifically at all.
>
> The second affirmation of religion is that we are better off even now if we believe her first affirmation to be true (p. 235).*

Certainly there are a variety of oddities about such a description of 'what religion says'. What religion ever claimed to be saying this? What would it even mean to say this? And what does James think the verifiability status of such statements are? "What are we to make of his concession that this affirmation 'cannot _yet_ be verified scientifically'?...One almost gets the feeling that a colleague is working on it even now in the next room, that verification is around the corner, and that we should be stupid if we did not take a chance on it without delay" (Kaufmann, p. 85).

Looking over these examples, then, it does _not_ seem that James had any intention of limiting the range of free decision to hypotheses which are in principle unverifiable.

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* In the light of this description of religion Hick's statement that it was "the Judaic -- Christian view of God as Creator (with which James was working)" (p. 51) is incomprehensible. Even when James talks of the _Thou_ aspect of religion, he is speaking not of a personal _God_ in the full-blown sense, but of the Universe as _Thou_ (p. 236). When the word 'god' is used it is _invariably_ in the plural form (e.g. p. 236).

Even his religious hypothesis he seems to consider as being in principle verifiable.

The importance of this is obvious. The essentially moral question concerning what we may or may not believe may well take on different aspects depending on whether a hypothesis is completely unverifiable or only unverifiable in time to make a decision. We shall return to this question in a later chapter (Ch. VI).*

Hick also has a further criticism, this time from the theological rather than philosophical viewpoint. In effect, he says that the upshot of James view is too much like that of the prudent gambler to be religiously satisfactory. "The ordinary believer does not regard his faith as a prudent gamble. He regards it as in some sense knowledge of God...His attitude is thus entirely different from that of the gambler. For the latter is conscious that he is dealing in uncertainties, while the man of faith is convinced that he has met with certainty" (p.55). Such criticisms from the theological point of view cannot be taken lightly. This is another problem discussion of which must be temporarily postponed.

Finally, there is at least a hint of still another, a third, argument in James' essay. He defends his doctrine of the importance of our 'willing nature' to belief first by pointing out that we *do in fact* believe many things for less than logically adequate reasons.

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* This is one of the most important questions that will concern us throughout this essay; i.e., just how are we to delineate the class of questions which may, reasonably, be decided by the will?

> Our belief in truth itself, for instance, that there is a truth, and that our minds and it are made for each other, what is it but a passionate affirmation of desire...? But if a pyrrhonistic sceptic asks us *how we know* all this, can our logic find a reply? No! Certainly it cannot...Evidently, then, our non-intellectual nature does influence our convictions (pp. 226-7).

> Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circumstances, "Do not decide, but leave the question open," is itself a passional decision,--just like deciding yes or no,--and is attended with the same risk of losing truth (p. 227).

> We must remember that these feelings of our duty about either truth or error are in any case only expressions of our passional life... (p. 231).

In these passages, James is saying: "You say that I am immoral for believing in the absence of coercive evidence. But you *do the same*. Such beliefs are unavoidable. Actually, the very 'fact' that I should not believe is not warrantable evidentially. Hence, you cannot criticize me for doing what you yourself do."*

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* That is, if such faith is 'all right' in one area of knowledge, then it must be all right in all areas. Those who claim otherwise are being 'arbitrary'. "The necessity of faith as an ingredient in our mental attitude is strongly insisted on by the scientific philosophers of the present day; but by a singularly arbitrary caprice they say that it is only legitimate when used in the interest of one particular proposition--the proposition, namely, that the course of nature is uniform" ("The Sentiment of Rationality" [45], in *Essays in Pragmatism*, William James).

It should be clear that this argument is quite different from the previous two. It need have nothing to do with belief being 'necessary' for knowledge; nor need it depend on prudential factors, This form of argument will be one of our primary concerns.

We shall now turn to an exposition of Kierkegaard, and then we can sum up both James and Kierkegaard and draw comparisons between them.

The most important point that Kierkegaard and James have in common is that both hold that religion is beyond the realm of straightforward rational verification and therefore must be accepted by means of _choice_. Beyond this, however, they diverge widely.

In particular, James was attempting to show that it is in some sense rational to believe by free choice. The choice that Kierkegaard advocates is one that flies in the face of 'mere reason'. In fact, Kierkegaard's* over-all position can be fairly characterized as the logical extreme of the often-met view that Christianity is not subject to the criticisms of reason at all. Rather, it is purely a matter of faith.

The title page of _Philosophical Fragments_ asks the following questions: "Is an historical point of departure possible for an eternal consciousness; how can such a point of departure have any other than a mere historical interest; is it possible to base an eternal happiness upon historical knowledge?" Chapter One then proposes "A Project of Thought." This project is to consider what must be the case if the answer to these questions is to be yes.

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* The present discussion of Søren Kierkegaard is in no way meant to do justice to the many facets of his thought. Rather, it is restricted to the _Philosophical Fragments_ [51], the work which is most relevant to our theme.

The chapter begins with another, but related, question--"How far does the truth admit of being learned?" This was Socrates' question, the difficulty being that one cannot seek for what he knows, nor can he seek for what he does not know. Socrates' answer was that in a sense one does know all the time.

> Inquiry is interpreted as a kind of remembering; one who is ignorant needs only a reminder to help him come to himself in the consciousness of what he knows. Thus the Truth is now introduced into the individual from without, but was within him (p. 5).

This truth which was within man all the time requires only a 'prod' to bring it to the surface. Hence, the dilemma is resolved. Learning is not a matter of seeking what one already knows (since the known has not yet been recollected), but nor is it a matter of seeking what one is absolutely ignorant of (and thus cannot be sought and would not be recognized were it to be stumbled upon). Rather, coming to know is a matter of recollecting, and since it was previously known, it will be recognized as truth.

But notice the consequences of this doctrine: First, the role of the teacher is that of mid-wife. His job is only to bring out what was already present in the learner. Second, "from the standpoint of Socratic thought every point of departure in time is _eo ipso_ accidental, an occassion, a vanishing moment. The teacher himself is no more than this" (p. 6). Both the teacher (as mid-wife) and the moment in time *could have been otherwise*-- that something was learned as a result of this teacher's words on a certain occasion is accidental. The same thing could have been learned from another teacher at a different time, since the truth was within the learner all the time.

It follows, third, that "each individual is his own center, and the entire world centers on him."

> It was thus Socrates understood himself. He had the courage and self-possession to be sufficient unto himself, but also in his relations to his fellowmen to be merely an occasion... For... no human being was ever truly an authority for another... With this understanding of what it means to learn the truth, the fact that I have been instructed by Socrates or by Prodicus or by a servant-girl, concerns me only historically (p. 7).

This self-sufficiency of the individual, then, means that I owe nothing to my teacher, this teacher and that moment were 'accidents'. "My relation to Socrates or Prodicus cannot concern me with respect to my eternal happiness, for this is given me retrogressively through my possession of Truth, which I had from the beginning without knowing it" (p. 8). Truth was within me all the time, so I am not eternally indebted to *this* teacher; another could have done the same thing; theoretically, I might even have come to realize the truth without any teacher other than myself.

It is with the Socratic point of view that Kierkegaard wishes to contrast another, a radically different point of view. But, it might be asked, what is the point of contrasting *any* view with this? After all, no one now believes that knowledge is recollection.

This is true, but beside the point. For any view of knowledge which holds that the individual can learn the truth through his own efforts will have the three results given above. We claim to know whatever we claim to know because our criteria of knowledge of this or that sort of fact are satisfied. That the criteria are satisfied is something we may find out from any one of a number of teachers at virtually any time. In sum, we are self-sufficient in Kierkegaard's sense whether we recollect truth or learn it by using our reason. In either case we can, with sufficient effort come to know the truth, on our own.*

Now Kierkegaard can turn to the alternative:

> Now if things are to be otherwise, the moment in time must have a decisive significance, so that I will never be able to forget it either in time or eternity; because the eternal, which hitherto did not exist, came into being in this moment. Under this presupposition let us now proceed to consider the consequences for the problem of how far it is possible to acquire a Knowledge of the Truth (p. 8).

The question, then, most simply, is: What are the necessary conditions of knowledge if the moment is to be of decisive significance?

The first condition is that the learner must be positively in Error, i.e. he must not in any sense be in possession of the Truth; he must be incapable of learning it on his own, or even of being aware that he is lacking it. "He cannot even have possessed it in the form of ignorance, for in that case the moment becomes merely occasional" (p. 9). The potentiality, the ability, of learning the Truth must be completely absent.

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* If one asks how we know our criteria are correct, we may eventually have to fall back on intuition. This is not totally unlike recollection. The point remains. It is our faculty of intuition. So we are self-sufficient and essentially owe nothing to the teacher.

Because the state of the pupil is different, the Teacher must also be of a vastly different nature. He cannot be merely the mid-wife, the occasion of the learner coming to know the Truth. For now the learner lacks even the condition (the ability) for learning the truth. Hence, if he is to acquire the condition, the teacher must supply it. It is this that makes the teacher much more than a Socratic teacher, more than a mere occasion. Further, it makes the teacher more than a teacher in any sense.

> All instruction depends upon the presence, in the last analysis, of the requisite condition; if this is lacking, no teacher can do anything. For otherwise he would find it necessary not only to transform the learner, but to re-create him from the beginning to teach him. But this is something that no human being can do; if it is to be done, it must be done by God Himself (p. 10).

> The teacher is then God himself, who in acting as an occasion prompts the learner to recall that he is in Error, and that by reason of his own guilt. But this state, the being in Error by reason of one's own guilt, what shall we call it. Let us call it Sin (ibid.).

How is one to escape from such a state of Sin? Since he lacks the condition, this must be given him by the teacher. "What shall we call such a Teacher, one who restores the lost condition and gives the learner the Truth? Let us call him Savior, for he saves the learner from his bondage and from himself..." (p. 12).

This teacher, who is so much more than a teacher, "the learner will never be able to forget." This teacher, unlike the Socratic teacher, is crucial; he gives the learner what the learner could not possibly have gained without him.

> And now the moment. Such a moment has a peculiar character. It is brief and temporal indeed, like every moment; it is transient as all moments are; it is past, like every moment in the next moment. And yet it is decisive, and filled with the eternal. Such a moment ought to have a distinctive name; let us call it the Fullness of Time (p. 13).

Such a being who receives the condition and the Truth may be called a new creature. The change in him shall be called conversion. The grief which results as a consequence of his former guilt shall be called Repentance.

* * * * *

What is the point of this 'project of thought?' The point is that Kierkegaard has developed what must be the case if the moment is to be of decisive significance. He has, in short, given an a priori derivation of the basic concepts of Christianity (without once mentioning Christianity). And what is it to say that the moment is of decisive significance? This is simply to say that truth cannot be known through our reasoning ability, but must come through a decisive event, the moment, the moment of revelation.

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Continuing, then, with the exposition, Kierkegaard has said that such a teacher is to be called God. Starting from this point, he asks how God could teach. His answer is that God must be incarnated--that this is the only way He could be an adequate teacher. For what God wants to teach man is, essentially Himself; He wants man to come to know Him, to love Him and to worship Him.

God could, of course, accomplish this very simply. He could use his omnipotence to bring about the love of mankind. Such a love would be a result of show, perhaps of fright, and would not be love for another being in any real sense. At best, it would be a fearful worship. In order to gain the love of man, in the requisite manner, God, then, must become a man, must be on the same level as a man. Otherwise the difference is too great to admit of a genuine 'relationship'.*

Therefore, God enters into the level of man. Does he become like a man? No, for to avoid all deception, (which would destroy the possibility of genuine love), God must become not like man but a man! Only thus can he adequately bring about conversion. So we are confronted now with the paradox, a being who is both wholly human and wholly God. This is the only way in which God could make himself loved, and therefore redeem man.

But why should we believe this to have happened? Kierkegaard's answer is that he has not said it has happened. He has only spelled out the consequences of the moment being of decisive significance, of 'getting beyond Socrates', of the possibility of truth by revelation. In sum, then, this is the way it must be *if* we are to know the Truth by revelation; but why *should* we have to rely on revelation? The answer to this, in brief, is that the proofs of the existence of God are failures. It is not possible to derive actual existence from a formal argument (Ch. III).* Existence is only arrived at by means of a *leap* (p. 34); but a leap means that proof is not given.

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* This 'story' is told by means of the analogy with "the king who loved a humble maiden." The analogy breaks down, however, precisely at the point that in the case of God the "servant form is no mere outer garment, like the king's beggar-cloak, which therefore flutters loosely about him and betrays the king... It is his true form and figure. For this is the unfathomable nature of love, that it desires equality with the beloved, not in jest merely but in earnest and truth" (pp. 24-5).

A proper understanding of a revealed religion, then, involves understanding that it is impossible to understand, that one is, at every turn, confronted with paradox. The absolutely unlike became like (God became man) in order to reveal to man the absolute unlikeness between God and man. Nothing could be more paradoxical.

The absolute inability of reason to understand leads Kierkegaard to his characterization of faith. Faith can only be understood through the limitations and the pretensions of reason. "It is... the supreme passion of the Reason to seek a collision, though this collision must in one way or

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*Basically, in this chapter, Kierkegaard develops, in his own peculiar manner, the Kantian arguments that it is impossible to prove the existence of God. In addition to the impossibility of proving 'real existence' from 'mere concepts' there is a further general reason for the *necessary* failure of the proofs: they are an attempt to demonstrate that God exists, but what is God? God is simply the unknown. A proof must say something about God, and insofar as it does, God ceases to be the unknown. Anything comprehensible we say about God will in some way limit him, and a limited god is not God. "No specific determination of difference may be held fast," for (if one does this) "it is essentially an arbitrary act, and deepest down in the heart of piety lurks the mad caprice which knows that it has itself produced its God" (pp. 36, 35-6) (cf. J. N. Findlay, "Can God's Existence be Disproved?" [21], C. B. Martin, "The Perfect Good" [61], and B. Williams, "Tertullian's Paradox" [90], in *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*, A. Flew and A. MacIntyre (eds.) [24]). As a result, any attempt to *know* God, to understand Him, is sinful (p. 37).

another prove its undoing" (p. 29). Reason destroys itself, for "the Reason, in attempting to determine the Unknown as the unlike, at last goes astray, and confounds the unlike with the like" (p. 36). "Reason in its paradoxical passion, precisely desires its own downfall" (p. 38). That is, reason persists in attempting to push on to places where it cannot go; reaching these, it falls into error, attempting to comprehend that which it cannot comprehend.

In this way a collision between reason and the Paradox comes about. The question is: What is the result of the collision to be?

> If the Paradox and the Reason come together in a mutual understanding of their unlikeness their encounter will be happy, like love's understanding, happy in the passion to which we have not yet assigned a name... If the encounter is not in understanding the relationship becomes unhappy, and this unhappy love of Reason if I may so call it... may be characterized more specifically as Offence. (p. 39).
>
> But how does the learner come to realize an understanding with this Paradox? We do not ask that he understand the Paradox, but only that this is the Paradox. [This results in] that happy passion to which we shall now assign a name... We shall call this passion Faith (p. 47).

There are then two aspects of (or reactions to) the clash between the Paradox and reason. The reason may simply take offense--"But that is absurd; it makes no sense." Or reason may "set itself aside"; "It is absurd, so far as I can see, but it is supposed to be. Perhaps this is ground where I should not tread."

The crucial part of the latter reaction is "but it is supposed to be." The Paradox 'knows' that it is absurd, so it is no objection to say that it is absurd.

> The Paradox has made the Reason absurd, [so] the regard of Reason is no reliable criterion (p. 41).
>
> The offended consciousness holds aloof from the Paradox and keeps to the probable, the Paradox being the most improbable of things... It is not the Reason that made this discovery; it merely snatches the words from the mouth of the Paradox, strange as this may seem; for the Paradox itself says: Comedies and romances and lies must needs be probable, but why should I be probable? (p. 42).
>
> The discovery that the Paradox is unreasonable was not made by the Reason; it was the Paradox that placed the Reason on the stool of wonderment and now replies: But why are you so astonished? It is precisely as you say, and the only wonder is that you regard it as an objection... (*ibid.*).
>
> When the Reason says that it cannot get the Paradox into its head, it was not the Reason that made the discovery but the Paradox, which is so paradoxical as to declare the Reason a blockhead and a dunce... All that the offended consciousness has to say about the Paradox it has learned from the Paradox, though it would like to pose as its discoverer, making use of an accoustic illusion (p. 42).*

If someone puts forth a hypothesis which he claims is a brilliant scientific theory, it is an objection to this theory to show that it has no empirical backing, in effect, that it is stupid. But if someone says, "Here is a stupid hypothesis which you should accept," it hardly seems an objection to say, "But that is a stupid hypothesis." The Paradox is here playing a brilliant game of 'one-up-manship'. Faith is the acceptance of of the Paradox as 'one-up'; Offense is the refusal to acdept the Paradox for what it is--to reject it as absurd, rather than accepting its avowed absurdity.

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* "While therefore the expressions in which offense proclaims itself, of whatever kind they may be, sound as if they came from elsewhere, even from the opposite direction, they are nevertheless echoings of the Paradox. This is what is called an acoustic illusion" (p. 40).

* * * * *

The primary similarity between James and Kierkegaard is that both maintain that religious belief is, in some fashion, beyond the realm of straightforward rational justification, that ultimately one either chooses to believe or not to believe. Evidence cannot be the deciding factor.

This, however, brings us to an important difference between the two: For James there is nothing _irrational_ about the choice which must be made; rationality, in the sense of "the merely logical intellect" cannot bring us to a conclusion, but it does leave the question open. No such choice _contradicts_ reason, although it may go beyond reason in that it leads to belief in propositions which cannot be shown to be probable. There is, however, a wider sense of reason in which the prudential bet which James advocates might be said to be rational.

For Kierkegaard, the situation is emphatically different. He sets up a situation in which the choice is not between alternatives which reason 'leaves open', but between reason _as a system_ and revelation _as a system_. As with James, reason cannot be expected to supply an answer, but, unlike James, Kierkegaard places reason itself in question. For James, reason has simply run up against questions it cannot answer; for Kierkegaard, reason cannot supply an answer because it is itself in question.*

Finally, both James and Kierkegaard bring up what I shall call the 'manner-content' argument. Each argues, although in completely different ways, that the content of certain beliefs makes certain modes of justification of those beliefs appropriate, other modes inappropriate. This in fact, might be said to be the entire point of Kierkegaard's 'thought project'. He is saying that the content of revelation makes revelation the only possible way in which we could come to know this revelation; i.e., if the content be true, we should have expected that the only way to come to be aware of this content is through revelation.

James gives an argument which is similar in structure, although quite different in particular. He gives this in his exposition of his first argument. If 'religion' is true, and thus if the universe is to be regarded as thou (which religion says it is), then one must begin with faith (which religion says it must). Hence, as for Kierkegaard, the manner of coming to know is what one would expect it to be if the content of the'knowledge' is indeed true.

This point, like so many of the others we have noticed in James and Kierkegaard, will come up again in the writers considered in the following chapters. In fact, it may be said, that the sum total of the thought of those discussed in the following chapters amounts to little more than refinements of the points made by Kierkegaard and James. This refinement, however, is essential, for, it must be admitted that many of the things which have been said so far stand in need of further development, if they are to be considered tenable (the manner-content argument, the notion of 'intellectually undecidable options', etc.). These will be among the problems in our next chapter.

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* That is, reason does supply an unequivocal answer, but revelation supplies a different answer, and one must bhoose between them.

CHAPTER III

Inadequate Attempts

In this chapter and in Ch. V we shall be discussing some contemporary writers each of whom, apparently in isolation one from another, has reached conclusions which are similar to those reached by the others and to those reached by Kierkegaard and James many years earlier. In the present chapter, we shall be concerned with three writers who put forth the weakest cases for the general position which all of these have in common. While their cases are the weakest, the questions they raise and the mistakes they make will prove illuminating for the more adequate attempts to be discussed in Chapter V.*

Theology, says W. A. Spurrier, begins with a premise, "God exists." But, we have no right to criticize the procedure of taking such a premise on faith, for

> how much of our everyday life is based upon assumptions which are neither facts nor criteria capable of proof! We assume that no accident will befall us today and so we make plans for the evening... Nobody can prove beforehand that a marriage will be happy, but millions get married on the premise that they can be happy... Thus, we live literally by faith. Nearly all decisions have

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* In general, in this chapter I shall argue that none of the writers considered makes a good case for his basic claims. I shall not be arguing that good cases cannot be made for those claims. In fact, in the following chapters I shall be discussing and defending more adequate versions of basically the same arguments considered herein.

> this basic element of faith in them... Any argument about whether man lives by faith or not is strictly an academic one. The only real argument is *which* faith will one adopt? (p.33)*

You cannot criticize theology for making a gratuitous assumption, since we all, *necessarily*, make such assumptions in our everyday life. "We cannot then, it is argued,... as social beings, or as practical men, throw dialectical stones at those who profess to live by faith. For in this respect we all dwell in equally brittle glass houses" (Hick [38], p. 67).

There are two obvious objections to this type of argument, however. First, it is simply not true that we 'have faith' that we shall live out the day if 'having faith' means adopting a gratuitous hypothesis. Rather, we make definite plans for the evening because the odds are very much in favor of our still being alive when evening comes. These plans are based on a very complicated (albeit 'subconscious') inductive inference involving such facts as: My health is good; I am not planning any mountain climbing for the afternoon ; the Mafia is not tracking me down; etc. In short, I simply have a rational belief (a belief clearly justifiable by inductive standards) that the future will hold certain things.

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* *A Guide to the Christian Faith* [79], p. 33. For references to others who have used this same basic argument, see Hick [38], pp. 67-8. Hick mentions Demos critically here; we shall discuss Demos later in this chapter and in a further chapter argue that Hick's own position is actually not so far from that of Demos.

It should be mentioned that Hick does not distinguish in these pages (pp. 66-69) between the view that science requires belief in hypotheses *not yet* substantiated by evidence and the quite different view that science requires belief in propositions which no evidence *could conceivably* count for or against. As a result, some of his counter-arguments are unclear.

The failure to distinguish these two views is also a fault of Spurrier. While I have seized on those passages in which he emphasizes that scientists accept *unevidenced* (as against unevidenceable) hypotheses, he earlier says that both science and philosophy accept first premises which are *necessarily* unevidenced (pp. 23-25). He does not seem to recognize that the two claims are quite different.

Nonetheless, "we do not know for sure that nothing will happen. And sometimes insurance statistics about accidents make our cocksure assumptions very tenuous indeed" (Spurrier, p. 33). This is true, but irrelevant. That I could conceivably be wrong in believing, and acting on, a certain proposition does nothing to undercut the basic distinction between a gratuitous assumption and a well-evidenced belief.

The second objection to such an analogy between 'everyday' and religious beliefs is that the former have a 'provisional' character not appropriate to the latter. As Hick says, "religious faith is absolute and implicit belief; the articles of a creed are no merely provisional assumptions" (p. 68). Is the belief that we shall be alive at night-fall a 'provisional belief'? In a sense, no, for we do not ordinarily doubt this or worry about the possibility that we shall not.

And yet, in another sense, it is provisional. Such a belief is not 'absolute and implicit'. For we do make wills and take out life insurance in order to guard against just such contingencies as unexpected death. Consider the fact that we would ordinarily not get on an airplane if we did not believe it would carry us safely to our destination. But 'one-flight-only' life insurance remains a brisk seller. Therefore, the analogy between 'everyday' and religious beliefs fails both logically and theologically.*

Spurrier, however, has another analogy designed to show that belief without evidence is respectable.

> Faith is not blind; it is precisely the opposite. It is an experience of some new truth, new insight, new meaning, which lights up other truths whose connection with others we could not see before.
>
> This type of discovery occurs even on the level of science. For example, medical science has long known of various bodily diseases such as tuberculosis, stomach ulcers, various infections. More recently, the science of psychiatry has discovered various mental illnesses. For a number of years, the diseases of the body and mind were known and treated separately. It was only through some new experiences and new experiments that the new knowledge was obtained. The discoverers of this new knowledge trusted these experiences as being significant and then went on in the faith and hope that analysis of these experiences might lead somewhere. It did--to psychosomatic medicine. This new active and committed pursuit shed new light on some old facts (pp. 35-6).

The point seems to be that we have various facts with no laws to bind them together. Then someone stumbles upon an idea which placed these facts in a different context by connecting them by laws. Because someone had great 'faith' in corroborating this new idea, i.e. because he believed in it before all of the evidence was in, he followed it up and it turned out to be well justified.*

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* These two objections are interesting when considered together. The first says the analogy fails because every day beliefs are too well evidenced to be properly called 'faith' while the second says those beliefs are not sufficiently 'certain' (i.e. are held provisionally, not with the required confidence). It may seem odd that the better evidenced is the least 'certain'.

This result is not actually so odd, however. The point is that any belief which is held because of empirical evidence in its favor likewise may be given up if new evidence is forthcoming which seriously counts against it. This, of course, is one of the primary themes of SK's work, particularly in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript [49]. It will also have an important place in the present essay in relation to what I have called the 'manner-content' argument.

Finally, the simplest way to understand how a belief which is not based on evidence can be 'certain' is to see that 'certain' here is a property of persons, not of propositions. That is, the meaning here is as in, "Jones is certain that he will go to heaven," which in turn means something like, "Jones has great confidence that..." It is not as in, "It is certain that all triangles have three sides."

Again, there are obvious objections to the analogy between religious faith and the 'faith' that is supposedly like it. The first one that comes to mind is that the procedure of the scientist "is an act not of faith but of policy. He is moreover prepared to withdraw his assumption if the facts ever fail to justify it" (Hick, p. 68). Here, as in the preceding case, the objection is that the supposed 'faith' is not the 'absolute and implicit belief' required for religious faith. In fact even more strongly than in the case of 'everyday beliefs', the hypothesis is provisional, always tentative; even though the enthusiastic inventor of a new theory may commit himself to it beyond the point warranted by the evidence, still it is always liable to be withdrawn in the face of sufficient contrary evidence.

Thus, the objections are precisely those given against the analogy with 'everyday' belief. First scientific theories are based on evidence and hence it is not correct to say that the scientist has faith as if he merely adopted gratuitous hypotheses. And second, the tentativeness of the belief which follows from its being based on evidence makes the analogy theologically unsatisfactory. Religious faith is not the sort of belief to be held until it might be contradicted by some new experiment.*

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* This argument seems to be similar to James' argument that sometimes "faith helps to create the fact," i.e. knowledge of the fact (cf. above, Chapter II).

R. M. Hare's contribution to the "Theology and Falsification" controversy is undoubtedly both the best known and the least adequate contemporary attempt to develop a view of religious assertions along the general lines with which we shall be concerned. It is also the only effort directed specifically against a challenge of the positivistic type, i.e., a challenge for the believer to state what would verify or falsify his faith or, failing this, to admit that his 'statements' have no meaning.**

In the famous controversy just mentioned, Flew argues that much theological discourse is vacuous, that sentences which begin as straightforward assertions tend to be qualified until no meaning remains. For instance, God is initially characterized as a great loving father.

> But then we see a child dying of inoperable cancer of the throat. His earthly father is driven frantic in his efforts to help, but his Heavenly Father reveals no obvious sign of concern. Some qualification is made--God's

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* There may, however, be a hint of truth in what Spurrier is saying here. That is, in some scientific situations something like religious faith may be involved. We shall discuss this below, Chapter IV.

** As we shall see, Hick also is concerned with this challenge; however, his answer has certain peculiar qualities which, I think, allow the above statement to stand (see below Ch. V). The other writers occasionally mention problems of meaning but in no case is it their primary concern.

> love is 'not merely human love' or it is 'an inscrutable love.'*

But what is an 'inscrutable love'? How does it differ from an 'inscrutable hate'? It is impossible to know what to answer and so, in this way, "a fine brash hypothesis may be killed by inches, the death of a thousand qualifications" (p. 97).

So far, Flew has clearly described a familiar phenomenon, one which no theologian can afford to ignore. However, during the course of his exposition, he introduces the notion of falsifiability, apparently as a general criterion of meaning.

> Now to assert that such and such is the case is necessarily equivalent to denying that such and such is not the case. Suppose then that we are in doubt as to what someone who gives vent to an utterance is asserting, or suppose that, more radically, we are skeptical as to whether he is really asserting anything at all, one way of trying to understand (or perhaps it will be to expose) his utterance is to attempt to find what he would regard as counting against, or as being incompatible with its truth....If there is nothing which a putative assertion denies then there is nothing which it asserts either: and so it is not really an assertion (p. 98).

So the challenge is made: "Tell me what would count against (or completely falsify?)** your putative assertion, and I will admit it has meaning." I shall shortly argue that this criterion is, in this context at least, misleading.

It was in reply to Flew's challenge that Hare formulated his notion of a blik. He begins by granting that "on the ground marked out by Flew, he seems to me to be completely victorious." Therefore, he "shifts his ground" by relating a parable.

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* "Theology and Falsification (A)" [23], in Flew and MacIntyre [24], p. 99.

** cf. below for discussion of which of these Flew means.

> A certain lunatic is convinced that all dons want to murder him. His friends introduce him to all the mildest and most respectable dons they can find, and after each of them has retired, they say, "You see, he doesn't really want to murder you; he spoke to you in a most cordial manner; surely you are convinced now?" But the lunatic replies "Yes, but that was only his diabolical cunning; he's really plotting against me the whole time, like the rest of them; I know it I tell you." However many kindly dons are produced, the reaction is still the same.*

This lunatic, says Hare, is not, on Flew's test, asserting anything, since nothing is allowed to count against his statement that the dons are evil plotters.

> His theory on this test asserts nothing. But it does not follow that there is no difference between what he thinks about dons and what most of us think about them--otherwise we should not call him a lunatic and ourselves sane...(p. 100).

What the lunatic 'has' about dons, called by Hare a blik, clearly makes an important difference, but this difference cannot be described as a difference in assertion, because it is not falsifiable. This, apparently, is why Hare says Flew is 'completely victorious' on his own grounds; i.e. Hare admits that crucial 'statements' about God cannot be said to be assertions, since they are, indeed, unfalsifiable.

Lest we be unclear as to just what sort of thing a

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* "Theology and Falsification (B)" [32], in Flew and Mac Intyre [24], p. 100.

blik is, another example is given: One trusts, when driving along, that the steering mechanism on one's car will not give out. But suppose it suddenly is thought that it *might*. This possibility is also not falsifiable. "No amount of safe-arrivals or bench-tests will remove my *blik* and restore the normal one; for my *blik* is compatible with any finite number of such tests" (p. 101).

So far it may seem that the lunatic with his insane belief about dons has a *blik*, and the almost equally lunatic person who cannot be convinced that the steel in the steering mechanism of his automobile is reliable has a *blik*, but the rest of us do not. After all, we hold sane beliefs about dons and steel. But this would not be correct, says Hare.

> Let us call that in which we differ from this lunatic, our respectative *bliks*. He has an insane *blik* about dons; we have a sane one. It is important to realize that we have a sane one, not no *blik* at all; for there must be two sides to any argument--if he has a wrong *blik*, then those who are right about dons must have a right one... It is very important to have the right *bliks* (p. 100).

In sum, we all have *bliks*, according to Hare. They are not assertions (since they are not falsifiable,) but they *are* important. Again, observation will not decide between *bliks*, but it is imperative that we hold the right *blik*. Therefore, we must, of course, hold the right *blik* about God. The fact that our God-*blik* is not falsifiable makes no difference, for *bliks* never are. So non-falsifiability makes seeming-assertions about God not assertions at all. Rather, they are *bliks*. But we all hold lots of *bliks*, so that is all right.

While Hare is obviously on the track of something important, the above controversy is an incredible jumble of confusions. Hare, himself, is thoroughly confused, but the root of the problem is to be found in Flew's dubious notion of falsifiability.[*]

To begin with it must be noted that conclusive falsifiability is *not* an adequate criterion of meaning. The simplest way to show this is to point out that on this criterion any purely existential hypothesis (e.g. "There exists at least one unicorn") is meaningless, because no sentence of this type can be conclusively falsified by any finite number of observations (i.e. one could look forever for a unicorn but failing to find one would not *prove* there are none and, therefore, that the above sentence is false; it would only prove one had not found one *yet*.).[**] It is obvious that any criterion which leads to such absurd consequences must be rejected.[***]

At this point, then, it may seem tempting to say that Hare's mistake was that he took Flew's challenge seriously (and thus granted much too much when he admitted 'statements' about God to be non-assertive). However, in spite of the obvious inadequacy of the falsifiability criterion of meaning, there is an important point in what Flew is saying. There are also many confusions in Hare's account which are worth noting because they are instructive.

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[*] It should be borne in mind that the following discussion is *not* intended to show that there is no point to Flew's challenge. Rather the discussion is meant to show only that he presents his point in a misleading way, and, hence, causes his opponents to give irrelevant replies.

[**] Even an obviously *true* statement such as "There exists at least one cow" would be *meaningless* by the same criterion. Neither failing to find a cow nor finding one would *falsify* that statement.

[***] For this and other inadequacies of this criterion, see C. G. Hempel, "Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning" [33], in L. Linsky, *Semantics and the Philosophy of Language* [55].

By way of an approach to both of these, we must ask more specifically, what does Flew mean by 'falsifiability'? The traditional positivistic view was that a statement, to be falsifiable, must be *logically incompatible* with some observation sentence or logically consistent (finite) class of such sentences (Hempel, pp. 169-170; slightly changed here for the sake of simplicity). An 'observation sentence' is one whose truth or falsity can be determined by 'direct observation' (pp. 164-5). I shall call this logical falsifiability. (It is, of course, in this sense that every existential statement is non-falsifiable.)

It is not clear, however, that Flew means to be demanding falsifiability in quite so strong a sense. Suppose we simply 'make up' a new sense of 'falsifiability' and call it 'rational falsifiability'.** Although I do not pretend to be able to give a strict definition of this, it will be seen, I believe, to have a clear sense. In fact, it *must* have a clear sense in practice, because we do, in fact, believe the statement, "There exists at least one unicorn," to be false, and it would be highly implausible to claim that a statement which all rational persons regard as false is completely nonfalsifiable.

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* What I am here calling 'rational falsifiability' is essentially what Hick has in mind (except that he is talking about verifiability) when he characterizes verifiability as the "removal of grounds for rational doubt"("Religious Statements as Factually Significant" [42], in *The Existence of God*, Hick [34], pp. 253; cf. *Philosophy of Religion*, Hick [41], p. 100).

This type of falsifiability, while not neatly definable, is roughly describable. Given any statement of the existential form* such as, "There are unicorns," "There are black swans," or "There are abominable snowmen," the rational person regards these as false if: (a) There is no 'theoretical' reason to think there are such creatures; (b) there has been ample opportunity to discover such creatures, were they to exist, but they have not, in fact, been discovered. For instance, no rational man believes in the existence of red, white, and blue striped cows with fifty stars emblazoned on each flank. Rational people do not believe in the existence of such patriotic bovines because: (a) There is no reason to think such a phenomenon should occur in nature, i.e. it is not 'demanded' by other natural phenomena; (b) were there to be such, surely they would have been discovered by now.**

Should it be charged that the above is a highly fallible procedure, that, still, there could be such cows, the reply is true but irrelevant. The fact that we know what counts

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* Only these are in question here. Statements of universal form are logically falsifiable. The latter may be regarded as a proper sub-class of rationally falsifiable statements; i.e. all logically falsifiable statements are rationally falsifiable statements but not vice-versa.

** Compare Putnam: "And in many cases of this kind, lack of any good reason for supposing existence is itself the very best reason for supposing non-existence" (Hilary Putnam, "The Analytic and the Synthetic" [70], in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, H. Feigl and G. Maxwell, eds. [55], p. 386).

against the truth of any given proposition is surely sufficient to establish that we know the meaning. In Flew's terms, we know what is being denied. We do not expect to meet that inspiringly-striped cow in the street or on the farm or even in the high Himalayas.

Given these two senses of falsifiability, logical and rational falsifiability, which of them does Flew have in mind? The answer to this seems clearly enough to be that Flew does not know, or perhaps more fairly, he does not care; either, he thinks, would do for his purposes. "Suppose we are sceptical as to whether he is really asserting anything at all, one way of trying to understand (or perhaps it will be to expose) his utterance is to attempt to find what he would regard as *counting against*, or as being *incompatible with*, its truth (p. 98; italics mine). 'Counting against' would seem to be equivalent to my rational falsifiability; 'being incompatible with' would seem to be logical falsifiability. It would, however, in the over-all context of Flew's argument, be fair to say that he would be satisfied if the religious believer were to admit just that *anything might* count against his belief. That is, he does *not*, over-all, seem to be demanding that the stronger requirement (logical falsifiability) be met, but, rather, he would be satisfied if the weaker one (rational falsifiability) were met.

It is, however, this ambiguity concerning the meaning of falsifiability which leads Hare to give a reply which misses the real point of Flew's challenge. Before elaborating on this contention (i.e., that Hare's reply is essentially irrelevant), an unintended consequence of Hare's notion of a *blik* should be pointed out.

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Basically the unintended consequence of Hare's claim is that in spite of his assertion that all of us have *bliks* (about dons, steel, etc.) this, on his own account is not true. *Only* the lunatic has a *blik*. Hence, the religious believer, who also has a blik, is analogous, *on Hare's own showing*, only to a lunatic.

Why is it that only the lunatic has a *blik*? The reasoning here is quite elementary. What makes a *blik* a *blik* is that nothing counts against it. Now, let us consider each of the two senses of falsifiability and see whether this is true of the opposite '*blik*'.

The two examples of *bliks* that Hare gave were "The dons are out to murder me," and "My steering mechanism won't hold up." What about those of us who would reject these *bliks*? We, of course, believe that the dons are not out to murder us and that our steering mechanism will continue to function properly. But if we think of logical falsifiability both of these are quite obviously falsifiable. The first by some don trying to murder me, the second by my crashing against a tree due to a failure of my steering mechanism. *Either* of his major examples, then, brings out that only what the *lunatic* holds is not falsifiable, and, hence, is a *blik*. So the religious man (particularly the Christian with his "God loves man") with his *blik* is analogous *only to the lunatic*, since, only in these cases is a nonfalsifiable belief being held.

One may find this result peculiar. How can it be that the logical negation of a blik (which is not an assertion) is not a blik (and clearly is an assertion.) Such a result is not only peculiar, it is clearly untenable. Whatever else one may demand of a discussion of meaning, its result must be that the negation of a genuine assertion is itself a genuine assertion (cf. Hempel [33], pp. 168-9, 170). Hare seems to realize that such symmetry is necessary. For as we have seen, he says concerning the lunatic and his (non-falsifiable) blik, "We have a sane one, not no blik at all; for there must be two sides to any argument--if he has a wrong blik, then those who are right about dons must have a right one " (p. 100); i.e, the negation of a blik must be a blik. Hare would, then, grant that the negation of an assertion must be an assertion.

So it seems that Hare, having decided that some 'statements' are not falsifiable and therefore are bliks, then decided that the negation of a blik must likewise be a blik, in spite of the fact that the negation is falsifiable. Hempel (and other 'positivists'), on the contrary, having seen that the negation of a (falsifiable) assertion was not falsifiable, decided that the non-falsifiable 'statement' must be considered an assertion. Each noticed an apparent assymetry* and then made a change to bring about symmetry.

Which is more plausible? There can be little doubt that the 'Hempel-move' is correct. There are two reasons for this: First, it is 'intuitively obvious' that "The Dons are out to murder me" is meaningful. Second, if a criterion which has any plausibility at all has established a statement to be meaningful, it would be highly paradoxical to deny meaning to its negation, no matter what the criterion might dictate; i.e. surely there is a legitimate presumption that any statement which sounds meaningful is meaningful.

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* This is perhaps too kind to Hare. There is no clear reason to think that he did notice the assymetry, i.e. that the negation of his bliks are falsifiable.

In sum, concerning logical falsifiability, Hare seems to have a choice between two untenable positions. He may say that only the lunatic's conviction is a blik; in this case the religious man is analogous only to the lunatic,* and he is embracing the absurd position that the negation of an assertion is not an assertion. Or he may be saying that the negation of any blik is likewise a blik; this would mean that many bliks are falsifiable and that therefore it is no longer clear what a blik is. Whichever 'out' he takes, it seems that his position has reduced itself to the ridiculous.

If we turn now to the 'loose' sense of falsifiability, i.e., rational falsifiability, here, at least, one difficulty is avoided for Hare. If a statement is falsifiable, its negation will also be so. The rational man will, at some point, give up, e.g., either, "The dons are friendly fellows" or "The dons are out to murder me." But if this is so (as it manifestly is, since we do call the man who won't give up one or the other a lunatic) where does Hare's lunatic fit in? Putting this slightly differently, in this sense it seems that all of Hare's examples are falsifiable; so what can his point be?

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* cf. next note.

The answer to this is fairly simple. It is not that no evidence counts against the lunatic's beliefs, *if we mean* by 'counts against' 'rationally counts against'; rather, the situation is that the lunatic will not *allow* anything to count against his belief. ("There is no behavior of dons that can be enacted *which he will accept* as counting against his theory" [p. 100, italics mine]).

So the result is obvious. Some people do indeed hold beliefs which nothing *can* count against, where this means that they will allow nothing to count against them. They may believe that the dons are murderers, or that the steel in the steering mechanism is unreliable, or that Hitler is alive and living in Argentina. These are *bliks*. All of them may be held in spite of the evidence (which counts against them, but does not logically falsify them). And in each case, the believer can properly be described as a 'lunatic'. He may not be literally mad, of course, but his beliefs are, on a given subject, lunatic. In the same way, a person may have the *blik* that God loves man. He may hold this forever, allowing nothing to count against it. This, however, does not put the believer in very good company.*

In sum, here again one can make sense out of Hare's notion of a blik, a 'statement' now to be construed as one which is continually held no matter what the evidence may be that counts against it. But starting from the notion of rational falsifiability, this has been done at the cost of putting the religious man in the class of genuine lunatics. Surely this is a high cost to pay for a defense of religious belief.

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* The preceding case, the case of logical falsifiability, was just a 'trick,'; i.e., it cannot be said that anyone who believes a logically non-falsifiable statement becomes 'lunatic'. The important part of the criticism of that case was the lack of symmetry which results.

In this case, however, the analogy between the lunatic and the believer is *not* a'trick', for an important part of what we mean by 'lunacy' is maintaining one's delusions in spite of all reasons which are brought against them.

* * * * *

Attempting to answer Flew in terms of non-falsifiability has then led Hare to some odd and unintended consequences. It should be noticed, however, that even if Hare's bliks did not have these consequences the notion as he develops it would have been powerless to overcome the real force of Flew's argument. To see this it will be necessary to expand on my previous comment that Flew's argument is perfectly cogent until the point at which he suggests falsifiability as a general criterion of meaning and on my later comment that Hare's reply is irrelevant to Flew's real point although not to his general criterion of meaning.

We have seen already that this criterion is not adequate since it would render 'meaningless' all sentences of the existential form. No possible set of observations* can (logically) contradict such sentences. What Hare actually does is to give examples of such sentences and then say "God loves man" is like these. That is, his argument is: You say "God loves man" is meaningless because it is not falsifiable. But also "The dons are out to murder me," etc. are not falsifiable, but they are 'meaningful' (i.e. 'important'). This shows that there are sentences which are both non-falsifiable and important. "God loves man" is one of these, i.e., it is essentially like these in that it is both non-falsifiable and 'meaningful'.

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* i.e., No finite set of observation-statements.

Given that Flew is relying on falsifiability as a general criterion of meaning this is a fair and valid counter-argument. But this is precisely the reason why Flew never should have relied on falsifiability in this way; i.e., "God loves man" and "The dons are out to murder me," while they may be alike in that neither seems falsifiable, are non-falsifiable for different reasons. The latter has this property because it is essentially of the existential form.* "God loves man" (or even "God exists"), while its own form may not be simple to analyze, implies a statement which is universal in form. That is, given that God is omnipotent and loving, it seems to be implied that there is no evil in the world (or at least no needless suffering).** This means that "Everything is good" which can be contradicted by observations (since it is of the universal form). Furthermore, it seems to be contradicted by 'the evidence' (e.g., the child dying of cancer). It is because of these apparent contradictions that there is the tendency to qualify the sense in which God's love is 'love'. The "death by a thousand qualifications" follows. The same is not true of Hare's two examples of bliks since, being existential in form, they are never logically contradicted by the evidence.

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* That is, apparently what the lunatic means is, "There is a time at which the Dons will attack me." The failure of this time to arrive no more falsifies this than the failure to find a unicorn falsifies, "There are unicorns."

** I say 'seems to be' in order to avoid getting involved in the intricacies of the 'problem of evil'. That problem is really beside the point of the present controversy since all of the participants in the University Discussion seem to accept Flew's claim that suffering does count against God's love.

Putting this a slightly different way, because observations seem to count, logically count, against God's goodness (or his omnipotence) one is forced to subtly change the meaning of words. This change results in genuine puzzlement as to what the words do mean. Thus, the failure to admit that "God loves man" is falsified does lead to a sort of meaninglessness. On the other hand, since "The dons are out to murder me" (or "There are green cows") is not logically contradicted by any (finite number of) observations, one can hold this to be true without being forced to change any meanings no matter what the evidence (although one does do this at the cost of lunacy, since it is rationally falsifiable).

Hence Flew, in bringing up falsifiability, as a general criterion, obscured the fact that "God loves man" is held in a non-falsifiable manner even though it should, logically, be falsifiable. One does not ever have to hold existential statements in just this peculiar manner, however, because they are non-falsifiable for logical reasons. Thus, the criterion merely obscures the genuine difficulty, by causing sentences of very divergent types to be considered as all of one type. (i.e., of the type, 'non-falsifiable').

One final point: It may be said that all the above argument that "The dons are out to murder me" and "God loves man" are radically different in respect to falsifiability depends on using the notion of logical falsifiability only, but that they are actually more similar since they are both rationally falsifiable. This is true but it is not to the point. The fact remains that "God loves man" can (seemingly) be contradicted by an observation-statement and "The dons are out to murder me" cannot; although it is the case that the rational person will eventually cease to believe the latter, it is also true that, since there are no logical contradictions involved, one may irrationally continue to hold, and people do in many cases, both to the statement and the evidence against it, even without changing the meaning of the words. A logical contradiction of the statement by the evidence, however, forces more extreme measures, i.e. eroding away the meanings.*

The above lengthy discussion has been intended to show that Hare makes crucial mistakes in his account of bliks.

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* It might be suggested that it is possible to hold to both a statement and its logical contradiction without even attempting to make them 'compatible' by eroding away the meanings of the words. I am certain that this is indeed possible; in fact, we all probably believe some incompatible pairs of statements. The question is whether it is possible to hold an incompatible pair of statements and the third statement: "Those propositions are incompatible." The question is what it would mean to say we believe these three statements. I cannot see that it could be anything more than a commitment to say, "I believe both P and not-p" on certain appropriate occasions.

It has turned out that his argument does not show that there are non-falsifiable but important 'beliefs' which we all hold. We may, however, attempt to look more sympathetically at what Hare is trying to say. The real point he wishes to make (which he bungles so badly) begins to emerge in the following passage:

> It was Hume who taught us that our whole commerce with the world depends upon our *blik* about the world; and that differences between *bliks* about the world cannot be settled by observation of what happens in the world... [He showed] that no proof could be given to make us adopt one *blik* rather than another...The mistake of the position which Flew selects for attack is to regard this kind of talk as some sort of *explanation*, as scientists are accustomed to use the word. As such, it would obviously be ludicrous. We no longer believe in God as an Atlas--*nous n'avons pas besoin de cette hypothese*. But it is nevertheless true to say that, as Hume saw, without a *blik* there can be no explanation; for it is by our *bliks* that we decide what is and what is not an explanation. Suppose we believed that everything that happened, happened by pure chance. This would not, of course be an assertion; for it is compatible with anything happening or not happening, and so incidentally, is its contradictory.* But if we had this belief, we should not be able to explain or predict or plan anything. Thus, although we should not be *asserting* anything different from those of a more normal belief, there would be a great difference between us; and this is the sort of difference that there is between those who believe in God and those who really disbelieve in him (pp. 101-2).

One might characterize this difference between those who believe in God and those who do not, as being different ways of looking at the world. There is no clear difference in what they expect to happen, but there is nonetheless some difference in their over-all views. The difference, however, is not empirical, in that the beliefs of either are "compatible with anything happening or not happening."

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* This again shows Hare's confusion. What he casually refers to as 'incidental' is, of course, crucial.

Clearly, such over-all ways of viewing the world differ from the more particular beliefs which Hare previously characterized as bliks. Just what sort of distinction may be drawn between them will be investigated at more length later. For now, however, it will suffice to say that Hare now seems to have arrived at what seems, prima facie, to be a genuine belief which is 'non-empirical', i.e. which no observations clearly count for or against, something he failed to do in his examples concerning dons and steering mechanisms.

Nonetheless, what he has said remains mysterious. While there seems to be some truth in his view that there are genuine differences between the ways various people may see the world and that these differences somehow 'come before' differences on empirical matters, he is far from clear. Perhaps the clearest statement he makes is that a blik must come before explanation, "for it is by our bliks that we decide what is and what is not an explanation." Apparently, he means that there is no 'given' which will decide for us what will count as an explanation. So we must decide for ourselves; we must adopt a blik. When this is done, and only when this is done, we will 'know' what is to count as an explanation.

In a later work, Hare amplifies somewhat his notion of a blik (without using that word).

> Without principles of some sort we do not get any facts; there is no distinction between fact and illusion for a person who does not take up a certain attitude to the world.*

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*"Religion and Morals" [31], in Faith and Logic, Basil Mitchell (ed.), p. 190.

> People sometimes talk as if facts were somehow given to us entirely independently of any dispositions of our own with regard to them. Kant saw that this is not so...I can put the point briefly (at the cost of obscurity) by saying that any statement of fact which claims objectivity will be found on analysis to contain an element which is ineradicably modal...and that such modal statements are not analyzable in purely descriptive terms, but have a prescriptive element (ibid.).

Just as what is to constitute an explanation is not 'given' to us, also what is to count as a fact is not given. Rather, it is dependent on our attitudes. One attitude will cause us to regard some things as facts; another will cause us to so regard another. Thus the 'given' becomes a vacuous notion; what is given depends on our attitudes.

In applying this to specifically religious matters, Hare considers the divinity of Christ.

> When a man says 'Jesus is Christ' or 'Jesus is Lord' is he stating a fact (in the ordinary sense) at all? I think it would be agreed that of the people who were familiar with Jesus in His earthly life, some were ready to make this affirmation, and some were not. St. Paul, perhaps, knew in one sense all the facts about Jesus before his conversion...It seems to me that one might, in one sense of the word 'fact,' know all the facts about Jesus and still refuse to call him 'Lord'or 'Christ'... There is another possibility, which might be suggested at this point. It might be said: 'If one person says "Jesus is Christ" and another denies this, they may not be differing about the facts; it may be that they have different attitudes to the facts (pp. 183-4).

There are several points being made here. St. Paul "knew...all the facts about Jesus before his conversion," so, it seems, that his conversion involved a 'change of heart'; i.e. he came to superimpose on these facts a different attitude. But this is not quite right for the attitude one assumes determines what the facts are. "Even our belief in so-called hard facts rests in the end on a faith, a commitment, which is not in or to facts, but in that without which there would not be any facts" (p. 192). St. Paul then, having acquired no new 'information', through his conversion, came to believe in quite a different set of facts.* For instance, previously he had known of a man deluding the people by casting out devils through the aid of Belzebub. Now he knows of a man who helped the people by casting out devils through God's aid [p. 184].) The facts themselves are changed by one's ultimate attitude toward them.

It follows that the difference between the 'believer' and the 'non-believer' is not primarily one of belief, but rather one of attitude. St. Paul possessed no new 'facts' after his conversion. But is it not a question of 'fact' whether the power of Jesus comes from God or from the Devil, a question of supernatural fact?

> It is plausible to say that in so far as religious discourse seems to refer to supernatural facts, this is the result of the superimposition of the attitude of worship upon factual beliefs which are themselves not other than empirical; that, in fact, we have here a case like that of 'non-natural' qualities of ethics. When we say that a strawberry is good because it is sweet...what we are doing is not attributing to the strawberry any other quality at all besides sweetness; but we are, as well as attributing to it that perfectly ordinary quality, *commending* it for having that quality.** In the same way it might be that the *facts* that religious discourse deals with are perfectly ordinary empirical facts like what happens when you pray; but we are tempted to call them supernatural facts because our whole way of living is organized around them...(p. 189).

In sum, then, the difference between the 'religious' and 'non-religious' man is not a difference in their factual beliefs, if that means that one accepts certain events as fact and another rejects the occurrence of these events. Nonetheless, they disagree in that one construes the facts in a quite different way than does the other, the result being that, in a sense, they do not accept the 'same facts'. The facts differ for the two, however, not because one accepts a theory the other rejects but because they have different 'attitudes'.*

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* cf. next note but one.

** cf. Hare, *The Language of Morals* [30], *passim*; also J. O. Urmson, "On Grading" [83], in *Logic and Language* (*Second Series*), Anthony Flew (ed.).

* * * * *

Hare had begun this essay with the following:

> I am still not at all certain what I want to say about this difficult subject...I am at the moment not able to make much progress in this enquiry...[others] are to be warned...that much of this paper is undigested, and the last section, at least, positively indigestible (p. 176).

I quote this in order to agree with it wholeheartedly. The topic is highly difficult, and Hare's treatment of it is clearly 'undigested'. He sees a small way into an important point** but is capable of going no further in clarifying and expanding his admittedly puzzling thesis.

In Chapter V, we shall see his point developed more adequately (but with important differences) by Hick and others. For now, however, we shall conclude the discussion of Hare by pointing out some obvious questions which arise from what he said.

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* These passages, help to make clear why Hare did not notice the difference between "The dons are out to murder me" and "There is an external world." In each case the believer can assimilate any new 'facts' to his 'theory' by re-interpreting those facts. The crucial difference remains, however. In the first case, the assimilation before long becomes absurd. In the latter case, it is not clear that it is absurd to continue the process forever. (This difference is closely related to the fact that in the first case [the Dons] the belief is verifiable [i.e., its opposite is falsifiable] whereas in the second case empirical evidence seems quite unable to dictate an answer in any way.)

** No doubt an important contributing factor to his inability to go further is the semi-religious pride which the 'Oxford Group' has in knowing nothing about the history or structure

To begin with, just what is an 'attitude' and how is it related to the spurious (according to Hare) belief in 'metaphysical facts'? It seems clear how one can have a 'pro-attitude'* toward sweet strawberries and express this by commending them with the appeallation 'good'. But just what is the attitude which St. Paul came to have toward Jesus when he was converted and came to call him 'Christ'? Did he suddenly decide that Jesus was admirable? good for the masses? Surely this would be a travesty of that change which converted Saul of Taursus into St. Paul. To say simply that he adopted a 'pro-attitude' toward Jesus does not begin to make us understand what happened; he did not just come to 'commend' Jesus to others on the basis of a 'good feeling' he had about him.

The second question is virtually inseparable from the first. Can the sort of attitude which the Christian has toward Jesus be divorced from his belief that certain facts do obtain? Is

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of science or of the works of such 'non-ordinary-language' philosophers as Quine and Putnam (cf. below. For a similar 'nasty comment', cf. P. K. Feyerabend, "Explanation Reduction, and Empiricism" [20], in Feigl and Maxwell [17], p. 86n).

It will be a crucial claim of the present essay that the writings of the latter, together with writings on the history and structure of science and philosophy, (e.g. Kuhn, Hall) are crucial for a proper understanding of the sort of 'prefactual commitment' required by religion.

* This is Patrick Nowell-Smith's terminology (Ethics [65], passim).

it not necessary, in order to account for the attitude which Paul came to have toward Jesus, to admit that he underwent a basic change in beliefs concerning the supernatural 'background' of Jesus? Hare would reduce the supposed change of belief to a change of attitude, but is it not the case that the change of attitude makes sense only if there were also a change of belief?*

Third, even if the above questions could be answered, one must question the theological adequacy of the above analysis. We have seen (Ch. I, above) that there are problems in attempting to give a thoroughly non-cognitive analysis of religious faith (particularly of Christian faith).** But such a non-cognitive conclusion seems to be the intended result of Hare's 'analysis'.

Next, Hare's claim that one's 'attitude' determines what the facts are leaves much in a state of obscurity. Can one not say, for instance, that the facts which St. Paul believed before and after his conversion were exactly the same? That is, did he not throughout his life believe that (taking Hare's example) Jesus was a man who could cast out devils? And was not the change which occurred (from so doing because of the power of Beelzebub to so doing because of the power of God) merely a change in his interpretation of those enduring facts? It certainly seems on the surface as if an affirmative answer to these questions is the correct one.*

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* The intuitive plausibility of this is shown by the fact that Hare himself inadvertently falls back on talking about belief where, on his own showing, he should be talking about only attitude. "Now Christians believe that God created the world out of chaos...Is it possible that this is our way of expressing the truth that without belief in a divine order - a belief expressed in other terms by means of worshipping assent to principles for discriminating between fact and illusion - there could be no belief in matters of fact or of real objects?" (p. 192, italics mine). In each of the cases where he uses the word 'belief', he should use 'attitude' if he is to adhere consistently to his thesis.

** Compare Hick: "A serious and rational concern with religion will inevitably make us want to know whether the way the believer feels and acts is appropriate to the actual character of the universe, and whether the things he says as a believer are true" ([41], pp. 98-9). Flew [23, p. 108) and Hick say that this is the basic objection to Hare's original account of a blik. I cannot agree with this; this objection becomes really important only in his example of the 'external world' and in this later essay, because "The Dons are out to murder me" and "The steel will not hold up" cannot, no matter what Hare says, be construed as anything but assertions since we know what would verify them.

Finally, a point which underlies all of those above: Is it really possible to draw such a hard and fast distinction between a factual belief (which may be partially determined by an attitude but which is clearly 'cognitive') and what Hare calls an 'attitude', i.e., the 'thing' (proposition, attitude, blik, whatever it is) which supplies the general framework that determines what the facts are?** And insofar as some distinction can be drawn, is 'attitude' even close to the correct word for describing those 'pre-empirical' seeming-beliefs which Hare thinks are so important? In particular, even assuming that different beliefs may determine 'what the facts are', how could an attitude do so?

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* I shall later argue that the general sort of point which Hare is making here is, in fact, correct. This however, does not damage the claim that Hare is open to this objection, given the way he states his point.

** I shall later argue (following Quine, etc.) that no such absolute distinction can be drawn. This might seem to undercut my criticism of Hare's account of bliks since that criticism assumes a great difference between, e.g. "The Dons are out to murder me" and "There is an external world." The later argument will only be that there is no absolute distinction; there are important differences. These differences are sufficient to justify the above criticism.

Each of these questions will be further discussed in later chapters. Before leaving Hare, however, one final comment should be made. That is: Hare is, as we have seen, primarily concerned with the meaningfulness of theological statements, whereas our major theme is their justifiability. Does Hare, in that case, really 'fit in'?

I think actually that he does, since he says that we all, necessarily, have bliks, e.g. about the external world. That is, he actually has two points to make, although the emphasis is on the first. These are: (a) theological 'beliefs' are 'significant' (although not cognitive); (b) we all, necessarily, hold to similar types of 'beliefs' (bliks) in other areas, and, hence, they cannot be objected to in religion. The latter contention is the same as that of the other authors with whom we are concerned.

In a less well-known but generally more coherent essay, Raphael Demos has argued essentially the same point that Hare rather unsuccessfully attempted to make. The brunt of Demos' argument is given near the outset:

> Science, no less than Christianity, operates with certain beliefs which may be called premises or presuppositions; that is to say, both of these disciplines are based on beliefs which are ultimate in the sense that (a) They are not demonstrable deductively, and (b) They are not verified by sense-experience. If we take the meaning of "Reason" to consist of these two criteria, then we can say that the presuppositions of both science and Christian doctrine are without rational justification. Such ultimate beliefs may, therefore, be called articles of faith...Religionists are accused by secularists of accepting the proposition that God exists without rational demonstration and without evidence; so they are called dogmatists. I will

> answer the charge by admitting the first part while demurring to the second.*

So his point will be that while it is true that 'religionists' accept certain premises without 'evidence' (either deductive or inductive), this cannot justify calling them 'dogmatists'. Somehow, it is 'all right' to accept such premises, since 'everyone' does so, and therefore the derogatory label, 'dogmatist!' is not in order. The remainder of Demos' argument consists in attempting to substantiate the above position, i.e. in attempting to show that the acceptance of such premises is not peculiar to the religious believer, that it is equally necessary in science, and hence, since it is inevitable, it is justifiable.

He begins by saying that

> Both the scientists and their fellow philosophers have recourse to faith, if by faith we mean the acceptance of belief without evidence, demonstrative or empirical. (Faith="the vision of things unseen," Epistle to the Hebrews.) (p. 131).

That this seems counter-intuitive at first sight is recognized by Demos. It will be said that scientists rely on evidence while religious people have only faith. However, this only removes the question to another level. For "what constitutes evidence?"

> For example, the criterion in science for the acceptance of a theory is confirmation by the senses, not by the imagination, not by feeling. Yet all three alike

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* "Religions Faith and Scientific Faith" [15], in Religious Experience and Truth, Sidney Hook (ed.), pp. 130-131.

> are modes of conscious experience. The selection of only the first as relevant to evidence is the outcome of a decision (p. 131).

Yes, science relies on evidence. But a prior decision is necessary to know what shall count as evidence.*

Demos continues in bringing out other ultimate presuppositions of science. There is the inductive principle itself ("As Hume has conclusively shown, this is a principle which cannot be justified by evidence of any sort..." [p. 133]). But more, science, having assumed the inductive principle** and that sense experience (rather than imagination or feeling) is to count as evidence, cannot stop here. Also, the reliability of memory must be assumed. "As a scientist, I observe an experimental result in the laboratory. But time is passing; in fact, I have left the laboratory, and now I no longer observe the result. Instead, I remember what I saw" (p. 133). And the reliability of memory can no more be proven than can the reliability of the inductive method. Just as justification of the latter inevitably involves assuming induction at some point ("the future will be like the past because in the past the future was like the past"), similarly justification of the former involves the assumption of memory if it is to be of lasting value (" a person still has to remember the justification or the proof of the trustworthiness of memory" [p. 133]).

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* Compare Hare above: Unless we adopt some 'attitude', we do not know what is to count as an explanation. While explanation and evidence are not the same, the point is essentially the same, i.e. some over-all view must be adopted before we can begin to 'discuss', to give evidence for our beliefs or explanations of phenomena.

** One may, of course, question whether there is any such assumption in science (cf. Chapter VI).

There is a final canon of faith of the scientist: The theory that is simpler is accepted rather than that which is more 'complex': Occam's razor. "But who is Occam that we should worship him?... Why assume that only the simple theory is true? It may be that the creator of the cosmos was extravagant, like a painter who does not spare his brush strokes" (p. 132).*

The scientist, then, makes assumptions. "But if you can do it, why can't I?" replies the religionist. One unjustified assumption is as good as another.

> I think it is nonsense to say that while science is a matter of reason, Christian doctrine is a matter of faith; both have their basic commitments (faiths) and both strive to establish rational structures upon these foundations (p. 136).

The point, Demos thinks, is made.

He does, however, make several other note-worthy comments, each of which we will return to in some later section. First, a further point of similarity between scientific and Christian methodology:

> The scientist assumes the universal application of the principle of explanation. Supposing, for instance, that our scientist is confronted with a datum which he cannot explain; will he say: here is a brute irrational fact?

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* This 'assumption' of science seems to be different in type from the others. It does not seem, on the surface, to be used as a method of reaching 'truth'; i.e. it seems to be a criterion of 'acceptability' of theories, rather than of their 'truth'.

> No, indeed, He will say: give me (or my successors) time and the explanation will be found. So does a Christian, confronted with human misery, still say that God is good and that everything will turn out all right in the long, the very long run... Both the Christian and the scientist are willing to stand by their conviction, not only beyond but also contrary to the evidence (p. 135).

Both have a sort of faith that the 'wild data' will someday be assimilated to their theory.*

Second, Demos realizes that many scientists (and philosophers) would not claim to be able to justify their ultimate premises. He quotes Von Mises, concerning his account of induction: "All of these propositions are supposed to be merely descriptions of the hitherto observed ways of research... We are dealing primarily with a description of the characteristic features of scientific activity" (p. 134).

Concerning this Demos observes: "The scientific tribe has its custom (Hume's habits); so have other tribes other customs" (p. 134). But if all one can do is describe these customs, if all the philosopher can do is describe them, then how can he do more than describe the customs of the Christian? He would seem to have no right to charge that the latter are unjustifiable since no inquiry into the justifiability of the scientists' customs has been made.

Third, if one replies that the scientist need not justify his methods, because the workability of science is too obvious, the reply is itself obvious: "Should... the pragmatist say that science works, he must answer the question, works to what end? For success, for salvation, in this life or the next? Any pragmatism presupposes some theory as to what things are valuable" (p. 135). Science works. Of course it does. It works for many matters concerning this world. But that is no reason to assume it will work for matters concerning the next world.*

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* This, of course, is similar to Spurrier's point, above, pp. 67-68.

Fourth, Demos says, "I do not mean to say that, because a belief is a presupposition, it lacks cognitive worth. I do not mean that the premises of science or the premises of Christianity are not true or are not knowledge"(p. 135). The ultimate presuppositions of science and of Christianity, then, are wholly cognitive in nature, although they are provable neither by deduction nor by induction from sense experience.

A fifth point is one, I believe, whose significance Demos only partially realizes. Having said that one cannot maintain that Christianity is a matter of dogma while science a matter of reason, he continues:

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* Hume argued (*Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* [44], in particular Part V) that we cannot move from what is true *within* 'this world' to what is true *about* it or outside of it, i.e. that we cannot go from that which we have experienced to things of a wholly different type which we have not experienced. His conclusion was religiously sceptical: We cannot argue from this world to God's world. Thus Hume undercuts an argument for theism. Demos reverses the procedure: Using the same premise he argues against a sceptical argument which attempts to move from this world to God's world. Both Hume and Demos, then, are asking: "Why should we think that the sort of reasoning that 'works' within 'this realm' also works concerning 'God's realm'?" The same question is at least implicit in Kierkegaard.

> May I remind the reader of the following statement by Whitehead: "Science has never shaken off the impress of its origin in the historical revolt of the late Renaissance. It has remained predominantly an anti-rationalistic movement, based upon a naive faith." It is easy for us today, as we look many centuries back into the Middle Ages, with their almost Gothically intricate Christian formulations, to see that these statements rest, ultimately, on faith; and that their arguments can persuade only those already converted. But because science is of the present and because science is an ever-expanding movement, it is more difficult to discern its limits, to realize that it also has its ungrounded beliefs. Science, being the greatest intellectual power today, tends to overwhelm and to blind us to the fact that the "evidence" for scientific ideas can be persuasive only for those who are already converted. All this, I think, will become more evident to human beings of a later and metascientific epoch (p. 136).

We are so much 'within' the framework of science that we cannot help but take it for granted, see it as self-evident, be blind to its far-from-obvious presuppositions. This is analogous to the way in which the medieval man was within a framework of final causes which ultimately depended on God, and to the way the Biblical prophets were within a framework which likewise included God as a presupposition.* But to these, belief in God no more seemed to be a 'presupposition' than induction seems to us. He was there. His presence was too pervasive to appear as an assumption. Only that which is genuinely questioned is seen as an assumption in any meaningful sense.**

So, 'final causality' and God seemed obvious yesterday,*** science seems obvious today; but what will seem obvious tomorrow? We simply do not know. What right, then, do we have to assume that what seems obvious today is therefore true?

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* This sentence and the remainder of 'point #5' is an elaboration on Demos, going beyond what he says.

** cf. below, Chapter VI.

*** And apparently seem obvious today to the majority of Roman Catholic theologians (cf., e.g. Jacques Maritain, Man and the State [60], Ch. IV).

The sixth and final point is that Demos repeatedly states that in spite of the fact that science, religion, and every other 'discipline' rests on assumptions, on 'articles of faith', one should not take this to mean that any one faith is as good as another, that all are equally rational, or that there are not rational methods of questioning and evaluating them.

> No basic doctrine, religious or scientific (or appearing in common sense), is immune from philosophic criticism, from Socratic questioning, from Cartesian doubt (p. 130). It is not enough to show that both science and Christianity rest on presuppositions. The labeling of a statement as an article of faith should not mean the giving of free tickets to superstition for admission into the theater of thought. There is the problem, then, of distinguishing true from false faith--one acknowledged in the Scriptures, as when they warn us against false prophets. Magic and animism, on the one hand, must be kept out of the halls of science, and Christianity on the other. How to judge the good from the bad, how to distinguish the true from the false faith; science from antiscience, true from false religion--here is a problem demanding solution. However, this is not a problem for the present essay (p. 136).

So we must distinguish the good from the bad, the rational from the irrational, the true faith from the false. Those of us who are not willing to justify Christianity at the cost of justifying lunacy must agree wholeheartedly with this. But (and here my questions concerning Demos' argument begin), how is this to be done. Demos has not only argued that the ultimate presuppositions of science have not been justified, he also seems to have argued that they are totally unjustifiable.

He has not only said that no straightforward 'evidential' argument is coherent, he has also said that no argument of the pragmatist type can work; nor can one argue, he says, from common sense. One cannot help but wonder what can be left as a possibility.[*] (His final statement [last sentence, last quote, above] would seem to imply that he has some idea, but does not have the space to develop it. But he first presented this sort of argument over ten years ago![**] Surely, if he did have some idea it would have been forth-coming by now.) On his own showing (i.e. we accept the impossibility of pragmatist, etc. arguments) there seems little possibility of being able to distinguish Christianity, and even science, from madness. This substantiates his primary point, but it hardly seems to be a *happy* solution to the Christian's problem of justifying his faith.

Many other questions[***] arise from Demos' argument: Just what *are* the ultimate presuppositions of Christianity that are on a par with "The future will be like the past"? The most basic Christian statement would seem to be "God exists," but is this really more like "The future will be like the past" than it is like "Electrons exist"? (It certainly 'sounds' more like the latter.) But if it is more like the latter, then can it be said to be a matter of faith? For the existence of electrons, while a highly complex matter, seems, nonetheless, to be a question to be decided by evidence and experiment.*

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[*] Notice that whatever form of reasoning Demos has in mind, it must be such that science and Christianity would be justifiable, but magic and animism (and madness) would not. But one may ask: Why *this* initial criterion for the adequacy of a mode of reasoning. The animist would surely not agree!

[**] "Are Religious Dogmas Cognitive and Meaningful?" in *Academic Freedom, Logic, and Religion*, Morton White (ed.).

[***] Note: 'Questions' here is meant literally; i.e. nothing that follows is intended to show that he is wrong, but only that there are puzzling aspects to what he has said.

Also, the principles which Demos argues are presuppositions of science are basically methodological rather than substantive in nature. If this is the case (and if any real distinction can be made between the 'methodological' and the 'substantive'), then, if his analogy is to be kept intact, the presuppositions of Christianity must likewise be methodological. But it certainly seems that "God exists" is substantive. What sort of analogous, religiously methodological principles could be cited?

Then too one must question Demos' blasé assumption that a statement may be 'cognitive and meaningful' even though there is nothing at all of an experiential nature which is even relevant to its truth or falsity. One need not be a positivist to wonder about this.

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* In this connection, what of Demos' definition of faith as "the vision of things unseen"? Can he mean this seriously? In the context, he seems to mean "belief in the existence of the unevidenced." But, one often hears this quoted as implying that electrons, etc. are accepted on faith or not at all. This is clearly untenable, because evidence is relevant here. There are criteria for the true and false. At least it is incumbent upon Demos to show that such a statement is essentially a 'non-evidential' statement. He makes no attempt to do so, but rather, assumes that this (or some statement) is of that type.

Next, Demos' contention that the fact that scientists will treat nothing as 'brute-fact' but rather will assume that it will be explained is like the Christian's assumption that seemingly needless evil will be explained someday seems to have both an air of plausibility and a certain suspicious quality about it. He is certainly correct in maintaining that the scientist will not just say, "That is an unexplainable brute fact." But what will he do? Will he leave this fact 'outstanding' forever? Will he even count it as a fact? The Christian seems willing to do both. This is a complex matter and our later discussion of it will be important to our main point.*

Finally, a question which cuts across all of the above questions. Demos has apparently subscribed to the thesis that everything which science 'needs' which is unevidentiable is to be put into one category. Similarly, he seems to hold that whatever is basic to religion is to be put into one category; in fact, this is the same category. But can this be made out? What criteria are there for a statement qualifying for being 'respectable' although unevidenced. Surely it is not sufficient to say that it is unevidentiable, for any nonsense is unevidentiable. Therefore, the class of statements which Demos considers to be simultaneously cognitive, and important, and unevidentiable needs to be delineated. One cannot simply say that some statements are unevidentiable, but that's all right. The question is what statements are such.*

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* see below, Chapter V, on the 'difficulties' in Christian belief.

In sum, Demos' is much more clear than Hare and generally more plausible than Spurrier. In a less mysterious way, he raises many interesting points. But he leaves too many questions unanswered, too many points vague. For a more complete working-out of this approach to 'justifying' religious faith, we must look to the other writers.

* * * *

If we consider the 'progression' from Spurrier to Hare to Demos, we see a move from the claim that some ordinary everyday beliefs must be accepted on faith to the quite different view that some extraordinary, very general beliefs must be so accepted. For Spurrier such concrete beliefs as "I will be alive this evening" are in question; Hare is unclear on the difference, moving from "The Dons are out to murder me" to "There is an external world" without, it seems, understanding the vast difference between them; Demos, finally, relies entirely on the most general statements, the 'framework' statements, to support his claim that faith is necessary.

It is clear that the move from Spurrier to Demos, from the concrete to the general, is indeed a progression. That is, if the claim that we all, necessarily, accept many propositions on faith is to be made out, one must base one's argument on such general principles; otherwise, the claim simply has no plausibility for the reasons noted in the discussion of Spurrier and Hare. At the same time, we saw that the line which Demos takes itself raises a host of problems. In order to better understand the nature of these problems, it is now necessary to examine the distinction between what I have deliberately, up until now, called 'concrete' statements and what I have called 'general' statements. This examination will be the task of the next chapter.

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* Notice that this point is different from the above concerning what evidence one may have for accepting or rejecting such a statement. The question here is what these statements are, not why one should accept or reject them.

CHAPTER IV

Science and Philosophy: Frameworks, Paradigms, and the Analytic*

Carnap, in "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" [10]** has given a clear statement of the 'internal-external' distinction. His version of the distinction might be called 'absolutistic', i.e. he attempts to draw a hard and fast distinction between them.

Carnap's immediate concern is with the question, "Are there properties, classes, numbers, propositions?" (p. 21). His problem is that in certain contexts it "hardly seems possible to avoid" these, and yet, as an empiricist (and a "strictly scientific" thinker [ibid.]), he is committed to the meaninglessness of talking about their existence (or non-existence).*** Hence, he has devised a ploy to enable him to talk about them while simultaneously denying that he is committed to any non-verifiable ontological claims.#

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* The reader should be forewarned that this chapter, far more than any other in this essay, is intended to be purely expository. Our concern is not with the 'structure' of science or philosophy as such. Rather, Quine, et.al. are brought in here as a *tool* for clarifying theistic faith as it is characterized by Hick, et.al.

** In *Revue internationale de Philosophie*, 11 (1950). Reprinted in Linsky [55]. Page numbers are to the original (which are also given in Linsky).

*** I.e., as a logical positivist, he cannot admit that such statements, which are not empirically verifiable, can be meaningful.

# "Here we have a characteristic positivistic move, calculated to remove the sting from the original aspersions, to subtract insult from injury" (Morton White, *Toward Reunion*

He begins by drawing

> a fundamental distinction between two kinds of questions concerning the existence or reality of entities. If someone wishes to speak in his language about a new kind of entities, he has to introduce a system of new ways of speaking, subject to new rules; we shall call this procedure the construction of a framework for the new entities in question. And now we must distinguish two kinds of questions of existence: first, questions of the existence of certain entities of the new kind within the framework; we call them internal questions; and second, questions concerning the existence or reality of the framework itself, called external questions (pp. 21-2).

Carnap gives several examples to elucidate this distinction. We shall consider two of these which are of different types.

First, there is the framework of things, ordinary physical, observable spatio-temporal objects. (We do, of course, actually accept this framework on a 'pre-reflective' level, but we can, nonetheless, consider what it is to accept it.) If we accept this framework, then internal questions can be raised, e.g.,"'Is there a white piece of paper on my desk?', ...'Are unicorns and centaurs real or merely imaginary?...," etc. We answer these questions by conducting certain empirical investigations; just what these investigations will involve is specified by the rules which were incorporated in the

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in Philosophy [88], p. 100). It may be suspected, however that Carnap's motive is less to remove the insult to 'metaphysical philosophers' than to give himself an 'out' for talking in ways which seem to be non-sensical on his own criterion of meaning, e.g. about abstract entities. (Notice the tone of righteous indignation in this sentence: "It is certainly wrong to regard my semantical method as involving a belief in the reality of abstract entities, since I reject a thesis of this kind as a metaphysical pseudo-statement" [p. 36].)

framework along with the new ways of speaking. In sum, to introduce a new kind of entity into a framework is to: (1) introduce new ways of speaking; (2) specify rules which define the cases in which it is permissable to speak of these entities as real. If an object satisfies the rules it is said to be real. These internal questions which are settled by definite methods (empirical methods, in this case) are cognitive questions.

On the other hand, suppose we raise a question not of the reality of this or that particular object within the thing world, but the question of "the reality of the thing world itself." This is the question that only philosophers are concerned with (whereas internal questions may be the concern of anyone). This long-debated 'question', however, is not a genuine question at all.

> Realists give an affirmative answer, subjective idealists a negative one, and the controversy goes on for centuries without ever being solved. And it cannot be solved because it is framed in the wrong way. To be real in the scientific sense means to be an element of the framework; hence this concept cannot be meaningfully applied to the framework itself (pp. 22-3).

So, whether or not one is to accept the framework itself (the external question) is not a question of a cognitive nature since no definite yes or no answer is possible (p. 24); rather these are questions in which a decision is necessary (cf. pp. 23,29).

> If someone decides to accept the thing language, there is no objection against saying that he has accepted the world of things. But this must not be interpreted as if it meant his acceptance of a belief in the reality of the thing world; there is no such belief or assertion or assumption, because it is not a theoretical question. To accept the thing world means nothing more than to accept a certain form of language, in other words, to accept rules for forming statements and for testing, accepting, or rejecting them (p. 23).

There are, however, reasons which can be given for the acceptance of one framework rather than another. What reasons are relevant in a given case will depend upon what the purposes of the languages are. For instance, "the efficiency, fruitfulness, and simplicity of the use of the thing language may be among the decisive factors" (ibid.). It should be reemphasized, however, that the satisfaction of these criteria does not make it probable that it correctly describes the world.

> The thing language in the customary form works indeed with a high degree of efficiency for most purposes of everyday life. This is a matter of fact, based upon the content of our experiences. However, it would be wrong to describe this situation by saying: "The fact of the efficiency of the thing language is confirming evidence for the reality of the thing world", we should rather say instead: "This fact makes it advisable to accept the thing language" (p. 24).

The other example Carnap gives which we shall note is the system of numbers. Here, again, acceptance of the framework is not acceptance of the existence of anything whatsoever. There is no ontological question involved, but only a question of the convenience or inconvenience of adopting a certain language.

The only important difference between the character of this framework and that of 'things' is that in this case the internal questions are logical rather than empirical. "Here...the answers are found, not by empirical investigation based on observations, but by logical analysis based on the rules for the new expressions. Therefore, the answers are here analytic, i.e., logically true" (p. 24). For instance, the statement, "There is a prime number greater than a million," is true given the logical rules which are accepted in accepting the framework, but these rules which determine its validity are not to be applied to experience but simply allow us to perform certain logical manipulations. Hence it is an analytic statement. In sum, the only difference of note between this framework and the framework of things is that the internal questions of the former are decided by experience in conjunction with the rules of the framework and the internal questions of the latter are decided by purely logical manipulations which are licensed by the rules.

So, for Carnap, a question of the form, "Are there X's?" may mean one of two things: If it is meant as an internal question, it is to be answered in the affirmative if it is shown that indeed at least one entity satisfies the rules for being an x provided by the framework. (The question, "Are there physical objects?", is answered yes by showing that the paper weight on my desk satisfies the rules for being an object.)

If, however, this is meant as an external question, it is a 'pseudo-question' (cf, e.g. p. 25). In this sense it is the philosopher's question, the question of realism. As such, there are no rules for arriving at an answer, and the question makes sense only as the practical question of what language it is most convenient to adopt.

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In "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" [73]* Quine argues that two of the basic principles of modern empiricism, the analytic-synthetic distinction and reductionism, are totally unfounded, and therefore should be abandoned. "One effect of abandoning them is, as we shall see, a blurring of the supposed boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural science" (p. 20). This opening statement makes it immediately seem likely that Quine may provide encouragement for the theologian who puts forth hypotheses of a metaphysical character. In particular, if there is no absolute boundary between science and metaphysics the charge of the positivist that metaphysics is meaningless would, at the very least,be in serious doubt.

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* In Quine, From a Logical Point of View [71].

There are two classes of supposed analytic statements. First, there are those such as (1) "No unmarried man is married." This is a 'logical truth' where "a logical truth is a statement which is true and remains true under all reinterpretations of its components other than the logical particles" (pp. 22-3). Thus, this statement would be true no matter what is substituted for each occurrence of, e.g., 'married'. There is no particular problem about the analyticity of logical truths.

On the other hand, such statements as (2) "No bachelor is married" are also said to be analytic. This sort of statement, while not a logical truth, can be made into a logical truth, by substituting synonyms for synonyms. This, however, does not actually explain the analyticity of this statement, for "we have had in the above description to lean on a notion of 'synonymy' which is no less in need of clarification that analyticity itself" (p. 23). Quine goes on to argue that this invariably is the case; every attempt to elucidate the notion of analyticity leaves it as mysterious as it was before.

It would be beyond our present purpose to discuss all of Quine's arguments for this contention, but one or two should be mentioned by way of example. First, the simplest way in which one might try to explicate analyticity is to say that analytic statements are those whose denial is self-contradictory. But this just raises the same problems again, for such a statement is only the opposite of an analytic statement and hence is no less mysterious than the latter. "The two notions are the two sides of a single dubious coin" (p. 20).

Again, it is often said that analytic statements are true by definition. 'Bachelor' is defined as 'unmarried man', and thus replacing one by the other in (2) yields a logical truth. But this is also unhelpful. For how does one find out what the definition is? Appeal to a dictionary?

> Clearly this would be to put the cart before the horse. The lexicographer is an empirical scientist, whose business is the recording of antecedent facts; and if he glosses 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man' it is because of his belief that there is a relation of synonymy between those forms, implicit in general or preferred usage prior to his own work. The notion of synonymy presupposed here has still to be clarified, presumably in terms relating to linguistic behavior (p. 24).

Thus, this attempt to explicate synonymy by means of definition fails due to the fact that definition depends on a prior notion of synonymy.*

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* Other attempts to use definition for this purpose similarly fail (except for "the extreme case of the explicitly conventional introduction of new notations," which is unhelpful if one wishes to discover synonymous expressions), cf. pp. 25-7.

The general pattern of the argument should now be clear. The upshot is that there is no satisfactory way of explicating analyticity, because every seemingly promising attempt depends upon the assumption of the comprehensibility of some other crucial term, e.g. synonymy or interchangeability, which actually is understandable only if one has already a prior notion of analyticity.

Thus Quine can conclude: "For all its a priori reasonableness, a boundary between analytic and synthetic statements simply has not been drawn. That there is such a distinction to be drawn at all is an unempirical dogma of empiricists, a metaphysical article of faith" (p. 37).

There is, however, one more attempt to define synonymy which must be considered; this attempt is crucial in that it leads us to the second 'dogma', reductionism. "The verification theory says...that statements are synonymous if and only if they are alike in point of method of empirical confirmation or infirmation" (p. 37). Thus, any statement may be said to be analytic if it is synonymous with a logically true statement.

This leads to the question: "Just what are these methods which are to be compared for likeness? What, in other words, is the nature of the relation between a statement and the experiences which contribute to or detract from its confirmation?" (p. 39). The most simple answer to this is that of the radical reductionist. "Every meaningful statement is held to be translatable into a statement (true or false) about immediate experience" (ibid.). Such a view was held by Locke and Hume, and, at one time by Carnap. It has however, now disappeared into oblivion at least in its explicit form. The last proviso is necessary, however, for

> the dogma of reductionism has, in a subtler and more tenuous form, continued to influence the thought of empiricists. The notion lingers that to each statement, or each synthetic statement, there is associated a unique range of possible sensory events such that the occurrence of any of them would add to the likelihood of truth of the statement, and that there is associated also another unique range of possible sensory events whose occurrence would detract from that likelihood. This notion is of course implicit in the verification theory of meaning (pp. 40-1).

Therefore, "the dogma of reductionism survives in the supposition that each statement, taken in isolation from its fellows, can admit of confirmation or information at all" (p. 41). We have, then, worked our way from the analytic-synthetic 'dogma' to the reductionism 'dogma'. But,

> More directly, the one dogma clearly supports the other in this way: as long as it is taken to be significant in general to speak of the confirmation and information of a statement, it seems significant to speak also of a limiting kind of statement which is vacuously confirmed, ipso facto, come what may; and such a statement is analytic.
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> The two dogmas are, indeed, at root identical (ibid.).

The dogma of reductionism, then, implies that the analytic-synthetic distinction makes sense; but it was just this distinction that so "stubbornly...resisted any straightforward drawing" (p. 41), and therefore one must suspect that reductionism itself must be faulty. And, indeed, says Quine, that dogma is, on grounds other than the problem of the analytic-synthetic distinction, unsatisfactory, for it mistakenly says that the unit of significance is a single statement, whereas, "the unit of empirical significance is the whole of science" (p. 42).

As such, this statement seems highly mysterious. What is the point of saying that "The unit of significance is the whole of science"?

> The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges. Or, to change the figure, total science is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are experience. A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions readjustment in the interior of the field (p. 42).

We have a field of 'knowledge' which leads us to have certain expectations. If these expectations are not fulfilled, i.e. if we have an experience which is not expected, something must be changed. But we cannot say in advance what must be changed.

> If this view is right, it is misleading to speak of the empirical content of an individual statement-especially if it is a statement at all remote from the experiential periphery of the field. Furthermore it becomes folly to seek a boundary between synthetic statements, which hold contingently on experience, and analytic statements, which hold come what may. Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system. Even a statement very close to the periphery can be held true in the face of recalcitrant experience by pleading hallucination or by amending certain statements of the kind called logical laws. Conversely, by the same token, no statement is immune to revision. Revision even of the logical law of the excluded middle has been proposed as a means of simplifying quantum mechanics; and what difference is there in principle between such a shift and the shift whereby Kepler superseded Ptolemy, or Einstein Newton, or Darwin Aristotle? (p. 43).

Some statements are, of course, more likely to be revised than others; these are the statements on the 'periphery' of our total knowledge field. But they need not be revised. The central statements, those of "highly theoretical... physics or logic or ontology," might instead be revised. The basic aim of such revisions is simplicity. ("The edge of the system must be kept squared with experience; the rest, with all its elaborate myths or fictions, has as its objective the simplicity of laws" [p. 45].)

Just what will be included in our knowledge system? It follows from what has been said that there is no theoretical limit on what might be included.

> Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries-not by definition in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible posits comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of Homer...Physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind (p. 44).

In sum, by undercutting the analytic-synthetic distinction and the doctrine of reductionism, Quine has presented a new vision of knowledge. One no longer has a pattern consisting of analytic statements which require no empirical confirmation and synthetic statements whose truth is decided by simply checking them against experience. No single proposition can be so checked. If adjustment must be made it may be made virtually anywhere within the system, even within the realm of the supposedly analytic truths.

In effect, then, Quine is working to undercut the absolute distinction between internal and external questions as that distinction is drawn by Carnap. For, according to the latter, only external questions need be answered 'pragmatically'; internal questions, in particular, questions within the framework of science, are answered by straightforward empirical checking of those statements against experience. Rather, says Quine, all questions must be answered on 'pragmatic' grounds. Thus the answer to, "Is there a paper-weight on my desk? is no less pragmatic in nature than "Are there physical objects?" All statements are roughly 'in the same boat'. None can properly be considered in isolation from the others. This undercuts the whole rationale of Carnap's distinction* and leaves him without reason for maintaining that what he considers external questions, questions of ontology,** ("Are there physical objects?" "Are there numbers?" etc.) are non-cognitive because they are properly answered by pragmatic means, because they are unlike 'real' scientific questions.

Clearly, if that distinction is not made, one may now hold one of two positions: One could hold that all statements are essentially like Carnap's 'ontological' statements, not telling us about 'the way the world is' but only reflecting our choices of convenient ways of speaking; or one could hold that ontological statements are just that--ontological, telling us what is. At one point Quine seems to be adopting the former course:

Ontological questions, under this view, are on a par

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* We shall later discuss in what sense one might draw a similar distinction given Quine's argument.

** In line with his entire argument, Carnap thinks it

> with questions of natural science...Now Carnap has maintained that this is a question not of matters of fact but of choosing a convenient language form, a convenient conceptual scheme or framework for science. With this I agree, but only on the proviso that the same be conceded regarding scientific hypotheses generally (p. 45).

In saying that he agrees with Carnap here he seems to be saying that all of our 'knowledge' is of our own making, that it does not 'mirror the world'. But he may be making the quite different point that he is just agreeing with Carnap that our _method_ must be pragmatic but that such a pragmatic method is aimed at closer 'conformity with the world'.

That the latter is Quine's actual view is indicated in his essay "On What There Is" [72].* Here he is quite clear that the problem of ontology is a problem of what _is_.** He recommends "operating on a semantical plane" in debating ontology, but "we must not jump to the conclusion that what there is depends on words. Translatability of a question into semantical terms is no indication that the question is linguistic" (p. 16). Of course to choose an ontology does involve choosing a conceptual scheme, but, _pace_ Carnap, it is also to embrace a position concerning what is: it is not _just_ to choose the most simple way of talking.

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While Quine's argument is in many respects compelling, it

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misleading to call choosing a conceptual scheme choosing an 'ontology', cf. p. 32, note 2.

* Also in Quine [71].

** He could say of what 'exists' except that he earlier (p. 3) 'gave that word away' due to its being too much abused.

leaves most readers with a wholly justifiable feeling of dissatisfaction. The feeling is that something has somehow gone wrong, for no matter how difficult it might be to satisfactorily elucidate the analytic-synthetic distinction, surely it cannot be correct to treat "no bachelor is married" as anything but different _in kind_ from "no frog is ten feet long."* Thus, as Putnam points out, most philosophers were shocked at Quine's thesis and attempted to refute him by simply bringing up examples such as those just given. Putnam himself is in sympathy with their motivation: "No matter how long I might fail in trying to clarify the distinction, I should not be persuaded that it does not exist. In fact, I do not understand what it would mean to say that a distinction between two things _that_ different does not exist."** But most objectors have done nothing to show _how_ Quine is wrong, to clarify the nature of the distinction. "Philosophers who disagree with Quine have found themselves in the last few years in this position: they _know_ that there _is_ an analytic-synthetic distinction but they are unable to give a satisfactory account of its nature" (p. 360). Putnam attempts to give such an account, and thereby to make clear just where Quine is right and where he is wrong.

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* I would suggest that this is analogous to the feeling that one has in the face of the recalcitrance to analysis of counterfactual conditionals (cf. Nelson Goodman, _Fact, Fiction and Forecast_ [27]). No matter how long such statements resist analysis, it is difficult to believe that such a statement as, "If Jones had not fallen down on the five yard line, Tech would have won the game," is not clear in meaning.

** Putnam [70], p. 361.

While Putnam does maintain that there is an analytic-synthetic distinction to be drawn, and thus Quine is wrong, in a more important sense he holds that Quine is right.

> On the whole my story will resemble Quine's. This is to say, I believe that we have a conceptual system with centralities and priorities. I think the statements in that conceptual system--except for the trivial examples of analyticity, e.g. 'All bachelors are unmarried,' 'All vixens are foxes'--fall on a continuum, a multi-dimensional continuum. More or less stipulation enters; more or less systematic import. But any one of these principles might be given up, farfetched though it may seem, and perhaps without altering the meaning of the constituent words. Of course, if we give up a principle that is analytic in the trivial sense ('All bachelors are unmarried'), then we have clearly changed the meaning of a word...With Quine, I should like to stress the monolithic character of our conceptual system, the idea that "when trouble strikes" revisions can, with a very few exceptions, come anywhere (p. 366).

There are, then, two parts to Putnam's thesis: First, there is an analytic-synthetic distinction to be drawn, but it is not very important; second, with this exception, Quine is right. Most important, he is right concerning the 'monolithic character' of our conceptual system.

First, let us consider how the distinction could be drawn. Suppose someone simply invents a formalized language and

> singles out from all his postulates and rules a certain subset (e.g., "L - Postulates," "Meaning Postulates," and "logical axioms") and says that the designated statements, statements in the subset, are not to be given up, then these statements may be reasonably called "analytic" in that language (p. 381).

Quine does not deny that this procedure is possible (cf. above, P.112n). "Quine does not deny that some people may in fact hold some statements immune from revision; what he denies is that science does this, and his denial is not merely a descriptive denial: he doesn't think that science ought to do this" (pp. 382-3). The problem, therefore, becomes: Is there any reason for having such statements within a conceptual system, given that its over-all character is the monolithic one described by Quine?

The answer to this is: "Why not? It can't hurt." In fact, it has positive advantages. First, it makes brevity possible. Second, it increases the intelligibility. "Different speakers of the same language can to a large extent understand each other better because they can predict in advance at least some of the uses of the other speaker" (p. 383).

So far we have only seen reasons for thinking that the analytic-synthetic distinction is intelligible and useful in formalized languages. But can the distinction be made in natural language? The problem is that here there is nothing which can be construed as explicit stipulation in natural languages, therefore different criteria for analyticity must be used.

For natural language, then, Putnam suggests the following criteria for analyticity:*

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* These criteria do not automatically make up a definition of analyticity, but one might devise a definition by saying that any statement which satisfies these criteria is to be called 'analytic'. Notice here that this explication of 'analytic' depends upon actual usage (Putnam's #2 and 3). The failure to give consideration to this way of making sense of analyticity is, I think, a serious blunder on Quine's part; i.e. having pointed out that one cannot turn to the lexicographer to determine true synonymity since the lexicographer, in turn, is an 'empirical scientist' who bases his reports on actual usage (p. 24), one expects him to go on to consider actual usage as forming a criterion of synonymity. But, instead, he never mentions this possibility. Putnam, then, is supplying an important corrective here.

(1) The statement has the form: "Something (someone) is an A if and only if (he, she) is a B," where A is a single word.
(2) The statement holds without exception, and provides us with a criterion for something's being the sort of thing to which the term A applies.
(3) The criterion is the only one that is generally accepted and employed in a connection with the term.
(4) The term A is not a "law-cluster" word* (pp. 392-3).

The first criterion is not sufficient because it would be satisfied by some natural laws. The second means that people "can and do" use B to determine whether something is A. The third means that only B can show that the object in question is A. The fourth will require more elaborate discussion and we shall return to it shortly.

That a statement which satifies these criteria is analytic in the traditionally intended sense of the word is rather obvious. The essential point about analytic statements is that one would not have the slightest idea how to verify or refute them through experience. One could not, for instance, establish that all bachelors are unmarried by means of 'experiment' (a poll, etc.) because they are no independent criteria for determing whether a person is unmarried and whether he is a bachelor. "To verify or confute a statement of the form 'Something is an A if and only if it is a B' experimentally requires that we have independent criteria for being an A and for being a B... In short, there could hardly be theoretical grounds for accepting or rejecting it. It is for these reasons that such statements might plausibly be regarded as consituting the arbitrary fixed points in our natural language" (p. 396). Putnam, then, makes sense of the analytic-synthetic distinction by relying on how people actually do use words; the ultimate criterion is behavior, how people do go about establishing that a man is a bachelor. Even though one can, in this way, make sense of the analytic-synthetic distinction, it is possible to do so only in a very limited range of cases. For, as we have previously noted, Putnam holds that Quine is, on the whole, correct. To see just why this is so we need to explain the notion of a 'law-cluster' concept (as mentioned in the fourth criterion above).

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* Actually, it would seem that (4) is superfluous. For if 'A' is a 'law-cluster' word then (1), (2), and (3) could not all be met.

This is introduced (p. 378) in analogy to the Wittgenstein-inspired notion of a 'cluster-concept'. Consider the word 'man'. It does not seem to be analytic that a man has to have any specific properties, i.e., a being who was not rational, or who was feathered, might, nonetheless, be called a 'man'. So it seems that no single condition is necessary if someone is to be a man (and hence, it is not analytic that a 'man' has any specific properties). Rather,

> the meaning in such a case is given by a cluster of properties. To abandon a large number of these properties, or what is tantamount to the same thing, to radically change the extension of the term 'man,' would be felt as an arbitrary change in its meaning. On the other hand, if most of the properties in the cluster are present in any single case, then under suitable circumstances we should be inclined to say that what we had to deal with was a man (p. 378).

'Law-cluster concepts', which Putnam next introduces, are like this except that they "are constituted not by a bundle of properties as are the typical general names like 'man' and 'crow', but by a cluster of laws which, as it were, determine the identity of the concept" (p. 379). A law-cluster concept is one which enters into a great number of laws so that it is impossible to say that any one law determines its meaning.

The example which Putnam uses throughout is that of kinetic energy: "Certainly, before Einstein, any physicist might have said, '"$e=\frac{1}{2}mv^2$"; that is just the definition of "kinetic energy."'" (p. 368). That is, this was supposed to be an analytic statement. Then Einstein "changed this definition" But,

> it would clearly be a distortion of the situation to say, that 'kinetic energy$=\frac{1}{2}mv^2$' was a definition, and that Einstein merely changed the definition. The paradigm that this account suggests is somewhat as follows: 'kinetic energy' before Einstein, was *arbitrarily* used to stand for '$\frac{1}{2}mv^2$'. After Einstein, 'kinetic energy' was *arbitrarily* used to stand for '$m+\frac{1}{2}mv^2 + 3/8\,mv^4+\ldots$' This account is, of course, incorrect. What is striking is this: whatever the status of the "energy definition" may have been before Einstein, in revising it, Einstein treated it as just another physical law (pp. 370-1).

But how could it be treated as 'just another physical law' if it was 'set up' as a definition? The answer is simply that, no matter how it was originally regarded, now "it enters into a great many laws. It plays a great many roles, and these laws and inference roles constitute its meaning collectively, not individually, [and so] any one law can be abandoned without destroying the identity of the law-cluster concept involved, just as a man can be irrational from birth, or can have a growth of feathers all overhis body, without ceasing to be a man" (p. 379). That is, the meaning of 'kinetic energy' is highly complex, since each law into which it enters plays a role in the determination of its meaning.

The net result of Putnam's argument is, then, that one may make changes anywhere within the total framework of our knowledge and, in so doing, it cannot be said that one has simply 'changed the meaning of words', *unless* the change has been made in a case which meets the above criteria for analyticity. For, if a term enters into a number of laws, a change in any one of the criteria which is usually associated with that term cannot be said to change its 'meaning' (anymore than the admission of a feathered man would change the meaning of 'man').* Thus, while there is certainly a strong superficial resemblance between '$e = \frac{1}{2} mv^2$', and 'All bachelors are unmarried', the resemblance is *only* superficial:

> What makes the resemblance only superficial is the fact that if we are asked what the meaning of the term 'bachelor' is, we can *only* say that 'bachelor' means 'unmarried man,' whereas if we are asked for the meaning of the term'energy' we can do much more than give a definition. We can in fact show the way in which the use of the term 'energy' facilitates an enormous number of scientific explanations, and how it enters into an enormous bundle of laws... '$e= \frac{1}{2} mv^2$' is not and was not analytic, if by an analytic statement one means a statement that no one can reject without forfeiting his claim to reasonableness (p. 380).**

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* Suppose a being were found in a previously unexplored 'corner' of the globe which was just like a man in every respect except that he had feathers. One *could* choose to call this being a different name, but, in so doing, *something would be lost*, i.e. the similarities between him and the rest of us. Putnam's point is reflected by this: If a term is, on many counts used as before, but on one or two used differently, it cannot, without being misleading, be said that one has simply 'changed the definition' of the word in continuing to use it to apply to the same things. Crucial to this is that the extension of the term has been changed very little, whereas any change in the meaning of bachelor would involve a radical change in its extension (cf. p. 380).

** It may be objected that 'bachelor', while not now a law-cluster term could become one. Putnam admits this but says, nonetheless, that he (we) have every right to believe it will

It might now be objected that, no matter what is said about law-cluster concepts, there do seem to be principles of science (which *are* law-cluster) which nonetheless, no experiment could overthrow. This is true and indeed very important both in itself and for the purposes of the present essay. Certain basic principles of science ($e=\frac{1}{2} mv^2$, $f=ma$) "have a kind of preferred status. They can be overthrown, but not by an isolated experiment. They can be overthrown only if someone incorporates principles incompatible with those statements in a successful conceptual system" (p. 372). For instance, "no experiments with light rays or tape measures or with anything else...could have overthrown the laws of Euclidean geometry before someone had worked out non-Euclidean geometry" (*ibid*). Some principles are so central to science that it is imperative that an alternative should be available before it can be even rationally considered that they should be repudiated.* Notice that these central principles which cannot be overthrown by isolated experiments cut across the traditional analytic-synthetic distinction. *Any* 'central' theory, whether or not it was introduced by 'arbitrary stipu-

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not become one. If it *were* to become one it would indeed be dangerous to hold "All bachelors are unmarried" to be analytic, not subject to revision (cf. pp. 384 ff.).

* "Before the work of nineteenth-century mathematicians, the principles of Euclidean geometry were as *close* to analytic as any nonanalytic statement ever gets. That is to say, they had the following status: no experiment that one could describe could possibly overthrow them by itself. Just plain experimental results, without any new theory to integrate them, would not have been accepted as sufficient grounds for rejecting Euclidean geometry by any rational scientist. After the development of non-Euclidean geometry, the position was rather

lation, is to be rejected only if a plausible alternative is available.

* * * * *

The over-all view of human knowledge, and it is not less than that, put forth by Quine and Putnam is further developed by other writers whom we shall consider shortly. For the moment, however, let us 'take a break' and look back at Carnap's contrary views.

Carnap's views may be briefly summed up as follows: There are two and only two sorts of meaningful statements, analytic and empirical. The first group is composed of statements which follow trivially from the rules set up by the framework. The second group is made up of statements whose truth or falsity is determined by checking them against experience in ways that are specified by the rules of this framework. There are no other meaningful propositions. All meaningful statements either are necessarily true by virtue of the rules of this framework. There are no other meaningful propositions. All meaningful statements either are necessarily true by virtue of the rules of the language* (i.e. the rules

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different, as physicists soon realized: give us a rival conceptual system, and some reason for accepting it, and we will consider abandoning the laws of Euclidean geometry" (p. 374).

* I am not sure whether or not Carnap would also say that statements which are necessarily false by virtue of the rules of language (i.e. self-contradictions) are meaningful.

of the framework) or are simply checkable against experience in accordance with such rules. External questions, i.e. questions about which framework to adopt, are not cognitive questions at all, since they are answerable by neither of the foregoing simple methods, but rather depend on such pragmatic considerations as "the efficiency, fruitfulness, and simplicity" of the framework in question.

The net effect of what Quine and Putnam are saying, however, is that (apart from the trivial examples of analyticity) statements of Carnap's two groups, the analytic and the synthetic, are to be judged according to pragmatic considerations of the type Carnap reserves for framework 'statements'. The 'analytic' statements, then, are not trivially certain, the 'empirical' statements are not independently checkable against sense experience in the simple way the positivists envisioned, and the framework statements are themselves not to be put in a different class. The point is that _any_ statement may be revised under certain conditions, whether it seems intuitively to be analytic, synthetic, or 'framework'. And, further, the decision as to which statement(s) is to be revised in a given case will depend on pragmatic considerations.*

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* I have, in this paragraph, made a three-fold classification of 'statements', analytic, synthetic, and framework. It might be said that this is misleading, that framework statements are actually analytic in that they are not in question, not to be given up. Quine [73] (pp. 45-6) seems to think of Carnap's framework statements as (supposedly) analytic. Carnap, himself, however, makes a distinction between analytic and external statements: e.g. "The statement 'There are

The result of this is, of course, that Carnap's dichotomy -- empirical or rule of language -- is a completely spurious one. For in his formulation, 'empirical' means 'subject to straightforward experiential verification or falsification'. But, as Putnam makes clear, the important basic statements of science fall into neither category.*

We said at the beginning of this chapter that softening the line between 'speculative metaphysics' and science would seem to be salutary for the theologian. At the same time, however, the philosopher-theologians we are concerned with do want to make a distinction rather like Carnap's internal-external distinction. Can one make a similar distinction on the basis of a Quine-Putnam type analysis of the structure of science?

It is obvious enough that such a distinction can be drawn, and, in fact, is, in effect, drawn by Quine and Putnam themselves. For Quine, the statements to be regarded as 'framework' statements would be those, using his distance metaphor, furthest from the experiential periphery, the most general statements

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propositions' may be meant in the sense of (d); in this case it is analytic...If, however, the statement is meant in an external sense, then it is non-cognitive" (p. 26). Clearly, this sets up a disjunction, analytic or external. External statements are not considered to be analytic. But even though, for Carnap, the two distinctions are not the same, they are, nonetheless, interdependent. For the framework principles include the rules which entail that a given statement is to be considered analytic; i.e., the framework principles which are not in question within the framework include the rules by virtue of which some statements are necessarily true. But, of course, if the 'rules of language' are not sacrosanct then neither are the statements formulated in accordance with them.

* This will be important later (both in latter part of this chapter and in Chapter VI) since the contemporary 'analysts' wholeheartedly embrace this dichotomy (cf. Putnam, pp. 362-3).

which enter into the formulation of a great number of other statements, and which, therefore, cannot be changed without making radical alternations in the rest of the system (pp. 43, 44). And Putnam, also, says that there are certain basic principles, those which can be overthrown but not by any isolated experiement and only if another principle is available to take its place.

> There are many, many principles -- we might broadly classify them as "framework principles" -- which have the characteristic of being so central that they are employed as auxiliaries to make predictions in an overwhelming number of experiments, without themselves being jeopardized by any possible experimental results. This is the classical role of the laws of logic; but it is equally the role of certain physical principles, e.g., '$f = ma$,' and ... the laws of Euclidean geometry, and the law '$e = \frac{1}{2} mv^2$,' at the time when those laws were still accepted (p. 375).

It is such principles as these that Putnam describes as "as *close* to analytic as any nonanalytic statement ever gets" (p. 374). Thus, such basic principles are 'analytic' in that they are not in *question*,* and they are 'framework principles' in that they are assumed in a great many different experiments.

The Quine-Putnam arguments go a long way toward giving the sort of view of science (and, in fact of knowledge in general) that we are here concerned to expound. However, there is still far to go to completely develop this view. In particular, the work of T. S. Kuhn carries what Quine and Putnam say much further. His approach, however, is quite different in that his view is derived primarily from an analysis of the history of science.

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* Notice that Quine merely says that such principles are less likely to be given up than those 'on the periphery'; Putnam's point is stronger: They are not, ordinarily, in question *at all*. Kuhn (cf. below) concentrates on this point, calling

Kuhn entitles his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions [34],* and this title accurately mirrors his primary aim which is to distinguish between what he calls 'normal science' and the more radical changes in science, changes of 'paradigms', which constitute 'revolutions'.

First, what is a paradigm? There is no simple answer to this. An understanding of Kuhn's distinction comes about only by examination of his over-all thesis. Some initial attempt at explication must be made, however. Paradigms are "universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners" (p. X).

> Close historical investigation of a given specialty at a given time discloses a set of recurrent and quasi-standard illustrations of various theories in their conceptual, observational, and instrumental applications. These are the community's paradigms, revealed in its textbooks, lectures, and laboratory exercises. By studying them and by practicing with them, the members of the corresponding community learn their trade (p. 43).

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the framework principles 'paradigms'. (Actually, though, as we shall see shortly, a paradigm for Kuhn is not simply a principle. Rather, it also includes methods, applications, etc. The principles may not even be explicitly stated.)

* This book, far more than any other 'non-theological' work we shall consider (or for that matter, to my knowledge, in existence), is crucially relevant to the view of religion we are here concerned with. Partially for this reason, and partially because of the sheer scope of Kuhn's study, I frankly despair of doing it any sort of justice in the space available.

A change from one paradigm to another is

> a reconstruction of the field from new fundamentals, a reconstruction that changes some of the field's generalizations as well as many of its paradigm methods and applications...When the transition is complete, the profession will have changed its view of the field, its methods, and its goals. One perceptive historian... described it as "picking up the other end of the stick," a process that involves "handling the same bundle of data as before, but placing them in a new system of relations with one another by giving them a different framework." Others...have emphasized its similarity to a change in visual gestalt... (pp. 84-5).*

On the other hand,

> 'normal science' means research firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice (p. 10).

Initially, then, we see that a paradigm is a standard accepted theory (or complex of theories) which is central to the science in question, so central that learning the science is equivalent to learning about the paradigm. Further, the paradigm _defines_ problems which the scientist attempts to solve; this is the 'normal' job of the scientist, coping with the problems supplied him by the paradigm. The paradigm, then, gives rise to coherent traditions of research, such traditions as Ptolemaic and Copernican astronomy, Aristotelian and Newtonian dynamics, corpuscular and wave optics (p. 10).

The crucial point to be borne in mind is that, within normal science, the paradigm itself is _not_ in question. However, within the framework of the paradigm, there are "all sorts of problems" to be solved by those who accept it (p. 10; cf. pp. 17-18), for a paradigm is not accepted because it solves all the problems in a given field but because it solves some few problems which the scientific community has recognized as acute.

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* The historian referred to is Herbert Butterfield. His overall view of the workings of science is very similar to that of Kuhn; cf. Butterfield's _Origins of Modern Science: 1300-1800_ [9], _passim_.

> The success of a paradigm...is at the start largely a promise of success discoverable in selected and still incomplete examples. Normal science consists in the actualization of that promise, an actualization achieved by extending the knowledge of those facts that the paradigm displays as particularly revealing, by increasing the extent of the match between those facts and the paradigm's predictions, and by further articulation of the paradigm itself (pp. 23-4).

The three tasks of normal science given above should be briefly elaborated upon. First, extending the knowledge of particularly revealing facts: for instance, in chemistry, the boiling point of solutions would be investigated; in astronomy, concern might be with stellar position and magnitude; in physics, specific gravities of materials would be investigated.*

This first class of facts is investigated because such facts are of intrinsic interest. Some facts however, are determined simply because they provide opportunity for checking the theory against nature. Often such 'checking-points' are quite rare: Einstein's general theory of relativity, for instance, can be checked, at most, at three points.

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* The latter is a particularly obvious example of the way in which paradigms set the problems of normal science; i.e. apart from theory, the concept of specific gravity would be meaningless and hence there would be 'nothing to investigate'. This of course, also provides an obvious example of the way in which 'the facts' are theory-laden (cf. below).

> That attempt to demonstrate agreement is a second type of normal experimental work, and it is even more obviously dependent than the first upon a paradigm. The existence of the paradigm sets the problem to be solved; often the paradigm theory is implicated directly in the design of the apparatus able to solve the problem. Without the Principia, for example, measurements made with the Atwood machine would have meant nothing at all (p. 27).

The third type of experiment aims at further articulating the paradigm. This is often necessary because it may be ambiguous or simply incomplete. Newton, for instance, maintained that "the force between two unit masses at unit distance would be the same for all types of matter at all positions in the universe" (p. 27). But Newton himself did not attempt to give the actual size of this attraction; hence, Newton's paradigm needed further articulation; it was necessary to determine the size of this gravitational constant.*

The foregoing should be sufficient to illustrate the general character of normal science. Its essential feature, again, is that there is an accepted paradigm which may be further developed through the research but which is not itself in question. If it is seriously questioned, we are no longer in the area of normal science. It might seem that the second area mentioned above, determination of facts crucial to checking the paradigm against nature, is an area of calling the paradigm itself into question. But even here the paradigm is not actually in question; for a certain range of results (which would tend to confirm the paradigm) is expected, "and the project whose outcome does not fall in that narrower range is usually just a research failure, one which reflects not on nature but on the scientist" (p. 35).* In sum, "the aim of normal science is not major substantive novelties" (ibid.). This brings up a question.

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* The paradigm may be articulated in two ways other than specifying the constants of the theory: one may search for quantitative laws (e.g. Boyle's law); it may be necessary to carry out experiments to determine how the paradigm applies to areas other than that for which it was specifically invented (pp. 28-30). The examples given above all come under the general heading "determination of significant fact," i.e. they all involve experimentation and observation. Each of the three tasks of normal science, however, may be carried out from the point of view of theory (e.g. theoretically rather than experimentally articulating the paradigm) (cf. pp. 30-4).

> If the aim of normal science is not a major substantive novelty - if failure to come near the anticipated result is usually failure as a scientist - then why are these problems undertaken at all?...Bringing a normal research problem to a conclusion is achieving the anticipated in a new way, and it requires the solution of all sorts of complex instrumental, conceptual, and mathematical puzzles. The man who succeeds proves himself an expert puzzle-solver, and the challenge of the puzzle is an important part of what usually drives him on (p. 36).**

But what does it mean to say that normal science is concerned with 'puzzle'solving'? To begin with it means that it is not important whether or not the solution is of intrinsic interest or importance (p. 36).* But it is important that it is known that there is a solution. Thus, normal science is so far concerned with puzzles since, often, the problems tackled are merely matters of articulating some practically unimportant aspect of the paradigm, and it is known that there is a solution (since the paradigm is not in question and it dictates that there is some solution).**

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* This means that if experiment does not agree with theory, so much the worse for experiment. This is truly a shocking contention to the positivist (and I suspect to the layman). We might say now that this is the basis of a major point of correlation between science and theology which we shall later develop.

** This immediately brings to mind the cry of the analytic philosophers that they are concerned with solving puzzles, indeed that this is all any philosopher can do. We shall return to this later in this chapter since it is one of our main concerns to establish certain correlations between science, philosophy, and theology.

Closely connected with this is a second criterion for something being a 'puzzle'. "If it is to classify as a puzzle, a problem must be characterized by more than an assured solution. There must also be rules that limit both the nature of acceptable solutions and the steps by which they are to be obtained" (p. 38). For instance, to make a picture with a jigsaw puzzle one could simply scatter the pieces at random (thus creating a work of abstract art). But that would not be a 'solution', since it would not be in accordance with the rules (e.g. interlocking all the pieces).

In a somewhat similar manner, a paradigm supplies a set of rules which stipulate what will count as a solution to a problem.

> Throughout the eighteenth century those scientists who tried to derive the observed motion of the moon from

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* Think of jigsaw puzzles and crossword puzzles.

** Thus, many socially important problems are not even dealt with by a science, because there is no paradigm that provides guidelines for, and assurance of the existence of a solution (p. 37).

> Newton's laws of motion and gravitation consistently failed to do so. As a result, some of them suggested replacing the inverse square law with a law that deviated from it at small distance. To do that, however, would have been to change the paradigm, *to define a new puzzle, and not to solve the old one* (p. 39, italics mine).

Finally, a solution was discovered. The original puzzle was solved.

In the above, we have talked as if to accept a paradigm is to accept a set of rules. Indeed, this is true, in a sense, but, in another sense, it is misleading. Oridinarily, what scientists agree on is the paradigm itself; they may or may not agree on any set of rules.

> Scientists can agree that a Newton, Lavoisier, Maxwell, or Einstein has produced an apparently permanent solution to a group of outstandng problems and still disagree, sometimes without being aware of it, about the particular abstract characteristics that make these solutions permanent. They can, that is, agree in their *identification* of a paradigm without agreeing on, or even attempting to produce, a *full interpretation* or *rationalization* of it. Lack of a standard interpretation or of an agreed reduction to rules will not prevent a paradigm from guiding research...Indeed, the existence of a paradigm need not imply that any full set of rules exists (p. 44).

What are these rules? First, there are "generalizations..., explicit statements of scientific law and about scientific concepts and theories" (p. 40). For instance, there was the law that quantity-of-matter remains constant.

Next, there are "a multitude of commitments to preferred types of instrumentation and to the ways in which accepted instruments may legitimately be employed" (p. 40). Further, there are the 'quasi-metaphysical' commitments of science. For instance, Descartes' influential writings maintained that

> the universe was composed of microscopic corpuscles and that all natural phenomena could be explained in terms of corpuscular shape, size, motion, and interaction. That nest of commitments proved to be both metaphysical and methodological. As metaphysical, it told scientists what sorts of entities the universe did and did not contain: there was only shaped matter in motion. As methodological, it told them what ultimate law and fundamental explanations must be like... (p. 41).

Finally, there is simply a commitment to 'scientific method'. That is, he must be committed to understanding the world and to extending the range of laws which organize it for us.

Therefore, paradigms do imply a set of rules as set forth above, but these rules may not be explicitly stated; they may not even be accepted as rules by those who accept the paradigm itself.* However, under ordinary circumstances, science can get along without such rules. "Normal science can proceed without rules only so long as the relevant scientific community accepts without question the particular problem-solutions already achieved" (p. 47). Therefore, rules become important only when "paradigms or models are felt to be insecure" (ibid.). And so, "when scientists disagree about whether the fundamental problems of their field have been solved, the search for rules gains a function which it does not ordinarily possess. While paradigms remain secure, however, they can function without agreement over rationalization or without any attempted rationalization at all" (pp. 48-9).*

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* Kuhn here uses an analogy to Wittgenstein's notion of naming. We can all agree that what is going on there is a 'game' although we cannot say what it is that all and only games have in common. In the same sort of way, research problems may not "satisfy some explicit or even some fully discoverable set of rules and assumptions that gives the tradition its character and its hold upon the scientific mind" (p. 45).

So far we have discussed 'normal science' and have seen that this area can be characterized as an area of 'puzzle-solving', which entails that the basic theory is not in question, e.g. the inverse square law is not in question within normal science. This leads to the problem: under what circumstances might such basic laws and theories be brought into question? This will, of course, lead us into the quite different area to be called extraordinary science.

Normal science does not aim at novelty, at new sorts of facts. When it does attempt to make discoveries, these are such that they fit into a prepared niche in the pre-existing paradigm (e.g. the discovery of a new chemical element). However, occasionally genuine novelty (anomaly) comes forth. Such anomaly leads to further investigation in that area and eventually to scientific discovery, i.e. to new theories in which what was previously anomalous has its own 'niche'.**

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* This indicates one important difference between science, on the one hand, and philosophy and theology, on the other. The latter disciplines seem to be more typically in a situation in which they need to spell out their rules; i.e., their 'paradigms' are not usually as secure as are those of science.

** 'Discover', in the sense in which it occurs in 'oxygen was discovered', is not equivalent to finding anomaly: "discovering a new sort of phenomenon is necessarily a complex event, one which involves recognizing both that something is and what it is" (p. 55). For instance, Priestley isolated a "gas that was later recognized as a distinct species" (p. 54), but he did not so recognize it. Rather, for him, it was dephlogisticated air. Therefore, only in a highly peculiar sense can he be said to have 'discovered oxygen'.

In this way, new paradigms are brought into being.* But we have already had to bring in theory, and now we must turn to changes which clearly come about by the invention of new theories, such theories as those of Copernicus, Newton, and Einstein.**

For instance, consider the emergence of Copernican astronomy. The earlier Ptolemaic system had been highly successful when it was first developed (roughly from 200 B.C. to 200 A.D.). As time went on, however, more and more discrepancies between prediction and observation developed. This meant that the work of normal science was to reduce the magnitude of these discrepancies as much as possible; and, indeed, on the whole, each particular one could be largely eliminated.

> Given a particular discrepancy, astronomers were invariably able to eliminate it by making some particular adjustment in Ptolemy's system of compounded circles. But as time went on, a man looking at the net result of the normal research effort of many astronomers could observe that astronomy's complexity was increasing far more rapidly than its accuracy and that a discrepancy corrected in one place was likely to show up in another (p. 68).

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* Even though discoveries which follow from anomaly involve conceptual change it is not the case that each discovery involves a change of paradigm, for the change of method, expectation, and categories may not be so central to the science as to warrant this claim.

** Kuhn, of course, cannot draw a sharp distinction between discovering facts and inventing theories, since he has argued that facts (e.g. "That is oxygen") are theory-laden. Nonetheless, the process here described (Ch. VII) is different than that previously described, and the descriptions (discovering facts, inventing theories) are appropriate.

The net result of this was a general dissatisfaction with the entire system (thus, Copernicus said the entire "tradition he inherited had finally created only a monster" [p. 69]).

This situation, a situation in which the old paradigm has become tremendously complex without great gain in accuracy, in which many different versions of the paradigm are created, in which there is "increasing vagueness and decreasing utility" (p. 71), and therefore much dissatisfaction with the theory, is called by Kuhn a state of *crisis*. It is as a result of crisis that wholly new paradigms are put forth and accepted.

Two further characteristics of this type of situation are noteworthy. First, to a large extent the problems which finally led to the overthrow of the old theory were not new; it had been long known that these problems existed.* What was new was a sense of futility due to long-standing failure of the old theory to solve the problems, or due to its solving them only at the cost of great complexity and/or vagueness. Second, often the new theory is itself not new in that it had been at least partially anticipated at an earlier time when there was no crisis in the existing theory; at such times, the suggested replacement was rightly ignored.**

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* Therefore, in no sense can one say it emerges from discovery.

** Perhaps the most famous example of such anticipation is that of Copernicus by Aristarchus in the third century B.C. But there was *no* reason to accept this replacement at *that* time, since it was neither more simple nor more accurate than the Ptolemaic system and

So far, then, science will reject the old theory only at a time of crisis. But even prolonged crisis is only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for rejecting the old theory. The other condition is that there is always an available alternative. In a time of crisis, scientists

> may begin to lose faith and then to consider alternatives [but] they do not renounce the paradigm that has led them into crisis. They do not, that is, treat anomalies as counter-instances, though in the vocabulary of philosophy of science that is what they are... Once it has achieved the status of a paradigm, a scientific theory is declared invalid only if an alternative candidate is available to take its place. No process yet disclosed by the historical study of scientific development at *all* resembles the methodological stereotype of falsification by direct comparison with nature... The act of judgment that leads scientists to reject a

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there was then no reason to doubt that the Ptolemaic system would eventually solve the problems. The Copernican system also was not superior in respect to simplicity and accuracy; however by the time of Copernicus scientists had despaired of the Ptolemaic system solving its problems, and so, "the time had come to give a competitor a chance" (p. 76).

For a very different view of the failure of Aristarchus' system to be accepted over that of Ptolemy, cf. Koestler, *The Sleepwalkers* [52]. Koestler, however, does not, so far as I can see, give any reasons why the heliocentric theory should have been accepted except to call the system of Ptolemy "a monstrous system of astronomy, which strikes us today as an affront to human intelligence" (p. 50). But (a) this is mere 'name-calling', and (b) how it seems *today*, when we know how many problems developed from it, and how it would seem to a *rational* man of 2000 years ago are two quite different things. Koestler's book is lively and informative but in reading it one must bear in mind his over-all preconception, a natural preconception for a 'literary man', i.e. the conviction that scientists are 'sleepwalkers', basically irrational men who somehow have managed to make important discoveries. The 'punchline' of this contention is in the last few pages where he warns us against thinking that scientists are more rational than other men and against taking their 'materialistic' pronouncements too seriously (for a comment somewhat similar to this last, cf Gillispie, *The Edge of Objectivity* [26], pp. 43-4).

> previously accepted theory is always based upon more than a comparison of that theory with the world. The decision to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept another, and the judgment leading to that decision involves the comparison of both paradigms with nature *and* with each other (p. 77).

The above is purely descriptive (what scientists *do* do), but more can be said, for it is not just that the scientist *does* not reject a theory without embracing another; rather, he *could* not do so and yet remain a scientist. If one simply rejects the currently accepted paradigm without accepting another, he might do any one of a number of things - become an artist or a bookkeeper perhaps, but he cannot do so and remain a scientist. "Once a first paradigm through which to view nature has been found, there is no such thing as research in the absence of any paradigm. To reject one paradigm without simultaneously substituting another is to reject science itself" (p. 79).*

* * * * *

We have not yet said anything about scientific revolutions as such. "The preceding discussion has indicated that scientific revolutions are here taken to be those non-

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* Neither this statementnor the one preceding it is meant to be 'analytic', as it might seem to be; i.e. the claim is not, "If you do not accept a paradigm, I will not call you 'scientist'." Rather the point is that in the absence of a paradigm, there is little possibility of research in that there are no puzzles to be solved in the sense previously explained. The point is essentially that made by Popper when he maintains that theory must come before experiment since otherwise one is in a position of being told to go into a laboratory and 'observe!' But observe what? (Karl Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations* [68]. pp. 46-7).

cumulative developmental episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible new one" (p. 91). The justification for calling such changes 'revolutions' lies in their similarity to political revolutions. Both "are inaugurated by a growing sense, often restricted to a segment of the political [or scientific] community that existing institutions [paradigms] have ceased adequately to meet the problems" which they were designed to meet. In both cases, a "sense of malfunction," such as that Copernicus had, is prerequisite to the change.

The second, and crucial similarity, is that in both cases, the basic *structure is changed in ways which the structure itself prohibits*. In times of political crisis, society becomes "divided into competing camps or parties, one seeking to defend the old institutional constellation, the others seeking to institute some new one. And once that polarization has occurred, *political recourse fails*...because they acknowledge no supra-institutional framework for The adjudication of revolutionary difference..." Thus, they "must finally resort to the techniques of mass persuasion, often including force" (p. 92).

The same pattern is evident in scientific revolutions:

> Like the choice between competing political institutions, that between competing paradigms proves to be a choice between incompatible modes of community life. Because it has that character, the choice is not and cannot be determined merely by the evaluative procedures characteristic of normal science, for these depend in part upon a particular paradigm, and that paradigm is at issue. When paradigms enter, as they must, into a debate about paradigm choice, their role is necessarily circular. Each group uses its own paradigm to argue in that paradigm's defense.

> The resulting circularity does not, of course, make the arguments wrong or even ineffectual. The man who premises a paradigm when arguing in its defense can nonetheless provide a clear exhibit of what scientific practice will be like for those who adopt the new view of nature. That exhibit can be immensely persuasive, often compellingly so. Yet, whatever its force, the status of the circular argument is only that of persuasion. It cannot be made logically or even probabilistically compelling for those who refuse to step into the circle. The premises and values shared by the two parties to a debate over paradigms are not sufficiently extensive for that. As in political revolutions, so in paradigm choice--there is no standard higher than the assent of the relevant community. To discover how scientific revolutions are effected, we shall therefore have to examine not only the impact of nature and of logic, but also the techniques of persuasive argumentation effective within the quite special groups that constitute the community of scientists (p. 93).

Paradigm choice, then, is not a type of choice that can be "unequivocally settled by logic and experiment alone" (_ibid_.).

The last point, that paradigm choice cannot be "unequivocally settled by logic and experiment alone ," may be further substantiated by the realization that scientific revolutions are, quite properly speaking, changes in world views where the word 'view' is taken in its literal _perceptual_ meaning. "After a revolution scientists are responding to a different world" (p. 110).* This claim has several important implications for theology, but for now let us note just one: If a change from the acceptance of one paradigm to another is in important respects like the shift from seeing the duck to seeing the rabbit then one could not normally expect it to come about by simply having some new fact pointed out.

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* "Though the world does not change with a change of paradigm, the scientist afterward works in a different world" (p. 120).

Kuhn's point, that scientific revolutions are shifts in a world view, has been forcefully argued by Hanson.*

> Tycho** sees the sun beginning its journey from horizon to horizon. He sees that from some celestial vantage point the sun...could be watched circling our fixed earth. Watching the sun dawn through Tychonic spectacles would be to see it in something like this way.
>
> Kepler's visual field, however, has a different conconceptual organization. Yet a drawing of what he sees at dawn could be a drawing of exactly what Tycho saw, and could be recognized as such by Tycho. But Kepler will see the horizon dipping, or turning away, from our fixed local star. The shift from sunrise to horizon turn...is occasioned by differences between what Tycho and Kepler think they know (pp. 23-4).

He is saying here that Tycho and Kepler literally saw different things when looking at the 'same thing'. He is emphasizing the Gestalt quality of seeing (a quality which makes havoc of the positivistic conception of a 'neutral' observation language from which theories are constructed).

There is, however, a quite obvious implausibility in the claim that Tycho and Kepler saw different things. The obvious reply is that they saw the same thing but interpreted what they saw differently. This is certainly reasonable,

> for wherever it makes sense to say that two scientists looking at X do not see the same thing, there must always be a prior sense in which they do see the same thing. The issue is, then, 'Which of these senses

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* N. R. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery [29].

** Tycho thought the sun moved around the earth, but the other planets moved around the sun. Kepler, of course, placed the sun in the center. The best account of astronomy from Copernicus to Newton is probably Kuhn's Copernican Revolution [53]. Koestler's account [52] is also very good subject to the proviso given above (p. 142n). For a brief but good version, see Butterfield [9] passim.

> is most illuminating for the understanding of observational physics?"* (p. 5).

First, in what sense do they see the same thing? To begin with, "Tycho and Kepler see the same physical object. They are both visually aware of the sun" (p. 7). It is this fact that both see the same object that gives rise to the interesting philosophical question: Do they see the same thing?

Further, both have the same retinal images, but,

> seeing the sun is not seeing retinal pictures of the sun...If they are hypnotized, drugged, drunk or distracted they may not see the sun, even though their retinas register its image in exactly the same way as usual. Seeing is an experience. A retinal reaction is only a physical state - a photochemical excitation... there is more to seeing than meets the eyeball (pp. 6-7).

So, both see the same thing in that there is some common object which both see ("a brilliant yellow-white disc in a blue expanse over a green one" [p. 7], and therefore they have identical retinal images. This, however, is not sufficient to say that they *see* the same thing (except in one restricted sense of 'see'), because seeing involves more than retinal impressions and physical position.

To further explain how it is that Tycho and Kepler do not see the same thing, Hanson makes use of several standard figures. The most simple is the 'perspex cube' (p. 9, Fig. 1).

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* Notice that *this* is the question. The question is *not* "What is the ordinary use of the word 'see'?" (as the analysts would claim). The latter question is purely verbal and, as *such*, devoid of philosophic interest (cf. Feyerabend [20], p. 61n).

> Do we all see the same thing? Some will see a perspex cube viewed from below. Others will see it from above. Still others will see it as a kind of polygonally-cut gem. Some people see only crisscrossed lines in a plane. It may be seen as a block of ice, an aquarium, a wire frame for a kite - or any of a number of other things (pp. 8-9).

Again, it may be said that this is still seeing the same thing but interpreting what is seen differently. "This sounds as if I do two things, not one, when I see boxes and bicycles" (p. 9). And so this is an extremely artificial reply, for I am not aware of doing two things. It is not that I can catch myself seeing lines and then interpreting them in two different ways. The 'box' actually looks different to me at different times. What has changed when I suddenly see a cube from below (whereas before I had seen it only from above)? "The organization of what one sees changes" (P. 12).

> Organization is not itself seen as are the lines and colours of a drawing. It is not itself a line, shape, or a colour. It is not an element in the visual field, but rather the way in which elements are appreciated. Again, the plot is not another detail in the story. Nor is the tune just one more note. Yet without plots and tunes details and notes would not hang together (p. 13).
>
> As an example of such organization,
>
> Would Sir Lawrence Bragg and an Eskimo baby see the same thing when looking at an X-ray tube? Yes, and no. Yes-they are visually aware of the same object. No-the ways in which they are visually aware are profoundly different. Seeing is not only the having of a visual experience; it is also the way in which a visual experience is had (p. 15).

This brings us beyond the 'variable perspective' pictures. An X-ray tube does not change perspective as does the 'perspex cube'. Nonetheless, the basic point remains: The physicist sees it as one thing, the Eskimo baby as another (as a bright play-thing). The scene is organized differently for each.

> Contrast the freshman's view of the college with that of his ancient tutor...What are you doing over and above reading these words? Are you interpreting marks on a page? When would this ever be a natural way of speaking? Would an infant see what you see here, when you see words and sentences but he sees marks and lines?...The layman must learn physics before he can see what the physicist sees (p. 16).

It seems then that what is seen depends upon one's knowledge and theories about 'what is seen'. The conceptual organization of the 'picture' varies with such knowledge. "There is a sense, then, in which seeing is a 'theory-laden' undertaking" (p. 19). Tycho and Kepler do not share (some) theories about the sun; hence; their vision is differently organized.*

So far we have talked about seeing as; this however, is not a complete account of seeing. One must also consider seeing that.

> What is it to see boxes, staircases, birds, antelopes, bears, goblets, X-ray tubes? It is (at least) to have knowledge of certain sorts...It is to see that were certain things done to objects before our eyes, other things would result. How should we regard a man's report that he see X-ish things? Precisely as we would regard a four-year-old's report that he sees a meson shower. 'Smith sees X' suggests that Smith could specify some things pertinent to X. To see an X-ray tube is at least to see that, were it dropped on stone, it would smash (pp. 20-1).

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* The most important difference between the duck-rabbit shift and, say, a shift from a Tychonic to a Keplerian view is that the latter is not reversible (cf. Kuhn [34], pp. 85, 110).

This may sound as if in seeing one sees that certain things are the case _and_ one sees an object as something, i.e. it sounds as if there are two 'operations' going on. Such an account would be quite wrong, however. "'Seeing as' and 'seeing that,'... are not psychological components of seeing. They are logically distinguishable elements in seeing-talk, in our concept of seeing" (p. 21). "Seeing an object _X_ is to see that it may behave in the ways we know _X_'s do behave: if the object's behavior does not accord with what we expect of _X_'s we may be blocked from seeing it as a straightforward _X_ any longer" (p. 22).

These considerations bring us back to the initial claim about what Tycho and Kepler _see_. Each is confronted with the same phenomenon, but each sees this _as_ different phenomena; each sees _that_ something is happening, but they do not see that the _same_ thing is happening. The only alternative to this account is to say that they see (claiming that this is the _only_ acceptable sense of 'see') the same thing, but that they interpret their experience differently. This would not be so much false as misleading, since it implies that _first_ one sees, and _then_ one places an interpretation on what is seen. But there are not two distinguishable steps in seeing (compare the perspex cube; one finds it 'switching back and forth'; one does not first see a set of lines and then think of it as being above or below one's line of vision. The 'switch' is in the vision); the 'process' is one. The physicist and the Eskimo baby simply see different things.

Nonetheless, the temptation to say that they do not see different things remains strong. While Tycho and Kepler disagree about what they see, the fact remains, as we have observed before, that they both see a yellow-white disc. This, it might be said, is the 'neutral given' and is all they see. But (while the intuitive plausibility of this remains), it would seem to be impossible to develop this notion of the 'neutral given' in any satisfactory manner.

> Bragg and the baby share no knowledge of X-ray tubes. They see the same thing only in that if they are looking at X they are both having some visual experience of it. Kepler and Tycho agree on more: they see the same thing in a stronger sense. Their visual fields are organized in much the same way. Neither sees the sun about to break out in a grin, or about to crack into ice cubes. (The baby is not 'set' even against these eventualities.) (p. 18).

The point, of course, is that the common 'neutral object', the bright disc, is common only because they share many 'theories'; if they shared none, then there would be no way of specifying this supposed neutral object.*

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* Similarly, if, you see a duck and I see a rabbit in a 'puzzle-picture', it is tempting to say that the given neutral object is 'lines on a page'. But this too is theory-laden, involving as it does concepts of lines, pages, and the relationship 'on'. "Surveying the rich experimental literature from which these examples are drawn makes one suspect that something like a paradigm is prerequisite to perception itself. What a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his previous visual-conceptual experience has taught him to see. In the absence of such training there can only be, in William James' phrase, 'a bloomin' buzzin' confusion.'" (Kuhn, p. 112). "The scientist who looks at a swinging stone can have no experience in principle more elementary than seeing a pendulum. The alternative is not some hypothetical 'fixed' vision, but vision through another paradigm, one which makes the swinging stone something else" (Kuhn, p. 127).

Now, there is a further temptation to undercut the importance of this explication of 'seeing'. Is this not a linguistic point of little intrinsic interest? It is in accord with ordinary usage to say that we 'see' ducks or rabbits when looking at lines on a page, but, since it has been admitted that we both see the same thing in some sense, we are only quibbling about how we shall use the word 'see'.

Part of the answer to this has been given two paragraphs back. The sense in which Tycho and Kepler see the same thing involves specifying a thing which is itself theory-laden. Hence the difference between the senses in which they do and do not see the same thing is not a difference between theory-laden and neutral seeing. Second, even if there were a sense in which we see a given, neutral object, the point is that such a 'seeing' would not be appropriate for explicating science. That is, the point is not that we do in fact use the word 'see' in this or that way; it is that the only notion of 'see' which does not distort what scientists do is the notion that entails that seeing is theory-leaden.

To see this consider the inverse side of this picture, i.e. let us turn from seeing to what is seen, the facts. "For 'tough-minded' philosophers, observation is just opening one's eyes and looking. Facts are simply the things that happen; hard, sheer, plain and unvarnished" (p. 31). The facts are there; we see the facts, and we build a theory around them.

It should, by now, be clear that this is an extremely artificial picture. "Yes", says the observer looking at the duck-rabbit picture, "it is a fact that that is a picture of a duck. But another observer, more closely acquainted with rabbits and unaware of the 'look' of a duck says that it is a picture of a rabbit. And, this, it seems, is also a fact. Thus, in this sort of case, the facts one observes are dependent upon one's knowledge, one's complex of concepts.

But one's concepts are dependent upon one's language.

> We say 'The sun is yellow,' 'The grass is green,' 'Sugar is sweet,' 'Bears are furry.' In this adjectival idiom, yellowness, greenness and sweetness are properties which inhere (passively) in the sun, grass, sugar and bears. They are built into the objects of which we speak. Now convey such information by means of verbs, as in Arabic and Russian: say, 'The sun yellows,' 'The grass greens,' 'Sugar sweetens' and 'Bears fur' (p. 32).
>
> Grouping 'The sun yellows' with 'The bird flies' and 'The bear climbs' might incline us to view the dawn as a yellow surge over the horizon, a flood of colour enveloping the earth around us...Discursive thought and speech have the same logic. How could the two differ? Speaking with colour-words as verbs just is to think of colours as activities and things as colouring agents...If everyone spoke thus how could one insist on its being a fact that the sun is yellow...? (p. 33).

The way in which we think about 'events' depends upon our concepts; 'the facts' differ according to what concepts we have, what 'knowledge' we bring into our experience. If you (who know only Russian) and I (who know only English) were to draw a 'picture of a fact', say of a brown bear, we could draw the same thing; our pictures might be identical. Yet, we are not aware of the same facts: For you, the bear is browning (doing something), for me, the bear is brown (it is not doing anything at all, in respect to its brownness) (cf. p. 34).

Facts are what we see when we are performing scientific experiments. But what we see depends upon what we know, and hence 'the facts' depend upon our prior knowledge. They are not 'just there', waiting for us to find them and build a theory around them.*

If this is the case, we can see more clearly why the preceding argument concerning 'seeing' is not an argument about the ordinary use of words. We are concerned with the scientist's observation of the facts, and now we can understand that 'the facts' are not 'given', but are dependent upon background knowledge, concepts, language. Given this, there is simply no use for a 'neutral given', even if it were possible to make sense of this notion.

Perhaps, however, a more concrete example of the 'theory-laden' character of facts would be in order. Feyerabend says that it is an "indication of the 'manufactured' character of the experimental evidence...that observable results, and indeed anything conveyed with the help of a language, are always expressed in some theory or other"([20], pp. 51-2). Again, "experimental evidence does not consist of facts pure and simple, [i.e. facts as Hanson's 'tough-minded' philosophers would have them], but of facts analyzed, modeled, and manufactured according to some theory" (pp. 50-1).

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* "Theories, of course, do 'fit the facts', but only by transforming previously accessible information into facts that, for the preceding paradigm, had not existed at all" (Kuhn, p. 140).

In order to show this, Feyerabend chose the problem of motion. The problem here is simply the cause of change. Aristotelian science had a solution to this:* "'Motion is a process arising from the continuous action of a source of motion, or a "motor," and a "thing moving"'" (p. 53).** This means that any motion is a result of a constant force (as a cart drawn by a horse). However, there are obvious problems if one considers, e.g. a stone which is thrown, since the force ceases when the stone leaves the hand, but the motion continues. Therefore, the above was elaborated by means of impetus theory.

> According to the impetus theory, the motor (for example the hand) transfers upon the projectile an inner moving force which is responsible for its continuation of path, and which is continually decreased by the resisting air and by the gravity of the projectile (p. 53).

This theory then goes on to define motion in terms of the forces which bring it about as hypothesized in the above. "Adopting the impetus theory the motion of a stone thrown would have to be characterized by its inherent impetus, which pushes it along until it is exhausted by the opposing forces of friction and gravity" (p. 54). The result of this is the following law: "The impetus of a body in empty space which is not under the influence of any outer force remains constant" (ibid.) I shall call this statement 'A').

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* This, of course, is not to say that Aristotle put forth a theory of impetus. This theory was only developed in the fourteenth century. Aristotle himself thought that a moving, but 'unattached' object, say an arrow, was pushed along by the air behind it (cf. A.C. Crombie, Augustine to Galileo [10], pp. 242-258; Butterfield [9], Ch. 1).

** Feyerabend, in turn, is quoting from Clagett, p. 425.

Now, interestingly enough, (A) yields "correct predictions about the behavior of material objects" (p. 54), so it cannot "taken by itself, be attacked on empirical grounds "(p. 55). But consider the scientist who prefers Newtonian physics; he will have no use for the concept of impetus. His empirical results will, in a sense, be the same; quantitatively his results will not differ. But he is not measuring impetus. What he is measuring is momentum.

But if the results of measuring impetus and momentum are the same, is it not the case that they are identical? Not at all,

> For whereas the impetus is supposed to be something that pushes the body along, the momentum is the result rather than the cause of its motion...In the Newtonian physics it is the state of being at rest or in uniform motion which is regarded as the natural state. This means, of course, the explicit denial of a force such as the impetus is supposed to represent (p. 56).

It is clear from this that two physicists, one basically an Aristotelian, the other a Newtonian will be presented with two different facts when they encounter an object in motion. For the one, the object will be being pushed along by the basic force; for the other it will just be moving (because there is nothing to stop it). The facts are different because the theories are different. It cannot be claimed that there is a 'neutral fact' which is to decide between the theories. There is no such neutral fact; nor is there anything about 'the facts' which would legislate in favor of one theory or other.* Each has his own 'fact', determined by his own theory, and each has a 'factually adequate' theory. Neither has to 'twist the facts'; what each sees confirms his own theory.

I remarked earlier (above, p.145) that if paradigm shift is analogous to the duck-rabbit shift, then one would not expect it to be simply the result of some new fact being pointed out. It is noteworthy that some of the most important new paradigms in the history of science came about not at all due to some new fact being found.** Two examples should suffice to make this clear. Galileo, in arriving at his conviction of the independence of weight from rate of fall, saw the motion of a pendulum differently than did the

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* This does not, of course, mean that there are no grounds on which to choose between the two. It only means that direct experiment will not prove any superiority of momentum over impetus.

** Earlier the point was made that a new 'fact' is never coercive since it can always either be incorporated into the old system or, in extreme cases, be explained away as illusion. The point here is different. In the present cases, there was no new fact to explain away. Rather, the 'same old facts' were suddenly seen in a new light. 'Same old facts' here refers to those facts on which the discarded paradigm was based.

Aristotelians. "But note that genius does not here manifest itself in more accurate or objective observation of the swinging body. Descriptively, the Aristotelian perception is just as accurate" (Kuhn, p. 118).* Or, perhaps more striking, consider Copernicus displacing the earth from the center of the universe. Copernicus made no new observations; he had neither the equipment nor the interest in observation to enable him to do so. In fact, he based his theory on the old Ptolemaic tables and thereby created problems for his theory that need not have been there. For the Ptolemaic tables were not accurate in certain places which caused Copernicus' theory to diverge from the supposed facts when in truth it did not diverge from those which more accurate observation would have supplied. Copernicus, then, can in no way be said to be driven by new, and anomolous, facts; rather, his system derived entirely from a new vision which he applied to the 'old facts'.

Much of this section can be summed up now in only a few words. Normal science develops the paradigm in a variety of ways, but its aim is not to test the paradigm, for

> Paradigms are not corrigible by normal science at all. Instead, as we have already seen, normal science ultimately leads only to the recognition of anomalies and to crises. And these are terminated, not by deliberation and interpretation, but by a relatively sudden and unstructured event like the gestalt switch... Though such intuitions depend upon the experience,

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* "Regularities that could not have existed for an Aristotelian...were consequences of immediate experience for the man who saw the swinging stone as Galileo did" (Kuhn, p. 123)

> both anomalous and congruent, gained with the old paradigm, they are not logically or piecemeal linked to particular items of that experience as an interpretation would be. Instead, they gather up large portions of that experience and transform them to the rather different bundle of experience that will thereafter be linked piecemeal to the new paradigm but not to the old (Kuhn, pp. 121-2).

We have now completed this rather lengthy survey of the views of some recent writers on the structure of science. It is now time to attempt to sum up what has been said. The summary, in short, is simply that science does not work along the lines that the positivists thought it did. Science does not proceed by holding up this law and that theory to some set of neutral facts, rejecting those that do not fit these facts and accepting those that do; or, if more than one fits, accepting that which is most probable. Rather science proceeds pragmatically, as Quine says. A change from one paradigm to another occurs for an individual when he undergoes a perceptual shift, and, by extension, one could say that one paradigm has replaced another *in science* when all (or virtually all) of the leading practitioners of a given science undergo this perceptual shift. It was, for instance, only some hundred years after Copernicus that the heliocentric system achieved acceptance by even the intellectual leaders. The reasons for this were only partly scientific; as, if not more important than strictly scientific considerations, was the fact that removing the earth from the center not only changed astronomy but involved a change in man's whole view of *himself*, his morality, his religion; in sum, it destroyed his society, his entire world-view.

The (rational*) grounds for his perceptual shift seem to be many and varied. Those which we would normally think of as 'strictly scientific' include simplicity, 'fit' with other areas of science i. e., there could be no even nearly conclusive grounds for accepting the hypothesis that the earth is moving if this did not make sense from the point of view of the only known physics), no terribly important failure to account for known observations, and, most important, promise of solving problems which have proven intractible under the old thoery.**

But,further, the pragmatic considerations would seem to extend beyond the area which we normally think of as 'strictly scientific'. Copernican astronomy, as mentioned, was long rejected not only for astronomical and physical reasons, but also because it would have (and eventually was seen to have) destroyed man's entire view of himself, for his place in the universe, and his relation to God.***

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* This proviso must be added because scientists are influenced by factors which we should all agree are not rational. For instance, it was an important factor in Kepler's placing of the sun in the center of the universe that he had mystical feelings which amounted to sun-worship.

** Although, of course, the problems will not be exactly those the old theory faced, since basic theory, in a sense, creates its own problems.

*** cf. Kuhn [53], passim. and below Chapter VI.
I do not see that we can say that taking into

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We have already contrasted the Carnap thesis with that of Quine and Putnam, and we saw that the upshot of what the latter are saying is that the positivistic view of meaning and indeed of rationality is extremely artificial, that the scientist does not and, indeed, should not proceed by testing individual hypotheses against experience, rejecting any that seem to be contradicted by that experience. In sum, scientific procedure is not a simple one of the verification and falsification of individual statements.

The Kuhn-Hanson-Feyerabend analysis corroborates and extends this in two major ways. First, there is Kuhn's point that the paradigm itself is not in question within the context of normal science. This, notice, is exactly the same point that Putnam made when he said that some basic scientific principles are virtually analytic and are not in question. But Kuhn goes beyond this in pointing out that no paradigm ever solves all of the problems with which it is faced. That is, there are always anomalies, recalcitrant observations which the paradigm cannot account for. Further, if a sicnetist's experimentation produces results which are anomalous, his experiment is regarded as a failure; it does not, in itself, ever lead to the rejection of the paradigm. This is further elucidated by describing normal science as 'puzzle-solving'; one cannot solve a puzzle by changing the

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consideration such 'extra-scientific' considerations is not rational unless we also say that scientific beliefs are absolutely 'provable' by scientific means. But it is the latter that is being denied above.

rules. In sum, one might say that the scientist is committed to the paradigm and that mere observation of anomalous results is not, nor should be, sufficient to shake that commitment.

And yet, even though the scientist at a given time is thoroughly committed to the paradigm, paradigms do change; one is rejected, another accepted. The point we have emphasized is that, however this comes about, it does not come about just because of the occurrence of anomaly. Anomalies, with respect to a paradigm, are not to be equated with counter-instances if the latter are thought of as refutations of the paradigm.

Paradigm change, or 'revolution', is complicated by its being a change in world-view; under a new paradigm the world 'looks' different, the facts are no longer what they were before. (This is the second major point brought out by Kuhn, etc.) This means that adherents to opposing paradigms necessarily are talking at cross-purposes. Each sees a different world and each has his own set of facts on which to argue. In sum, each must assume his own paradigm in order to argue. There are no neutral facts to which both can appeal. Hence, argument becomes largely a matter of persuasion, attempts to make the other see the world 'through' his paradigm. The process is certainly not one of straightforward appeals to some neutral set of facts.*

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* Kuhn, in fact, repeatedly uses the religious term, 'conversion'. For instance, "The transfer of allegiance from paradigm to paradigm is a conversion experience that cannot

Science, then, is not the coldly logical process of verification and falsification it is so often thought to be. The positivistic version of scientific method comes to appear to be a set of aberrations of minds longing for simplicity. And 'scientific revolution' comes to have all of the implications of 'rule-lessnes' that does its political counterpart.

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Up until this point the nature of philosophy itself has been mentioned only in passing.* At the same time, quite a bit of what was discussed in the last chapter bears on the nature of philosophy; in particular, this is true of the attacks on the analytic-synthetic distinction. It is now time, however, to turn explicitly to the question of the nature of philosophy because it has been argued by Nicholas P. Wolterstorff** recently that philosophy does necessarily involve faith, a faith which is a kind of 'vision'. We have already seen arguments to the effect that science involves such vision, a sort of vision which cannot be based on 'hard and fast' evidence. If it can be made out that the same is true of philosophy, then two-thirds of the theistic argument is accomplished. It remains only to be argued that religious faith is 'vision' in the requisite sense.

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be forced" ([34], p. 150); "If the paradigm is one destined to win its fight, the number and strength of the persuasive arguments in its favor will increase. More scientists will then be converted..." (p. 158).

* e.g. Demos mentions philosophy; above p. 94 .

** "Faith and Philosophy" [91], in Faith and Philosophy, The traditional view of philosophy is far from this one. Philosophy's most famous practitioners have not thought of themselves as supplying us with vision, or with faith, with persuading us to see the world differently. Rather, they have thought of themselves as giving 'hard and fast' arguments, proofs that this is the way things are, that these are the facts.

> A problem is posed; an answer to the problem is offered; when necessary the answer is clarified so that we know exactly what is being said; then the answer is held up to the facts to see whether or not it is correct. A question is asked; a thesis proposed; the meaning clarified; and then confirmed or disconfirmed. Our goal in philosophy is truth: We are to accept what a philosopher has said on the basis of whether he has spoken truthfully or not. To speak truthfully is to report the facts correctly. (pp. 3-4).

Wolterstorff says that while this has been the traditional aim of philosophy, each major philosopher has felt that, up until him, the previous attempts have met with failure. Bacon, Descartes, Kant, Moore, and Schlick were in agreement that, prior to their own writing little had been accomplished.* Philosophy has failed to be cumulative in the

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Alvin Plantinga (ed). The argument of this chapter often does not follow Wolterstorff. That is, I sometimes depart from him and give other examples which seem to me to make his point more clearly.

* Wolterstorff quotes from these, pp. 4,6. The list could be expanded to include virtually all of the great names in philosophy. This is not to say that there are no exceptions, Hegel and Aristotle being perhaps the most obvious. But in spite of their more 'reverent' attitude toward past philosophy, even they had their own 'revolutionary' methods.

way that science and mathematics seem to be.* Each philosopher had to begin anew rather than build on the knowledge his predecessors bequeathed him.

But the great philosophers were in agreement not only on the fact that there had been no progress in philosophy, but also on the reason for philosophy being thus unique.

> The source, say the modern philosophers, is a mistaken method, or some crucial mistaken assumption. Science and mathematics have found their correct method, philosophy has not. Method for what? For seeing the facts aright, for getting at truth. Men purge their lives of disagreements in many ways: by threats, by persuasion, by appeal to authority. But the great modern philosophers are all apostles and ministers of reason, so these techniques are not available to them. It is their conviction that philosophical disputes can be settled by a calm objective appeal to the facts. Our difficulties arise from not approaching the facts aright.. What is necessary, then is...the removal of the faulty spectacles. What is needed is a new approach for philosophy, and once this new approach is found and adopted philosophical disputes will be settled in the same way scientific disputes are settled--by objective appeals to the facts (p. 5).

To illustrate what Wolterstorff apparently has in mind, one might consider Descartes. Philosophy before him had made no progress because it did not demand that one begin with clear and distinct ideas. Thus, all was confusion and the facts remained unknown. But, said Descartes, if we restrict ourselves to clear and distinct ideas and what can be deduced from these, we will arrive at the facts; we will find out what really is the case. All we need is this new method. "Once a person accepts this whole approach, then he has indeed a definite method for settling philosophical disputes" (p. 6; referring to Schlick's characterization of his method).

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* In the light of the foregoing argument 'seem to be' is, of course, all that can be said. Wolterstorff is apparently in agreement with the view that science is cumulative in a. in a straightforward way.

Wolterstorff is presenting the traditional characterization of the difference between philosophy and faith. It is rationality versus irrationality (or, at least, arationality). It is precisely this traditional view which he now wishes to challenge.

> In what follows I want to discuss some aspects of the relation between faith and philosophy. And especially I want to discuss this view that philosophy makes objective appeals to the facts; and that whatever else faith does, it cannot hope to compete with philosophy, at the cost of irrationality (p. 8).

Today, when knowledge of 'facts' is so exclusively connected with science, Wolterstorff's way of putting his point may seem naive. But it remains the case that Descartes, Kant, Moore, Schlick, et. al. each believed that his method would once and for all give us knowledge of the facts, whether these be straightforward 'empirical facts' or what have been called 'metaphysical facts' (e.g. that God exists).

Consider, on the other hand, a completely different, more sceptical, and more modern, view of philosophy.

> Metaphilosophy may be defined as the result of reflection of the following inconsistent triad:
> (1) A game in which each player is at liberty to change the rules whenever he wishes can neither be won nor lost.
> (2) In philosophical controversy, the terms used to state criteria for the resolution of arguments mean different things to many philosophers; thus each side can take the rules of the game of controversy in a

> sense which will guarantee its own success (thus, in effect, changing the rules).
> (3) Philosophical arguments are, in fact, won and lost, for some philosophical positions do, in fact, prove weaker than others.*

In this light, we can fairly simply characterize Wolterstorff's positive claim concerning the nature of philosophy. One can escape inconsistency by rejecting any one of the propositions which make up Rorty's 'inconsistent triad', and Wolterstorff's method is to reject (3); i.e., he is, in effect, denying that philosophical arguments are won or lost, if this means that one side or the other _triumphs_ by means of rational arguments. His aim in doing this should, in the over-all context of the present essay, be obvious enough. He wishes to maintain that the 'validity' of philosophical arguments is dependent upon what presuppositions one adopts, i.e. dependent on one's particular _faith_. But, of course, if such a faith is necessary (and therefore 'all right') in philosophy, then one cannot complain that religion is irrational on account of _its_ assumptions.

The rejection of (3) results in what can be called metaphilosophical scepticism. But, as Rorty points out, there are varieties of this: pessimistic and optimistic.

> Pessimistic sceptics hold that an understanding of (1) and (2) shows that philosophy is no occupation for grown men; they are the sort who desert philosophy for mysticism, logic, or political activism. Optimistic sceptics note that although any philosophical argument can, indeed, be gotten around, the ways

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* Richard Rorty, "Recent Metaphilosophy" [76], in _Review of Metaphysics_, Dec., 1961, p. 299.

> which philosophers think up to get around them are inherently valuable, because of the "vision" which they achieve in the process of doing so. From this point of view, philosophical argumentation is not a search for truth, but an occasion for inspiration. ([The latter position] has recently been well formulated by Waismann.) (p. 300).

It is not clear that Wolterstorff would accept either of these alternatives in just the way it is stated. Rather, he seems to hold to something like the second alternative without, however, the clause "philosophical argumentation is not a search for truth"; i.e., philosophy is indeed a matter of 'vision' but some 'visions' may be closer to the nature of reality than others.

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So far, then, since a philosopher is "free to change the rules" as he goes along, metaphilosophical scepticism would seem to be a plausible position. Put in this abstract way, however, the point is neither very clear nor very convincing. To help make it both, consider just one way in which philosophers actually do attempt to establish their conclusions: They often cite counter-examples.

> When do philosophers cite counter-examples? One circumstance in which they do so...is when someone has made a generalization to the effect that all X's are P, and someone else finds or thinks he finds an X which is not P. [Philosophers] have spoken of appealing to the evidence, of finding the evidence decisive or indecisive for or against a certain view; and they have accused other philosophers of overlooking and ignoring certain facts; Whitehead held that Hume had overlooked the "connectedness" of our experience... and Hume claimed that prior philosophers had overlooked the fact that the negation of a causal proposition is never self-contradictory...I think it is very difficult, however, to find any examples which are clearly and unambigously of this sort (Wolterstorff, pp. 9-10).

He maintains that such arguments are far from being 'hard and fast', that there is nothing coercive about them. The basis of what he wishes to show is this: First, the premise of a counter-example argument is seldom such that one can accuse those who refuse to accept it of irrationality; second, even if the premise is accepted, it is always possible (rationally possible) to refuse to accept the conclusion.

What seems to be one of the most straightforward counter-example arguments in the annals of philosophy is Moore's 'refutation' of the claim that there are no physical objects. And yet the very straightforwardness of this argument makes it seem philosophically very odd indeed.

> It has been frequently remarked that in their interminable struggles philosophers never both to look to the facts to see who is right and who wrong, or, if one of them ostensibly does, his foes pay no attention. Moore, of course, tried to do just this, but everyone involved, even the spectators, thought it quite irrelevant and a bit disgraceful when he held up his hand in disproof of his Berkeleian opponents.*

Just what is responsible for the 'oddness' of this alleged proof?

Wolterstorff's analysis of this argument runs like this: Moore maintains that if a person doubts that there exists anything outside himself, this doubt can be refuted by citing the fact that according to our common sense view, each of us knows that he has hands, legs, a head, etc. But if such knowledge is dictated by common sense, then it must be so. And his point is that this argument need not be seen as compelling. First, one may deny the premise: the 'plain man', once the nature of the problem has been made clear, may no longer claim to know that he has arms, etc. And second, at any rate, "does the ordinary man hold that he knows that he has hands? How do we tell?" (p. 11). There are clearly two different questions being asked here.* Taking the second first, how do we know whether or not the ordinary man, in ordinary non-philosophical contexts, would claim to know that he has hands? Now Moore is apparently just relying on his own acquaintance with people and what they believe. But there is a problem here, for, since

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* Everett Hall, Philosophical Systems [28], p. 26.

> Moore is an academician with at least some of the restrictions of social contact that this implies, his interpretation of the content of common sense is not beyond challenge. And if challenged there seems nothing to do, in this general framework, save to employ more reliable methods of ascertaining what it is that people do generally believe. The American pollsters and public opinion analyzers have at hand such methods (Hall, pp. 153-4).

While this would indeed seem to be the most reliable way of determining what people think they know, there certainly is, as Hall puts it, an "incongruity [In] the combination of G. E. Moore with the American pollsters" (p. 154). The following discussion should help to understand this intuitive incongruity, but I think it is fair to say now that what we are confronted with is that the oddness that appeared initially in Moore's arguing from the plain man's beliefs to the existence of the external world is simply heightened by the realization that the ideal way of determining what those beliefs are is by taking a door-to-door poll. That is, if it seems odd to think that the beliefs of the plain man are the philosophical touchstone, it seems even more odd if one considers what is implied by this, i.e. that we could solve our philosophical problems by hiring _Gallup, Inc_. to take a poll.

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* From the context of his second question, I am not certain he means to be asking two different questions. Nonetheless, it seems clear he does ask two different questions.

But let us assume that we can find out what the plain man believes without the benefit of such a poll, i.e. let us use the more fallible method of relying on our own acquaintance with other people. Now Wolterstorff's first question comes into play. Is it not likely that the plain man, _once the nature of the question is made clear to him_, will no longer be so certain that he has hands? For, after all, what would the plain man take you to mean if you asked him if he knows that he has hands. To begin with he would certainly think you to be a very strange person indeed and would probably quickly give an affirmative reply and attempt to escape from your company as soon as possible. Now why would the question seem so strange? Simply because, to the ordinary man, the question would only make sense in a context in which there was doubt as to whether the person _did_ have hands (or whether he knew that he had hands).* To put this a somewhat different (and perhaps more obscure) way: To the ordinary man, the question, "Do you know that you have feet" and the question, "Do you know that you have hands" are questions which have entirely different imports, hands and feet being quite different things. For the philosopher, though, the two questions have exactly the same import, since his concern is not with hands and feet *as hands and feet* but with hands and feet as physical objects (and thus, the question, "Do you know that you have a nose?" would do quite as well).*

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* i.e., The question, "Are you certain that you have hands?", would make sense in ordinary contexts either if I am sceptical as to whether you do have hands (e.g. if I had just come upon you in an amputee ward with your arms encased in gigantic bandages) or if I know that you have hands, but I do not think you know it (e.g. if you had been suffering from strange delusion about being handless).

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* Hall makes the same point in somewhat different terms. "Here we may tear a leaf from the casualists own book. We cannot be sure that these beliefs will perform properly if taken out of their appropriate contexts. Now the original and proper context of Moore's examples ("Here is a hand"...), as he himself quite specifically emphasizes, was in each case a practical situation of everyday life...But Moore's whole purpose is to use them in the philosophical context... Now have we any reason to suppose that with this shift of context they retain their incontestibility? I do not see that we have.

"[Moore's] response amounts to the contention that, as far as it is relevant to the claim of certainty, the philosophical context is not to be distinguished from the ordinary one of everyday life...Now I must confess that this leaves me completely unmoved. I cannot conceive that any philosopher who has questioned the existence of the external world has meant thereby to doubt the existence of any particular man's hand in the way one would if he thought the hand artificial or simply missing. Philosophical doubts, for example doubts about an external world, are questions about the whole framework of the world, about categorial features of it, not specific items in it that are subject to observational checking" (Hall, pp. 103-4).

For a similar criticism, cf. White [88], Ch. III, in particular, pp. 58-9, where it is made clear that Moore *presupposes* what philosophers doubt, i.e. the *in toto* existence of the external world (the framework). Notice that the oddness of relying on Mr. Gallup is partially explained by this; i.e. the persons questioned would not understand the question in its philosophic sense.

But, again let us be generous and grant Moore his premise, i.e. grant that the plain man is certain that he has hands and that the content of his belief is such that, *if what he believes were to be true*, it *would* refute all doubts concerning the existence of the external world. This leads us to the second way in which one may question philosophic counter-example arguments. One can simply state that he fails to grant that universal belief is an indication of truth. That is, one may "not see that the views of the ordinary man have anything to do with the matter" (Wolterstorff,p.11).* This changes the situation considerably. At first, it seemed that a straightforward counter-example was being offered to a 'generalization', but now the proponent of the generalization *accepts* the counter-example, but refuses to accept its *relevance*. That he can do this, without being absurd (since there is nothing absurd in refusing to accept the claim that whatever the 'man on the street' is certain of is, therefore, true), shows there is something more to philosophical counter-examples than simply 'presenting a counter-example'.**

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* The claim that we should accept such 'common sense' beliefs as true is even more puzzling in light of the fact that Moore *admits* that there has been universal acceptance of false beliefs at times in the past (Hall, p. 99). For an interesting discussion of just what Moore really meant by his 'certain beliefs of common sense', cf. Hall, pp. 99-104, 152-155.

** Again, the idea of taking a poll is important. Whatever intuitive appeal Moore's method may have is greatly lessened by the realization that the poll is the best way to implement that method.

In sum, then, alleged counter-example arguments are "indecisive for two reasons."

> In the first place, we found that the truth of the premises could frequently if not always be brought into question. And secondly, we found that even if the philosopher accepted the premise offered, he could still question the relevance of the premise to the conclusion and insist that he did not see why, if he accepted the premise, he should or must also accept the conclusion (p. 14).*

Philosophers, then, typically argue in a way that is not coercive, unless we accept their premises (such as: the final 'court of appeal' is to be ordinary language, common sense, clear and distinct ideas, etc.). But why should we accept such premises and/or procedures? Wolterstorff's answer is that there can be no hard and fast reasons given. Any premise to show we should accept the procedure (the premise) will itself be open to question.

Wolterstorff is far from alone in maintaining that philosophic arguments are inconclusive in the above way. Waismann's* general approach is exactly the same.** Hall, also, is in basic agreement that philosophic arguments are inconclusive because something is presupposed, and hence, unproven. Concerning for instance, Ryle's often-used method, attempting to show that other philosophic positions are confused, because they involve 'category mistakes', he says that it is not true that things _just_ _do_ belong to different categories. Rather, it is only if one _assumes_ _a_ _system_ in which A belongs to one category and B belongs to another that on can say that speaking of A and B as if they were in the same category is a mistake. "When [Ryle] uses the absurdity of coupling, it works only if one has already accepted the categorial disparity of the things designated by the coupled expressions..."([28], p. 30).***

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* This obviously raises the possibility that the philosopher should make his arguments completely coercive by adding a premise (or a 'rule of inference'), i.e. the premise that would make the conclusion logically follow from the previously given premise. But could this help? For if their premises were thus clearly stated, their conclusion would be greatly decreased in scope. Consider Moore's argument again: If its logic is to be strengthened by the addition of a premise the premise must be a very obvious one (otherwise it in turn would be questioned, and nothing would be gained). But what very obvious premise is possible? "Moore wants the conclusion from his survey of common sense beliefs to be, not that ordinary men believe, or say, they know that they have hands, but that they know they have hands" (p. 17). That is, the obvious (but also completely trivial) premise which Moore could state would be: If the common man claims to know that he has hands, then he claims to know he has hands. But what Moore wants to do is to move from what the common man claims to know to what the common man knows (and therefore, what is the case). But this is hardly self-evident, (in fact, it might plausibly be maintained that the explicit statement of such a principle would

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weaken the appeal of Moore's 'argument' rather than strengthen it.)

* F. Waismann, "How I see Philosophy" [84], in _Contemporary British Philosophy_, _Third Series_, H.D. Lewis (ed).

** In fact, the first two sections of Wolterstorff's article are so similar to Waismann's earlier article that one suspects that there is an unacknowledged 'debt' here.

***"[Ryle] fails to see that such 'mistakes' are mistakes only to or for one in a certain categorial framework and mark the intrusion of alien categories. He assumes that they are, right off, simply there or not there and he looks for a test of their occurrence quite apart from all commitments, yet it is patent to an outsider that he is metaphysically involved... Indeed the whole business in Ryle's hands is really circular, for the contradictions arising from categorial errors arise only if one is already committed to a framework in which they must appear as errors..." (Hall, pp. 28-9).

As an example of the way in which Ryle presupposes categories, consider his claim that "Mr. Pickwick is a fictious person" leads to a contradiction. Ryle's point is that a

If we grant for now, that philosophers are typically caught in the 'egocentric predicament' described above, what is it that they are 'really' trying to do?

> Of course, philosophers do not typically try to persuade us, by any non-violent means whatsoever, to accept a certain procedure. Rather, they try to get us to "see" that a procedure is the correct one and that a certain other procedure is _incorrect_; and consequently that there is a definitely correct answer to the question. But enough has been said to make us wary here. If we ask the philosopher why a certain procedure is the correct procedure, and why a certain answer is the correct answer, all the same questions can be asked about his response to us; Why must we accept his premise? And why, if we accept his premise, must we also accept his conclusion? If there are no conclusive arguments in philosophy, there are none here either. "Seeing" that a certain method is the correct one is is more like being converted than like following a proof (Wolterstorff, p. 19: cf. P. 16).

For instance, should Ryle be considered as attempting to _prove_ his claims?

> What we sometimes do in a philosophical discussion is not argue at all but simply raise lots of questions--a method brilliantly employed by Ryle. Indeed, a volley of perplexing questions can certainly not be described as an argument and _a fortiori_ not as a logical one, yet it is no less _effective_ in making one turn back in recoil to consider one's views (Waismann, pp. 473-4, cf. pp. 481-2).

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fictitious 'person' is not a kind of person at all, for, if 'he' were a person he would have to have been born in a certain year, which, being fictitious, of course he was not. But, as Hall points out this is true _only if_ one has already set up one's categories in such a way that being a person involves being actually born. But one _need not_ do this. "Suppose we operate in a system that allows being to fictitious entities and that has fictitious persons as a subclass of such entities. Then we can admit a genus, persons, made up of actual persons and fictitious ones. Here for the former variety only is it true or even significant to say that they are born (that is, actually born...)" (p. 29). So it is a category mistake if one has decided it will be a category mistake; otherwise, it is not.

That is, Ryle asks lots of questions, questions which, on the Cartesian view, it is difficult to answer satisfactorily. But his view, he says, supplies answers. Eventually, with enough questions and examples before us, we may come to 'see' 'minds and bodies' the Ryle sees them.

Or to return to Wolterstorff and his examples: Some may be convinced by Moore. "Yes, common sense is the philosophical touchstone." Others may find Kant's scathing comments concerning common sense convincing.* Perhaps Moore 'saw' something Kant missed; or did Kant 'see' something that Moore missed?** In either case, one cannot refute the other by argument, since the relevance of that argument may or may not be 'seen'. Therefore, a change from Kant's views to those of Moore is like being 'converted'.

But what now of the traditional view that philosophy must present us with the truth? must be in accordance with 'the facts'?

> Is there then no truth in philosophy? Suppose that in a certain puzzle I see a duck and a rabbit, whereas my friend sees only the rabbit. I then trace the outline of the duck, to get him to see it. But now it develops that where I see lines he sees only dots, etc. That is philosophy. Did I then not see the duck? Was there no duck to be seen? And what if I see only the duck and he sees only the rabbit? That is even

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* Kant's comments (in the Prolegomena) are quoted by Wolterstorff, pp. 11-12 n.

** Is it that one party is blind or is the other suffering from a philosophic illusion? The question here is strictly analogous to the question as posed by Frankena concerning the disagreement between ethical intuitionists and naturalists (and also non-cognitivists). (W.K. Fronkena, "The Naturalistic Fallacy," in Readings in Ethical Theory, W. Sellars and J. Hospers (eds.).

more like philosophy (p. 20).*

In sum, philosophy is basically a matter of 'seeing'. 'Objectivity', in the sense of the disinterested search after truth, is debunked. One's results depend upon one's method, and one's method is a matter of choice, or, better, of insight; no method can be proven to be the method.

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Are we now in a position to say that a Waismann-Wolterstorff type of analysis of philosophy must (if one is to be rational) be accepted? The answer is, of course, that we are not in such a position. We have only presented that view, and what corroboration has been given has taken the form of examples, examples which seem to strengthen the general claim that philosophers' conclusions depend upon their starting points; in particular, the examples seem to substantiate the point that what conclusions they reach depends upon the method which they initially adopt. Nonetheless, the point is far from 'proven'.

One might say, though, that there must be some initial act of faith, since any argument necessarily has to begin somewhere.* Indeed, this claim may seem to be as self-evident as any can be. Ultimately, however, I do not think that we can say that such a claim is a 'necessary truth' anymore than the principles of Euclidean geometry can be said to be self-evident in abstraction from other knowledge. For, after all, an important part of the argument of this chapter has been that what is 'self-evident' is dependent upon the system which one has adopted. Perhaps, indeed, it is conceivable that one could find a system, a basic methodology which is in some sense self-justifying, or one which is actually indubitable (no matter from what point of view one views it)**or even one which contains no presuppo-

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* Compare Waismann: At some point, a person "'sees' the question differently. And in what does this consist? Well, in the fact that he is now well aware of the analogies which were misleading him, that he sees the question against a different linguistic background (a 'figure' sometimes changes when it is seen against a different 'ground'), that a certain strain disappears and that he says, with a sigh of relief, 'Yes, that's it'...What matters is more like changing his outlook than proving to him some theorem; or more like increasing his insight. Insight cannot be lodged in a theorem; Insight cannot be demonstrated by proof" (p. 469).

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* This, indeed, is often taken to be self-evident. In effect, I think that both Ayer and Strawson take it to be so (see Ch. VI, below). Also, in ethics, Bentham (*Principles of Morals and Legislation* [6], I, XI) and Mill (*Utilitarianism* [64], p. 44) do so. These are just some examples of important writers who clearly resort to the 'argument' that what cannot, in principle, be justified, therefore needs no justification (cf. below, Ch. VI, pp. 269-85, for discussion of such a position).

** Contemporary 'analytic' 'Oxford School') philosophers sometimes seem to want to claim that their method falls within this category. This is, in effect, they claim that they are not *committed* to a methodology, i.e. they have not *chosen* one over another, because their methodology is in *itself* certainly correct.

There is a kind of plausibility in this claim. For instance, when Malcolm says that "ordinary language is correct language" or "ordinary language must be right" (quoted in Hall, p. 101), there seems to be a sense in which one cannot argue with him. This sense is exactly that in which one cannot argue with a lexicographer as to whether his definition of a word is correct on any grounds other than the way in which it is actually used. That is, it would be completely beside the point to tell him that that is not the correct definition of a word on the grounds that it *should* (for some reason) not be used that way. This is where the claim that "ordinary usage is correct usage" gets its plausibility. That is, it appears to be a trivial claim about language itself. As such it is incontestable.

However, once assent to this trivial claim is obtained, there is a shift to substantive claims such as Ryle's, "There are no such [i.e. mental] happenings...there is no [mental] world" (*Concept of Mind* [77], p. 161) and somehow thecertainty of the trivial claim is supposed to be maintained in spite of the shift to the material mode. The point is that the analyst cannot have it both ways. But he often attempts to do so by appearing to be making a trivial point about how we use words and then shifting to a substantive claim. On the other hand, though, he *may* claim that while he begins from ordinary language, this language is indeed the source of knowledge of the correct way of talking about the world. Warnock seems to be making such a claim in this passage. "To dismiss or ignore the wide variety of ordinary idioms as being 'merely verbal' is evidently to imply that it just *happens* (uninterestingly) to be the case that there is here a number of different ways of speaking, to imply that between them there are no significant differences. But it is surely enormously unlikely that this should be so. For language does not develop in a random or inexplicable fashion...The existence of a number of different ways of speaking is very likely indeed to be an indication that there is a number of different things to be said...Where the topic at issue really is one that does constantly concern most people in some practical way--as for example perception, the ascription of responsibility, or the assessment of human character and conduct--then it is certain that everyday language is as it is for some extremely good reasons...In such areas language is, as it were, a store-house of long-garnered principles and distinctions, enshrined there because they have been found important enough to merit specific linguistic recognition" (*English Philosophy since 1900* [85], pp. 150-1). I interpret this as does Feyerabend, "If I understand this passage correctly, it means that the existence of certain distinctions in a language may be taken as an indication of similar distinctions, in the nature of things, situations, and the like"([20] p.87).

I should also agree with Feyerabend's basic criticism: If a language that is spoken and is of practical value is assumed to be *eo ipso* correct language, then it would never be justifiable to introduce a *new* language, a new set of concepts (pp. 87-89). But if this were true, then we should all still be speaking the language of the Aristotelian-Christians of the Middle Ages (assuming we could progress *that* far). For a brilliant example of a specific way in which ordinary language may be a dangerous guide if *really* considered as inviolate, see Feyerabend's analysis of the terms 'up-down' (pp. 85-6). This type of example counts against both the claim that if a language is used it must contain the correct categories and the further possible claim that spoken languages are free from any categorial commitments.

sitions.* Nonetheless, in the absence of any clear candidate for a methodology which might have a status such as one of those just mentioned, we shall proceed as if Wolterstorff's argument concerning the nature of philosophy is the most plausible candidate for acceptance.**

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While the main purpose of this chapter is to give accounts of the basic structure of scientific and philosophical procedures in order to elucidate the structure of religion, the bases for some interesting points of comparison between science and philosophy themselves seem to have emerged. The comments that follow, however should be regarded as essentially incidental by-products of the major emphases of the essay, by-products which are, in their present form, little more than mere suggestions, but suggestions which might point the way toward fruitful further thought and research.

The primary implication of the discussion of this chapter seems, clearly enough, to be that science and philosophy are not as different in structure and methodology as they may appear. Perhaps the most interesting part of this is that the two are brought closer together not just by claiming that philosophy is 'scientific' or that science is 'philosophical'. Rather, each seems to have aspects which traditionally have been attributed only to the other.

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* Hall (Chapters III-V) argues that all such attempts fail. For comment on Hall's arguments therein, see Rorty [76]. I might add that it does indeed seem to me to be self-evident that some presuppositions must be made. But this, no doubt, is because I am within my own framework, and therefore I take as 'analytic' that which might seem dubitable or even false to another (cf. Hall, p. 42; Rorty, p. 306).

** I here should like to refer the reader back to the first note to the first page of this chapter.

To see this, consider the following passage from Hall concerning the ways in which one finds a given philosopher's categorial commitments* and compare it with Kuhn's description of a paradigm. First, Hall says that, in general, "We are to look for categorial commitments everywhere in the language of a philosopher" (p. 35). In particular

> When we see something so generally characteristic of a system that its removal would result not in a gap but in the collapse of the whole thing, something that is involved structurally in it, that cannot properly be translated into another standpoint without distortion or transformation into nonsense, that cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed observationally, that, within the system, appears foolish to challenge because it is analytic, but taken from outside, if not empty, then obviously synthetic--in any such something we have a categorial commitment...To this we may add that what we find a philosopher to accept as the kind of thing it is to exist, to refer, or to be valuable, together with sorts of "proofs" he allows as cogent in establishing cases of these *in concreto*, gives us insight into what is categorial for him (pp. 39-40).

Looking carefully at this passage, we can see a number of points of similarity between a scientific 'paradigm' and a philosophical 'categorial commitment'.** According to Hall, a philosophical system would collapse in the absence of the paradigm; for Kuhn, a new paradigm entails "a reconstruction of the field from new fundamentals" (p. 84), clearly implying that the 'old' version of the discipline collapses when the paradigm is taken away. That this is indeed the case is substantiated by the following considerations.

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* For Hall, each philosopher is committed to a set of categories, categories such as 'physical objects', 'sense data', 'non-natural properties', etc. This is his way of making the Waismann-Wolterstorff sort of point discussed above; the categories accepted by a philosopher determine the starting-points and methodologies of that philosopher, and hence, cannot be justified *within* his system.

** Henceforth, I shall often call the basic set of categories accepted by the philosopher a 'paradigm'.

One cannot transform elements of the philosophical paradigm into "another standpoint without distortion or transformation into nonsense." In a similar way, one cannot transform talk about, e.g. impetus, into talk about momentum without making nonsense of both the Aristotelian and the Newtonian framework. An attempted translation of 'impetus-language' into 'momentum-language' does result in nonsense unless the whole system is changed. Or, as a philosophical example consider Bouwsma's burlesque of Moore (in Hall, p. 45). One can talk (perhaps) in terms of sense-data or in terms of 'things', but one cannot have it both ways at once without falling into nonsense.*

That which "within the system...appears foolish to challenge because it is analytic, but taken from outside, if not empty, [appears to be] obviously synthetic" also reflects elements of the philosophical paradigm. This is also true of its scientific counterparts: Kuhn repeatedly emphasizes that, within normal science, the paradigm itself is not in question; Putnam, more strongly, says that the 'bedrock' theories('physical', 'mathematical', or 'logical', using these terms in their intuitive sense) are seen as analytic until an alternative view is available which enables one to view them from 'outside' the system.

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* The more general point behind this, of course, is that 'the facts' vary depending upon what theory one adopts; hence, 'the facts', 'immediately observed' or not, are not commensurable with all of the competing systems.

The single most important point at which a scientific paradigm parallels the philosophical categorial commitment is, of course, that the former, on Kuhn's account, like the latter "cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed observationally" (Hall, p. 39).* This was a major theme of the discussion of science in this chapter, and, hence, need not be elaborated. It will suffice to mention that there are no 'crucial experiments' in science (that the 'old' theoretical structure can always be made to account for the 'new' facts), that a paradigm is never rejected in the absence of a promising competitor, and that an experiment whose result seems not to be in accord with the dictates of the predominant paradigm will simply be counted as a failure (rather than the paradigm being rejected on account of the experiment).

Thus far, we have emphasized those respects in which science is 'philosophical'; but, equally, we need to notice those respects in which philosophy is 'scientific'. If, following Kuhn, we take as the mark of a field that is to be called (is, in fact, called, says Kuhn) 'scientific' the fact that it 'makes progress' (Ch. XIII, *passim*), then one can say that philosophy is 'scientific' to a certain degree.

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* Compare the strikingly similar statement by Kuhn: A choice between paradigms cannot be "unequivacally settled by logic and experiment alone" (p. 93).

> If we doubt, as many do, that non-scientific fields make progress that cannot be because individual schools make none. Rather, it must be because there are always competing schools, each of which constantly questions the very foundations of the others. The man who argues that philosophy, for example, has made no progress emphasizes that there are still Aristotelians, not that Aristotelianism has failed to progress (Kuhn, pp. 161-2).

Taking an Aristotelian approach as a paradigm, this paradigm can then be refined in ways analogous to that in which Ptolemaic astronomy was refined. As long as a paradigm is 'set', there can be clear progress.*

If one distinguishes between a chosen 'framework', 'paradigm', or 'set of categories' and work undertaken 'within' the paradigm in this way, quite a bit of light seems to be shed on the procedure of today's 'analysts'.

The 'Oxford School' is often criticized in the following sort of way:

> Philosophy is at a lower ebb than it has been since the last schoolmen argued in their attics. The successors of Bosanquet and Bradley, of McTaggart and Moore, quibble about niggling points of logic having as much relevance to reality as they have interest to the general public (*Times Literary Supplement*).**

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* Probably the clearest example of a philosophical paradigm would be that of the logical positivists. Starting from the verification theory of meaning, one then simply went along asking such questions as, "What then does religion become? What does ethics become"...", as Ayer does in *Language, Truth, and Logic*. [2].

** Quoted in D. F. Pears, *The Nature of Metaphysics* [67], p. 158.

This criticism is quite understandable, and, in fact the anology (to the 'schoolmen') is appropriate. For, the contemporary analysts are refining a paradigm (as were the Medievals).* And, seldom (if ever), since 'the schoolmen' has there been as much agreement on a paradigm as there is today at Oxford.

This seems to help put the work and the general attitudes of the analysts (in general, an unwillingness to take seriously any philosophy which is not 'linguistic' in their sense) into perspective. It is true that what they are doing often appears trivial to the layman or to philosophers who do not accept the "Wittgensteinian' paradigm. But the same is true of science when its paradigms are firm; intrinsic interest is not it's point.** Again, the layman very often literally cannot understand what the philosophers are doing. But this is because he does not know the paradigm they are elaborating. They write for the most part in technical journals; they less often write books, and they never write in popular magazines. Again, this is a characteristic of normal science.* They say that they are solving puzzles. This too is what normal science does, and the characteristics of what they are doing are the same: There is an assured solution and a definite way of arriving at it.** They seem to pay no attention to those who would solve problems by changing ordinary language; they do not even seem to understand the criticisms and often simply do not read those who do not accept the paradigm. But nor did scientists pay attention when it was suggested that Newton's inverse square law be replaced to account for anomaly. That would not be fair; it would be changing the rules. In sum, there are many questions (puzzles), but the paradigm is not in question.***

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* It is not easy to say to whom the paradigm itself should be attributed--perhaps to say that it developed from contributions by Moore, the logical positivists, Austin, and Wittgenstein would be as accurate as any other guess. (This, of course, is an extremely artificial question. It is not generally possible to say [in any area] that the paradigm was invented by A & B, and then elaborated by C, D, etc. All one can say is that at some particular time, this paradigm was accepted by this group, and henceforth all work under it is 'normal philosophy'.)

** cf. above, p. 136.

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* cf. Kuhn, p. 20 .

** The method is analysis of ordinary language. The answer must be in accord with common sense.

*** Wolterstorff says that it is a mistake to think of today's analytic philosophers as 'mere technicians!. He also says that "philosophy is today, as always, the elaboration and defense of a Weltanschauung" (p. 21). I should disagree with this on two related counts: (1) the word 'technician' does not seem inappropriate for philosophers who are clearly assuming a paradigm and working entirely within it (cf., e.g., Warnock's Berkeley [86] for a clear example of 'arguing' from within a paradigm. Whatever the reasoning behind Berkeley's arguments, they are dismissed out of hand for failing to conform with ordinary language.). (2) While analytic philosophy is the elaboration of a Weltanschauung, it is hardly a defense of one. Rather (consciously or not), the analysts seem to assume the validity of their paradigm in just the way that a 14th century astronomer would assume the validity of the basic Ptolemaic cosmology. Here we may note a further similarity

One final point: It is often said and seems on the surface to be true that in science one has proofs, while in philosophy there are none, none, at least, which are as coercive as those in science seem to be. We have already seen the reason for this; scientists, since most often their paradigm is not in question, have agreed-on problems and methods for their solution, while philosophers seldom seem to have such a generally accepted paradigm. This observation gives us, I think, more understanding of philosophy than is gained merely by pointing out that philosophical argument is primarily a matter of persuasion and conversion.

Waismann, for instance, says that philosophical "arguments on a small scale, containing a few logical steps only, may be rigorous. The substance of my remarks is that the conception of a whole philosophical view is never a matter of logical steps" ([84], p. 482).

John Passmore is understandably puzzled by this.

> This seems to me wholly inconsistent with what Waismann has said just above [i.e., that examples rather than proofs form the heart of philosophy]--and I do not see how it is possible to maintain that a philosophy can

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between science and philosophy as practiced by the analysts: As Kuhn points out (pp.1645), scientists study science as it is today; they, unlike the ordinary philosopher, the musician, or the literary man do not 'look back' to the past, do not study the history of their field. It just does not seem necessary, or even relevant, to do so. Here the 'analysts' seem to resemble the scientist rather than his 'humanistic' counterparts. Why? Clearly because, like the scientist, he has his paradigm and hence history is useless. (This should not be over-stated, however. Today's 'analysts' do sometimes show an awareness of the history of philosophy. But, most often, their attitude is that the past philosophers are 'historical curiosities' [e.g., Ryle's attitude toward Descartes]. This is a far cry from, say, the artists' attitude toward Rembrandt or the writers attitude toward Shakespeare.)

> contain rigorous arguments only if they are 'on a small scale', containing only a few 'logical' steps. The rigour cannot somehow go out of them if they are on a larger scale or contain more logical steps.*

Passmore is obviously correct in his latter observation; the number of steps in an argument just cannot be a criterion for its being 'rigourous'.

Nonetheless, Waismann does have a point in distinguishing between justifying a 'whole philosophical system' and proving one 'small' point. Clearly what he has in mind (but what he does present in a misleading way) is that _within_ a system, when starting points and methodology are 'given', proof _is_ possible; but, on the other hand, proof _of_ the system is not possible. And, once more, the situation is just as it is in science.

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In this chapter I have emphasized the similarities between science and philosophy. But are there not also _differences_ between them? No doubt there are. In particular, the questions which are generally taken up by philosophers seem to be much "further from the experiential periphery" as Quine would put it. Perhaps, it is as a result of this that philosophers, unlike scientists, never seem to achieve virtual unanimity on a paradigm. Nonetheless, the task of the present chapter has been to present the greater-than-usually-seen _similarities_ between science and philosophy. If there are more important differences between them than the relative "distance from the periphery," such differences are not obvious and it is incumbent upon those who would disagree with the preceding account to point out what they are.

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* Philosophical Reasoning [66], p. 37.

CHAPTER V

The Structure of Faith

In this chapter we shall consider four philosopher-theologians, Hick, MacIntyre,* Ferré, and Wolterstorff, who have presented justifications of theistic faith which have much in common. I do not mean that they agree with one another in all details, but the over-all patterns of their arguments bear crucial similarities to one another. The most general statement of what they have in common is that given by Hick which we noticed before: "Religious faith... is a state which it is rational to be in, but which philosophical reasoning cannot put one in."** This statement is so general that it could embrace people with widely differing ideas, but as we shall see there are many more specific areas of agreement between these four authors.***

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* There are 'two MacIntyre's' in much the same way that there are 'two Wittgenstein's'. That is, MacIntyre underwent a 'conversion' from belief to non-belief. The book, *Difficulties in Christian Belief* [37], and the essay "The Logical Status of Religious Belief" [59], belong to his Christian period. In the final chapter we shall have occassion to refer to his post-conversion views.

** "To Believe or Not To Believe," a review of W. I. Matson's, *The Existence of God* [63], in *The Saturday Review*, Feb. 6, 1965, pp. 39-40. Hick does not, of course, say that this is a statement of what they have in common. In fact, with the exception of references by Ferré to Hick (pp. 52-3), and to MacIntyre (pp. 141-144, 151) in *Logic Language, and God* [18], there is no evidence that any of them ever heard of any other.

*** I do not mean that all four discuss all of the points on which I am saying they agree. For instance, Wolterstorff does not mention the possibility of proving God's existence. In most cases, however, it is possible to infer what they *would* say if they were to address themselves to the point in question.

The approach of this chapter will be first, to present, with as little comment as possible, the views of the writers under consideration as they state them. I shall then turn to 'correcting' what they say and thereby (hopefully) improving it, in the light of the preceding discussions of science and philosophy.

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Our writers, like most contemporary Protestant theologian-philosophers reject any attempt to prove the existence of God. There are several reasons why they do so. First, the traditional proofs fail and, apparently, cannot be 'patched up'. They even wish to make the further claim that the proofs are totally irrelevant to religion, and, therefore, that a serious discussion of them can only be regarded as, as Hick puts it, a "slightly archaic exercise" (ibid.).

What sort of grounds could be given for saying that a discussion of the traditional proofs is 'archaic' and even irrelevant to religion? To begin with, it is so generally agreed among philosophers that they do not work, that one would not be discussing a 'life issue'.* Rather, religious philosophers today attempt to give a rational defense of faith which does not at all involve the traditional proofs.

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* On the other hand, this can be over-stated; as Hick himself says, some of these proofs are relied on by various particular groups, the cosmological by 'traditional' Roman Catholic theologians, the design argument by Protestant fundamentalists, etc. ([37], p. 39).

We can be sure that the proofs cannot be 'patched up' and that no new and better ones will be forthcoming because "only tautologies, though sometimes very complex tautologies, are capable of being proved demonstratively. Matters of fact are not susceptible of logical proof" (Hick [38], p. 21; cf. his [41], pp. 58-9). This point is put in a somewhat misleading way, for whether or not it is possible to give a logical proof of a proposition has, of course, nothing to do with whether or not that proposition is analytic. It is certainly possible to construct a proof of any empirical proposition.*

What Hick surely has in mind is that the premises of a demonstration whose conclusion asserts the existence of something must be based on experience, and hence it is not possible to demonstrate a matter of fact *ex nihilo*. But since this is the case, it cannot be said that the 'proof' would compel "assent in any rational mind," ([38], p. 21) since such experiential premises are not self-evident and so may be doubted (in fact, *will* be doubted by the sceptic). If this is what he means, he is making (not too clearly) the same point that MacIntyre is making in the following passage:

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* e.g., I can 'demonstrate' that grass is green by means of the premises: "If I am writing with a pencil, then grass is green." "I am writing with a pencil." (Hick himself points this out and thereby clarifies his point in the "Introduction" [40] to his *Existence of God* [36], pp. 4-7).

> There appears to be something curious about the project of proving the existence of God to the sceptic or atheist. For if we have a valid deductive argument in which the existence of God is affirmed in the conclusion, then that same existence must also be affirmed in the premises. And anyone who rejects the conclusion will certainly reject some at least of the premises ([37], p. 79).*

This is not exactly wrong, but it is not as conclusive as MacIntyre thinks. For, while it certainly is true that one need only reject the premises of a valid argument if one finds the conclusion unacceptable, it would seem possible that one might find a set of premises which the sceptic already accepts (or will accept once they are pointed out to him) which do entail the conclusion "God exists." The sceptic may not have 'put 2 and 2 tegether' before and realized just what was entailed by his previous beliefs. Thus, the point is over-stated; what is correct about the claim, however, is that the sceptic may always change his mind about the premises once he sees what the conclusion is, and it is, perhaps, unlikely, that a set of premises will be found that in fact will seem so clearly correct as to overcome his scepticism concerning the conclusion.**

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* "All deductive arguments are circular: they merely make explicit consequences of what has already been said" ([59], p. 195). The point he is making here and above is essentially that made by Kaufmann ([47], pp. 120-121). He does not, however, put the point as dogmatically as does MacIntyre. (It is, at best, misleading to say that all deductive arguments are circular.)

** It may be said that I am ignoring part of the point, i.e. that if the word 'God' does not appear in the premises, it cannot appear in the conclusion, and the sceptic will never accept a premise which contains the word 'God' (cf. Kaufmann, pp. 120-1). But even this is questionable, for how can

The second reason for rejecting the importance of the alleged proofs is based on the nature of religion itself. Most simply, the claim is that once one understands the nature of theism, one can see that it would be inappropriate for God's existence to be provable. MacIntyre points out that "if God is as he is claimed to be" his existence would not be provable. Accepting or rejecting belief in God ought to be a matter of personal decision ([47], p. 115). If there were proofs available, one's freedom would be taken away (pp. 76-77, 116, 117). Further, salvation would depend upon one's ability "to pass an elementary logic examination" (p. 117). "If we could produce logically cogent arguments we should produce the kind of certitude that leaves no room for decision; where proof is in place, decision is not" ([49], p. 197).* What one wants, he is saying, is a certainty based on decision. Complete provability would simply not be in accord with what is to be accepted.**

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we know a priori that such a premise would never be accepted by a sceptic (e.g. one can imagine a sceptic who would accept a premise something like, "If science cannot answer answer Q, then God must exist").

* Hick may partially disagree with this [40], pp. 15-18) not because he thinks such coercion is religiously adequate, but because he doubts that proofs can coerce, can produce genuine conviction. On the other hand, cf. "Sceptics and Believers" [43] (in his Faith and the Philosophers [39]) in which he seems to fully endorse the view that proof removes 'freedom' (p. 241).

** This is, of course, what I have previously referred to as the manner-content argument. The point will be amplified as we go along. It should be noted here that there is something decidedly peculiar in equating logical proof with the absence of free will. MacIntyre seems to be saying that to act completely rationally is not to act freely. It would take us too far afield to attempt to discuss free will here, but notice how diametrically opposed this is to the view of, say, Kant, for whom acting freely is acting rationally.

In addition to holding that deductive proofs fail, and happily so from the religious point of view, our writers also hold that God cannot be construed as a 'theoretical entity', that religious beliefs cannot be construed "as explanations of why there is a universe and why the universe is as it is" ([49], p. 195).* An obvious objection to such a characterization of religious belief is that "if it were correct no religious belief would be in fact justified" (*ibid.*). For suppose one represented God as a theoretical entity on a par with an electron. If this is done then Hume's 'hypotheses' come into play (e.g. from this world, one might infer that it was created by an apprentice deity who has since become the laughing-stock of all the other gods)(Hume [44], *passim*). Most important, however, is that

> where there are possible a number of hypotheses between which there can be no way of deciding we are not in fact dealing with genuine hypotheses. The essence of a genuine hypothesis is that it should suggest observations or experiments which will enable us to decide whether a particular phenomenon is to be explained in one way rather than another. Where the phenomenon in in question is the universe there are no observations

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* It is not obvious just how this distinction between a 'proof' and a theory can be made out. For instance, under which classification does the teleological argument fall? It can easily be 'formalized' and presented as a deductive proof but it also seems to represent God as a theoretical entity. The difference must lie in the premises. If they are tautologies or for any other reason seem unquestionable (as "Every event has a cause" has seemed, or as "There is human experience" may seem), then the conclusion is certain; one has a 'proof' rather than a 'theory'. The difference, then, would not lie in the logic of the argument, but in the nature of the premises.

> or experiments to be made over and above those observations which suggest the hypotheses (p. 196).

The impossibility of deciding between rival hypotheses, then, shows that there are (and can be) no genuine hypotheses. Therefore, this method of justifying religious beliefs *must* fail.*

Science, then allows of 'crucial experiments', straightforward empirical checks as to the correctness of the theories. Religious facts, however, are metaphysical in nature, which means that no such simple checks are possible. This is because of the 'unlimited comprehensiveness' of metaphysical 'hypotheses'.**

The conclusion from this might seem to be: So much the worse for religious beliefs. But, says MacIntyre, this is not the case; it never should have been thought that one should *want to* justify these beliefs in this way. "To treat religious beliefs as such is to falsify both the kind of belief they are and the way in which they are characteristically held " (ibid.). Concerning the latter, since we have an hypothesis of a basically theoretical nature, it is appropriate to hold it tentatively and provisionally (until upset by further evidence). But this is "alien to the whole spirit of religious belief. Having made our decision, we adhere to belief unconditionally" (p. 197). Again, the manner in which the belief is held must be appropriate to the content of the belief. Whereas in the case of 'strict proof' the belief was too 'coercive', in this case the belief is appropriate to its content, which demands a 'free decision', a decision to be 'unconditionally' bound to the belief.

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* Ferré says essentially the same thing, i.e. that religious beliefs are not like scientific beliefs, simply verifiable or falsifiable, and therefore that the facts that one believes are not scientific facts. "The sort of "facts" to which theological statements claim to have reference are not the same kind of facts which are discussed in the language of the empirical sciences. No straightforward experimental method for verifying or falsifying sentences claiming to state these 'facts' seems to be available--or to be desired by those who use these sentences...There seems no escape from the conclusion that the intended semantic reference of theological discourse is to 'metaphysical fact' of some kind" ([18], p. 160; cf. also [19], p. 144).

** Notice the positivistic assumption here. If there are no crucial experiments to enable one to decide between 'hypotheses', then they are not genuine hypotheses.

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We can now turn to the main arguments of our writers, the arguments which explicitly bring out what they take religious faith to be. In doing this it will be best initially to take them 'serially' since their points are put in quite different terms. Therefore, we will first survey their arguments as they state them and then sum them up and consider them in relationship to one another.

MacIntyre presents an uncompromising distinction between internal and external questions in the area of religion. Within a given religion, there is no problem concerning the justification of particular doctrines.

> Each has its own procedure for deciding whether a given belief or practice is or is not authentic. Each has a criterion by means of which orthodoxy is determined. And in this sense a belief is justified in a particular religion by referring to that rule by means of which it is determined what is and what is not included in the religion ([59], p. 197).

> 'The Bible and Bible only is the religion of Protestants,' 'What the Pope defines ex cathedra on matters of faith and morals are dogmas which one is obliged to believe' are examples of such rules (p. 198).

This naturally brings up the question of the 'validity' of the rules themselves, of the religion as a whole. Clearly the rules cannot be self-applying, i.e., the fact that the Bible may say (or imply) that the Bible is authoritative cannot serve as justification for accepting the Bible as the ultimate authority. Such reasoning would clearly be viciously circular. There is some sense in which one must 'just accept' the authority as authoritative.

But just what are we accepting when we accept a religion? What is it to adopt an over-all religious attitude? The answer to this raises problems. "In a general way the religious attitude has at least two elements to it. The religious believer is committed to the practice of worship in some fairly systematic way. Also, he declares that his God acts in the Universe" (p. 186). But there is inevitably a certain tension between these. For worship requires an 'adequate object', an unlimited being, but anything we attempt to say about God seems to limit him. Therefore, one is increasingly led to say that God is not this, not that. "He is neither this nor that, and we can say of him only what he is not. But the sceptic remains dissatisfied: this God may not be an inadequate object, but this is simply because he is not an object at all" (p. 187). Therefore, we have put ourselves in the danger of making talk about God (and hence beliefs about him) impossible.

Nonetheless, the believer does continue to talk about God and his acting in this world. "The theist both denies that anything adequate can be said about God and yet says a great deal. And in what he says positively we get the core of his religion" (p. 187).

It should be noticed first that "in worship we do not talk about God, but to him" (p. 188). The language of worship is systematically unclear about its object, but this is unsurprising since, in worship, we are concerned with praising God, rather than describing him. Nonetheless, even in worship some assertions are made about God. "How are we to characterize such assertions?"

> The first thing to note about them is that they do not occur as individual and isolated propositions each of which raises a separate issue of acceptance or rejection. They always occur as part of a total narration, in which a dramatic wholeness of vision is presented. So in order to understand religious assertions we must attempt to characterize such narrations (p. 189).

Following usual usage, MacIntyre calls such narrations 'myths' (making clear, however, that this use is not meant to prejudge their truth or falsity).

Such myths may be either accepted or rejected. But what is it to 'accept' such a myth?

> The crucial point about myth in a religious sense is that it is concerned with the central situations in a human life. Love and death, pain and grief, marriage and birth are important to myth. Any given myth incorporates an attitude to these themes and to accept a myth is to identify oneself with that attitude and so to make the myth directive of one's behavior(p. 191).

This is not to say a myth is to be construed as a set of rules for regulating behavior. Rather, the over-all attitude embodied in the myth gives guidance precisely in those cases where no rules are applicable. In sum, to accept or reject a role, "the role perhaps of Christian or of Christians, which the myth offers to us" (p. 193).* In sum, then, to accept a religion is to accept certain myths as (somehow) true of the world and to adopt a set of attitudes and a type of behavior appropriate to the myths. There are, however, definite problems of meaning involved; i.e. in accepting the myth we are accepting whatever is implied by the myth (e.g. whatever is in the Bible), and this includes much that we cannot really understand. But that one now has grounds for accepting or rejecting particular religious utterances does not seem to help with this crucial problem concerning meaning. "If someone asserts 'Twas brillig and the slithy toves did gyre' and when asked what this means replies that it must be accepted on authority, none of our difficulties have been removed" (p. 199).

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* This description of the role of myth seems to put MacIntyre in the same camp as Braithwaite. But, as we say above (p. 17), he disavows this and emphatically states that what one must accept is that the myths are somehow true of the world.

MacIntyre's answer to this problem is as follows:

> If someone claimed to be able to tell us which myths and cosmological pictures we must accept; and to be able furthermore to assure us that although we could not know how it was possible for these to represent a true account of these matters nonetheless we could be certain they did; how could we accept his claims? Only presumably if we accepted all that he said not because of what he said but because it was he that said it. If the authoritative criterion was uttered by someone who was accepted as completely authoritative we should be able to explain how we came to accept a religion as a whole. But what sort of person would this have to be? It would have to be someone who was given complete authority and, that is to say, who was worshipped (p. 199).

Jesus Christ is obviously such an authority. What he says about God _we_ say and understand in "familiar pictorial senses" (p. 200). Here statements cannot be justified by citing the facts of nature or of history. We accept them on the authority of Jesus.

But why accept Jesus as the authority? We accept him as such because of what the apostles say about him. And why accept what the Apostles say? "Here the argument ends or becomes circular" (_ibid_.).

It should be noticed that 'authority' has been used in two senses above. First, it is used in reference to a rule which defines the religion and furnishes criteria for acceptance of beliefs, practices, and attitudes. In the second sense, the reference is to a person. It is on the basis of the 'person' (personality) of this person that one accepts the rules as authoritative.

> We justify a particular religious belief by showing its place in the total religious conception; we justify a religious belief as a whole by referring to authority. We accept authority because we discover some point in the world at which we worship, at which we accept the lordship of something not ourselves (p. 202).

'The world,' then, cannot serve as justification for our particular religious beliefs; "we point to the state of the world as illustrative of doctrine, but never as evidence for it" (p. 201).*

The foregoing schema represents religion as a self-contained system. Either one does or does not accept a particular religious authority. If one does, then 'all else' follows from this acceptance. No transition from non-religious to religious language is possible. "And this means, if you like, that religion as a whole lacks any justification," there is no justification of the system, there is only justification of particular beliefs within the system.

> But this in no way reflects on the logical standing of religious beliefs. Of science and morals it can also be said that one can justify particular theories or prescriptions, but that one cannot justify science as a whole in non-scientific, or morals as a whole in non-moral, terms. Every field is defined by reference to certain ultimate criteria. That they are ulti-

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* This type of statement might make it seem that MacIntyre is in strong disagreement with our other authors, in that the others do talk about religion being adequate to the world or allowing one to see the world in a 'better' way. I do not, however, think that there is much, if any, real difference since MacIntyre says (cf. immediately below) that the content of the Bible either will be compelling or not. But this can only mean that one finds it adequate to the world, to one's own experience of the world, or he does not. This is no doubt what MacIntyre means in saying that "the state of the world [is] illustrative of doctrine." What he really means to

mate precludes going beyond them (p. 202).

So there is a limit beyond which argument cannot go. There is no possibility of giving further reasons. Why, then, does anyone come to believe? The answer has already been given in part. At some point one simply feels that he has found a person who is adequate for worship. And how does one find such a person? For most of us (those who are not contemporaries with such a person) the answer must be, through reading.

> If someone asks what religion is or more particularly what the Christian religion is, the only proper answer is to say: 'Read the Bible.' If a man then asks how he is to accept this, the only possible answer is that he must accept either the Bible itself as authoritative or some other authority such as that of the Church which refers him to the Bible. But, of course, what will be crucial for his decision will be the content of what he reads. The only apologia for a religion is to describe its content in detail: and then either a man will find himself brought to say 'My Lord and my God' or he will not (p. 205).

Thus, MacIntyre concludes that from the standpoint of both logic and theology it is evident that no religion is 'provable', in even a loose sense. From the standpoint of logic, "every chain of reasonings must have an ending." So, 'acceptance' is, at some point, necessary. From the point of view of theology, faith must rest on a free decision; it cannot, adequately, depend on either lightning bolts or formal proof. Either would eliminate the necessity of decision.

The same must apply also to unbelief. "Because it is

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be denying is that one can point to this or that fact and say, "See, that definitely shows that my hypothesis is a good one."

logically inappropriate to give reasons for a religious belief this does not of itself provide a reason for not believing. The man who wishes to justify not believing can only describe what religion is and perhaps give us a segment of his autobiography" (p. 209).

> Belief cannot argue with unbelief, it can only preach to it. When unbelief speaks, it will be as Hume does, to show how religion fails if it is judged by non-religious standards of rationality and to argue that therefore no rational man can accept it. And belief has no logically cogent reply to this. It can only recount the content of its faith and offer the acceptance of its authority (p. 211).

Such religion has a 'dramatic wholeness'; it provides a 'dramatic context' for life. It must be accepted or rejected entire. Conversion, not argument, is the key to changes from one such 'framework' to another. Argument, therefore, is irrelevant. This shows the irrelevance of the metaphysicians' attempts to "construct a set of ultimate beliefs," attempts which makes the philosopher the "rival of the theologian" (p. 210). But now we can see, says MacIntyre, how radically mistaken this is. The philosopher cannot rival the theologian.* Only the 'preacher', can rival the 'preacher each in hopes of bringing about the conversion of the other.

* * * * *

In sum, then, MacIntyre makes a radical distinction between internal and external questions of religion. The question, "should we accept religion A?", is not one that can be answered by appealing to a set of criteria; rather, the acceptance of the system as a whole must be the result of a decision, a decision based on authority. As a result belief and unbelief can only preach to one another. Finally, none of this is peculiar to religion: Science and morality are equally self-contained systems which are not self-justifying.

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* But cf. below, p. 227 n.

Ferré is largely in agreement with MacIntyre. There is, however, according to Ferré, one major point of disagreement: The acceptance or rejection of a religion is not as arbitrary as MacIntyre makes it appear.

> I am convinced...that theological discourse is misunderstood if it is interpreted, as in MacIntyre's view, as nothing but an exercise in the arbitrary. But though theological speech is not entirely a matter of mere acceptance of authority, neither is it to be understood apart from personal faith-commitment ([18], p. 143).

Like MacIntyre, Ferré thinks it necessary that religion involve a decision, a free commitment, but not so arbitrary a commitment as MacIntyre proposes.

Ferré also relies on the 'internal-external' distinction to make his point. He, however, makes a further distinction between systems of internal statements.

> The direct utterances of religious belief are syntactically correct in so far as they repeat the "faith of our fathers, living still." Compatibility with--more, re-expression of--the words of the Bible or the creeds is the essential syntactical demand placed on religious statements as distinguished from the statements of systematic theology. Compatibility of the various utterances of living faith with one another is, however, no part of the syntactic logic of this language (p. 151).

At a 'higher level' than the 'utterances of religious belief' are the statements of systematic theology. Theology is "the reason-oriented explications" (p. 154) of the religious utterances. Such explication may eventually even result in a change in the accepted religious utterances. The important point about theology as distinct from 'religion' is that it is indeed 'reason-oriented'. Theology can brook no contradictions.*

Such a distinction between the 'level of religion' and 'the level of theology', is, I think, of some importance. First, it shows that the sceptic would be misguided if he directed his criticisms toward what Ferré calls 'the direct utterances of religion'. For instance, were he to charge, "Since you say, 'Our Father Who art in heaven', your God must be spatially located," the believer could rightly counter that such an utterance, an utterance which is part of the act of prayer, is largely symbolic, that what matters in such a context is not the literal meanings of all of the words but the 'intent' behind them.**

Second, the distinction fits well with MacIntyre's point that a religion is accepted, ultimately, on the basis of its 'appeal' rather than because it is found to be intellectually justified. The majority of believers do accept a 'religion', and are little, if at all, concerned with the 'theology', the theoretical explication, of that religion.*

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* Ferré, however, qualifies his assertion that theology can contain no contradictions (cf. below, pp. 234f.).

** Unlike Ferré, however, I should not go so far as to say that in such a case we have the 'prayerful use of language' and hence there is no question of truth or falsity. Rather, the meaning of the words is important, although it may not be exactly the meaning that the words appear, on the surface, to have (e.g. the words 'father' and 'in' may be taken symbolically).

If, as Ferré says, MacIntyre makes the acceptance or rejection of a religion appear to be more arbitrary than it is, how are we to evaluate the 'metaphysical truth' of a given religion? To begin with, Ferré says that 'facts', metaphysical or other, are never simply 'given'.

> We usually ignore the vital role of mind in organizing even sense-experience into meaningful patterns of facts out of the "buzzing, blooming confusion" of bare sensation. What are judged "the facts" today are by no means identical to what were "the facts" a century ago ([18], pp. 160-1).

The so-called 'facts' of science "are typically theories over-whelmingly confirmed by conceptually organized experience..." (p. 161).

But if this is the case *generally*, of course the facts of a metaphysics cannot be supposed to be "'given' independent of the creative powers of intelligence." Rather,

> the nature of metaphysics...is *conceptual synthesis*. A metaphysical system is a construct of concepts designed to provide coherence for all "the facts." A "metaphysical fact," therefore, is a concept which plays a key role within the system, without which the system would founder (*ibid*.).

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* This point, however, should not be over-stated. Since Christianity depends upon 'correct belief', it is *inherently* theological (cf. J. H. Randall, Jr., *The Role of Knowledge in Western Religion* [75], e.g. p. 15, and Kaufmann [47], p. 162). What *is* valid about the point is that the average believer accepts the words and statements of the *religion*, rather than the theological explication of those *words*.

Metaphysical facts are relative to a system, but this is not a ground for objection, because all facts are so relative.

> Metaphysical facts, in the last analysis, depend for their confirmation on the adequacy of the system in which they are part. To convince a Hindu mystic of a "fact of science" one must do more than perform an experiment before him (pp. 161-2).

The choice of one metaphysical system over another, although often thought to be arbitrary, actually is not. There are criteria to guide such choice. These criteria are consistency, coherence (having a genuine unity), applicability and adequacy to experience, and finally effectiveness (capability of 'coming to life' for individuals) ([19], pp. 166-172; [18], pp. 162-3).*

Ferré also attempts to explain in some detail the 'structure' of a metaphysical system. There is, first, a model: "'the Christian model' is a frankly anthropomorphic master image woven from the biblical images of nature, man, and God" ([18], p. 163).** This model is not adequate in itself, because it is much too anthropomorphic (which the Bible itself warns against).***

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* There is some discrepency between the two accounts, in that the former is more complete, i.e., has more criteria. The former is the account given above.

** A somewhat different account of the model is found in [19]. "For Christianity...the conceptual model consists in the creative, self-giving, personal love of Jesus Christ. In this model is found the only literal meaning which these terms, like 'creature,' 'personal,' and 'love,' can have in the Christian vocabulary" (p. 164). The difference is that this account is strictly 'Christocentric' while that of [18] is not.

*** i.e., The Bible both gives the model and warns against taking the model literally. It should be added that the model is a set of 'images', not a set of propositions.

The second "conceptual stratum in our quest for metaphysical truth" is a set of sentences which theologians provide to transform the model into a set of *propositions*. One now has a set of "symbols, verbal and non-verbal, which go to make up this conceptual account of things" (p. 164). This 'totality' is more than either of the preceding, and component, parts. "The whole account, finally, itself needs testing by the standards of cognitive reliability" (p. 165). The standards referred to have already been mentioned.

> The efforts of systematic theology are bent to explicating the consistency and coherence of the synthesis built on this model of "God" as key concept. Christian preaching is devoted to pointing out the applicability of this conceptual synthesis to common experiences of life. And Christian apologetics struggles to show that the synthesis organized around this model is adequate to the unforced interpretation of all experience, including suffering and evil([19], p. 164).

Such total interpretations of experience cannot be "checked against reality," but they are, nonetheless, considered to be "faithful to reality." "The metaphysician and the theologian as metaphysician insist that their syntheses have ontological bearing" (p. 164).

> If some models are capable of providing greater coherence and adequacy than others, we may begin to suspect that this tells us something not only about the models but also about what reality is like: reality is of such a character that a metaphysical system based on model X is more capable of interpreting our experience and unifying our ideas than is a metaphysical system based on model Y...Theism is founded on the belief that reality is such that the metaphysical models of personal activity will best survive any tests which may be demanded (p. 165).

There are, however, rival conceptual systems, which theism must compete with. *Each* of these, *including* theism, has weaknesses, in its present form. Further refinement is thus necessary before it will be clearly rational to adopt one over the other.

> In the meanwhile, one is left to choose. There is no question of remaining aloof, taking no position on the character of reality. The poised and tentative posture is the natural one for cloistered thought. It is an impossible one for life...Daily challenges to action--where even inaction may be a culpable choice make agnosticism in life an absurdity. And the choices which one does make, whether to worship a God of love or to refrain from it, whether to treat others as "means only" or in some other way, and so on, have their influence on the mind...Then "agnosticism" becomes a bland mask covering an uncritical practical decision to accept one or another metaphysical view...* A decision that goes beyond the security of sufficient reason is in any case required; and by pretending not to recognize the language of this decision--which many Christians call "the leap of faith"--one is denying himself the right to look before (and after) he leaps (pp. 165-6).

Thus Ferré is finally denying that his criteria are capable of dictating a decision. There is too much which is 'outstanding' to reach a decision on the basis of these criteria. He does not, though, mean (apparently) that it is theoretically impossible for his criteria to dictate a decision. It is just that we are not yet 'clever enough' to use them to a rationally sufficient extent. Until we can make a completely rational decision, it is necessary, first, to evaluate all of the relevant data at our disposal, and, second, to commit ourselves on the basis of this data. The strength of the commitment, however, must, for the purpose of life, go far beyond that strictly warranted by the evidence.

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* cf. [18], "In questions of religion decisions are always---in the nature of the case---required in advance of exhaustive exploration and established findings. The determination to accept no religious tradition as normative for life and thought until 'all the evidence is in and sorted' is in itself an ultimate commitment. A practical religious commitment of some kind will not be evaded" (p. 52). "Commitment--and action based on that commitment--must often go beyond warranted belief...The pressures of living demand that we gamble ourselves with our choices, actions, and commitments... Christian faith, though it is logically compatible with critical inquiry and tentativeness of intellectual assent, is inconsistent with the unadventurous life" (p. 180).

"Risk--wagering one's life is unavoidable no matter what policy (or policy of no policy!) is adopted for living... The policy of caution, of 'no leaping,' is itself a risk-filled leap of faith" (p. 207).

As an analogy to this, Ferré offers the problem of our knowledge of other minds. Arguments may be offered on either side, but the result is inconclusive.

> If a skeptic insists on more and more grounds, rejecting as inadequate all that is offered to convince him that other minds like his exist, there comes a point at which the serious disputant must say: "The grounds I have given you are, it seems to me, sufficient to support my belief. I may be mistaken, but if I am mistaken then there is no profit in our talking--since one of us may not ever be conscious of this agreement. Now I must go about my business" ([18], p. 141).

At some point one must either accept or reject the argument, the premises and rules of inference, of the other. If neither will accept that of the other, the argument will continue forever; infinite regresses are generated.

One may object, however, that it is not rational to make such a commitment, even if it is done in the case of other minds (and perhaps in other cases). But one must now ask what it is to be 'rational'. If one means that one must guide one's life by critical inquiry',* then it must not be forgotten that this is just one possible commitment among others. Perhaps the commitment to Christianity should take precedence over that commitment. There is after all, no way of justifying an ultimate commitment. If there were it would not be 'ultimate'.

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* For a definition of 'critical inquiry', such as it is, see [18], pp. 18-20.

Perhaps 'critical inquiry' is too narrow a characterization of 'rationality'. Perhaps, rationality is rather to be characterized as 'intellectual responsibility', and to be 'intellectually responsible' is to use 'critical inquiry' within certain limited fields, of which philosophy is one. So the philosopher, *qua* philosopher, must (by definition?) use the methods of critical inquiry.

But the philosopher, not *qua* philosopher, but *qua* man, must not restrict himself to such a narrow scope. Rather, he *must* emphatically choose, even if critical inquiry leads to no such definite choice (in the case of other minds, of theism, etc.). If one asks why he must choose, the answer has already been given. It is *practically* impossible to remain agnostic.*

In summing up Ferré, the obvious point is that, while he says that MacIntyre made the choice between religions seem too arbitrary, and therefore offers criteria for choosing, in the last analysis his criteria do not *dictate* a choice, and one is again left in a position of having to make a more or less arbitrary decision. Ferré does, however, emphasize the importance of the religion 'fitting' the world* and even makes the point that 'the facts' are not given, but, instead, vary depending upon what 'system' one has adopted. The latter helps immensely to understand the sense in which a religion 'fits' the world, but Ferré, unfortunately, does not do much toward explicating this. The next author we shall consider, John Hick, does emphasize this 'fit', does emphasize the role of 'direct experience' in religion, and, therefore, it is necessary to turn to him for added light.

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*cf. [18], p. 139. This argument, of course, is 'straight James'. That is to say, like James, Ferré is saying that, from a practical point of view, one must wager, since refusing to commit oneself to either side in itself is a 'wager'.

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Hick's argument, again, is basically similar to that of the other writers, but he does emphasize experience of God much more than they do. Many persons claim to be directly aware of God in the world, not as an object, but as a 'divine presence.' This awareness of God while it cannot be proven to be veridical, does not need philosophical proof. It is, in this respect, like the awareness of the external world and other people--we do not infer that they are there, we do not argue that they are, we do not attempt to prove that they are. Rather, we are directly aware of them. If we refuse to acknowledge this awareness and try to give proof, we shall inevitably fail. "The believer does not reason from his religious experience to God but is conscious of God himself"([38]p. 40).

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* MacIntyre, as we saw above (p. 204n) does not completely ignore this, but his emphasis on authority tends to obscure the point.

It is clear from the above resumé that Hick's position rests on the possibility of an awareness of God, rather than an inference to God.

> We become conscious of the existence of other objects in the universe, whether things or persons, either by experiencing them for ourselves or by inferring their existence from evidences within our own experiences... The awareness of God reported by the ordinary religious believer is of the former kind. He professes, not to have inferred that there is a God, but that God as a living being has entered into his own experience (p. 109).

Any such claim to immediate experience of God brings to mind the sort of criticism that Martin gives against 'a religious way of knowing'. But, upon closer examination of Hick's position, it is not at all obvious that such a criticism is relevant. For it is a constant assumption of Martin's argument that God is encountered as one object (although the 'greatest') among others.* Hick emphatically wishes to dissociate himself from this position.

> The ordinary believer does not, however, report an awareness of God as existing in isolation from all other objects of experience. It is not a vision of God in solitary glory, filling the believer's entire mind and blotting out his normal field of perception (p. 109).

While such a special experience may be what mystics claim to have, it is not the basis of the faith of the ordinary believer.

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* Martin's point is that if a perceptual claim is to be judged veridical, there are certain criteria which must be met (can you touch it? do others see it? etc.), and that these are not met in cases of claimed awareness of God (*Religious Belief* [62], Ch. Five).

"He claims instead an apprehension of God meeting him in and through his material and social environments" (p. 110).*

The sort of knowledge which the Christian claims to have of God is of a common type, other knowledge is essentially like it, although it may not be obvious at first that this is so. The basic argument is that "interpretation takes place in relation to each of the three main types of existence, or orders of significance, recognized by human thought natural, the human, and the divine; and that in order to relate ourselves appropriately to each, a primary and unevidenciable act of interpretation is required which, when directed toward God, has traditionally been termed 'faith'. Thus I shall try to show that while the object of religious knowledge is unique, its basic epistemological pattern is that of all our knowing" (p. 111).

Since this argument is based on the concepts of 'significance' and 'interpretation', these must be explicated.

> By significance I mean that fundamental and all-pervasive characteristic of our conscious experience which *de facto* constitutes it for us the experience of a "world" and not of a mere empty void or churning chaos...Mind could neither emerge nor persist in an environment which was totally nonsignificant to it. For this reason it is not possible to define "significance" ostensively by pointing to contrasting examples of significant and nonsignificant experience. In its most general form at least, we must accept the Kantian thesis that we can be aware only of that which enters into a certain frame-

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* In effect, Martin is treating awareness of God as an *internal* question relative to our usual perceptual framework. Hick, however, attempts to construe awareness of God as an external question (where the framework in question is the religious one).

> work of basic relations which is correlated with the structure of our own consciousness. These basic relations represent the minimal conditions of significance for the human mind. The totally nonsignificant is thus debarred from entering into our experience. A completely undifferentiated field or a sheer "buzzing, booming confusion," would be incapable of sustaining consciousness. For our consciousness is (to repeat) essentially consciousness of significance (pp. 112-3).

This is essentially related to action; in a given situation, being conscious of a significance involves a judgment as to actions relevant in the circumstance.

> Significance is divided into object-significance and situational-significance.
>
> Every general name, such as "hat," "book," "fire," "house," names a type of object-significance. For these are isolable aspects of our experience which (in suitable contexts) render appropriate distinctive patterns of behavior. The word "hat" for example, does not name a rigidly delimited class of objects but a particular _use_ to which things can be put, namely as a covering for the head. Objects are specifically manufactured for this use; but if necessary many other items can be made to fulfill the function of hat. This particular way of treating things, as headgear, is the behavioral correlate of the type of object-significance which we call "being a hat." Indeed the boundaries of each distinguishable class of objects are defined by two _foci_ of (1) physical structure and (2) function in relation to human interests. Our names are always in part names for functions of uses or kinds of significance as apprehended from the standpoint of the agent.
>
> Significance, then, is a relational concept. A universe devoid of consciousness would be neither significant nor nonsignificant. An object or a sense-field is significant _for_ or _to_ a mind (pp. 114-5).

This gives us some idea of what Hick is talking about when he speaks of 'significance'. Basically, it is the Kantian-type thesis* that the world is not given to us 'complete'.

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* It is also the thesis of Hanson, etc. discussed above. We saw, too, that Ferré mentions this point but fails to do much with it.

Some basic data are 'given', but they must be organized by the mind for there to be 'experience'.

Interpretation is the mental activity which is the 'subjective correlate' of significance.'Interpretation' is a suitable word for this because it suggest variant accounts of the same subject matter (p. 115).* There are two types of 'variant accounts': mutually exclusive--"That is a fox," "That is a dog"; mutually compatible--"That is an animal," and "That is a dog." Hick is concerned with the latter kind, "in which several levels or layers or orders of significance are found in the same field of data" (p. 117).

The above is in terms of object-significance, but this is inseparable from situational significance. An object in no context would have no significance.

> An object owes its significance as much to its context as to itself; it is what it is largely because of its place in a wider scheme of things. We are indeed hardly ever conscious of anything in complete isolation. Our normal consciousness is of groups of objects standing in recognizable patterns of relations to one another. And it is the resulting situation taken as a whole that carries significance for us, rendering some ranges of action and reaction appropriate and others inappropriate (pp. 189-90).
>
> A "situation" may be defined, then, as a state of affairs which, when selected for attention by an act of interpretation, carries its own distinctive practical significance for us (p. 120).

There are situations within situations; for instance, one may be playing a game of chess and be within the artificial situation of the game, but from time to time make comments to the opponent which are not made as a part of the game.

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* We have seen other reasons for thinking that it is not the right word since it suggests two distinct 'operations', seeing and interpreting.

These are examples of individual or 'finite' situations. One can consider himself in ever-widening situations, however. When one reaches these widest situations, there are three levels of significance.* First, there is a natural significance. This includes not only the sort of thing talked about above, that "the perdeiving mind is thus always in some degree of selecting, relating and synthesizing agent," but also an even more basic act of interpretation; this is interpreting our experience as being experience of a world beyond us, i.e. interpreting the world non-solipsistically.

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* I think that Hick tends to confuse the reader by lumping what seem to be quite diverse phenomena under the headings 'interpretation' and 'significance'. In particular, it is confusing to lump together (a) what seems to be the purely psychological or (physiological) fact that the perceiver must select parts of his environment to be 'taken in', 'attended to', with (b) discriminations between 'that' being a dog or a fox, and both of these with (c) the perceiver's belief that (c) he is not 'alone in the world'. Each of these has quite different characteristics. The first seems to be a purely practical necessity (if we are to operate efficiently in the world we cannot pay attention to everything at once). (b) does involve organizing the 'given' data in a particular way and hence is similar to the third, but the freedom of choice is not the same as it is in the case of (c). That is, my seeing that animal as a fox does depend upon my having the concept 'fox', but if I say it is a fox or a dog I am clearly either right or wrong. Which I am is fairly simply determinable by empirical investigation. This is not true of the third case, where, as Hick says, empirical considerations do not seem to decide the case.

I do not see that this hodge-podge in any way invalidates Hick's over-all point. It does, however, tend to be confusing and thus deserves to be pointed out.

> The all-important first step, or assumption, is unevidenced and unevidenceable--except for permissive evidence, in that one's phenomenal experience is "there" to be interpreted either solipsistically or otherwise. But there is no event within our phenomenal experience the occurance or nonoccurance of which is relevant to the truth or falsity of the solipsist hypothesis (p. 123). /e

The second level of interpretation is viewing the world as a world of moral beings, the feeling of the sense of 'oughtness', of responsibility or obligation. This level, unlike the first (it is almost impossible to be truly a solipsist), actually does present a situation of choice.

> That is to say, it is not forced upon us from outside, but depends upon an inner capacity and tendency to interpret in this way, a tendency which we are free to oppose and even to overrule. If a man chooses to be a moral solipsist, or absolute egoist, recognizing no responsibility toward other people, no one can prove to him that he has any such responsibility toward other people, no one can prove to him that he has any such responsibilities...He must see and accept himself for his own situation as a responsible being and its obverse of ethical accountability (pp. 126-7).

The third and final level of interpretation is that of religious significance. On this level one interprets the world as a whole, all of experience, in a certain way. The monotheist apprehends the world in this way:

> The monotheist's faith-apprehension of God as the unseen Person dealing with him in and through his experience of the world is from the point of view of epistemology an interpretation of this kind, and interpretation of the world as a whole as mediating a divine presence and purpose. He sees in his situation as a human being a significance to which the appropriate response is a religious trust and obedience. His interpretative leap carries him into a world which exists through the will of a holy, righteous, and loving Being who is the creator and sustainer of all that is. Behind the world--to use an almost inevitable spatial

> metaphor--there is apprehended to be an omnipotent, personal Will whose purpose toward mankind guarantees men's highest good and blessedness. The believer finds that he is at all times in the presence of this holy Will. Again and again he realizes either at the time or in retrospect, that in his dealings with the circumstances of his own life he is also having to do with a transcendent Creator who is the determiner of his destiny and the source of all good (pp. 128-9).

This is not to be construed as an inference from facts to a general truth, but a 'divine-human encounter'. This definitely does not mean that the religious man does not assert propositions as true, but that these propositions are on a different level from any statement of 'facts' (just as a statement concerning the status of the external world is not on the level of statements about tables and chairs). It should be construed both as a way of cognizing and a way of living.

The religious significance of the world is not without an alternative; a consistent 'naturalistic' interpretation is also possible. Which one chooses ultimately depends on the will. The 'facts' do not dictate that one or the other be chose. This should not make us think that there is no right or wrong, however. "To interpret aright is to know; to interpret amiss is to be in error" (p. 166). What begins as faith, by a choice to see the facts of experience in the way of religion, becomes more certain to the individual as this becomes more firm. "By a response to this religious vision of life's significance, through the twin activities of worship and service, the Christian's faith takes on the quality of absolute certainty, which is knowledge" (p. 217).*

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* 'Absolute certainty' is not, according to most explications of 'knowledge', equivalent to knowledge (e.g. Chisholm [11], p. 16; Kaufmann [47], p. 78; A. J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge [3], Ch. I).

Given this view of faith, one might ask about the particular propositions of a given religion. No major religion is simply the acceptance of a world-view which sees the world as working according to divine purpose. A Christian, for instance, accepts the proposition, "Jesus was the son of God." Evidently, Hick would want to view this also as an 'interpretation'. "There is, first, faith directed upon the person of Christ himself in an act of interpretation which sees him as the unique Son of God" (p. 198). This does make some sense; no matter how many observable facts one may know about Jesus, it does not follow that he was divine. 'Divinity' is not a property which is open to view in the way 'being red' is; one must perform an act of interpretation of the known facts to arrive at the belief in Jesus' status in relation to God.*

Finally, Hick, alone among the writers with whom we are mainly concerned, brings in the idea of the afterlife. This, he maintains is an implication of the religious interpretation. He even maintains that without the afterlife the religious belief would be unverifiable and therefore meaningless.** But this appears to be a confusion of 'types', that is, he seems somehow to have shifted from 'interpretation' to relatively straightforward empirical belief. I do not mean to say that there is necessarily any error here, but certainly his procedure is puzzling. Again, this is a problem which will be postponed for now.

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* Hick is here, in effect, agreeing with the other writers that 'historical beliefs' of a religion cannot be finally settled by historical investigation. He does not go as far as the others, however, and claim that historical evidence is entirely irrelevant.

** pp. 149-50; cf., also, Hick's "Religious Statements as Factually Significant" [42] in his *The Existence of God* [36], and his *Philosophy of Religion* [41], Ch. 7.

One may sum up Hick's views in this way: to have faith is not to accept some factual propositions which are very improbable. Instead it is a way of viewing, of organizing, the world once all the facts are in, so to speak. He wants to emphasize that this is not unique with religion; it is not that one 'tacks on' an interpretation to an otherwise ready-ordered world. We must make interpretations on every level of life; this is also true on the highest level, whether we accept the religious interpretation or the 'naturalistic' one.

Hick's primary contribution to the over-all argument, then, is that direct experience of God is possible for the person who adopts the religious framework. Also, he gives further emphasis to the idea that the religious framework is not unique insofar as it has the character of being 'ultimate', of not being capable of evaluation by straightforward 'rational' methods. Indeed, he says, it shares this characteristic with our knowledge that anything exists apart from ourselves and with our knowledge of the ethical realm.

* * * * *

Many of Wolterstorff's most important points have already been discussed. In particular, we have seen him argue that philosophy requires a set of ultimate commitments, just as religion requires faith. He has, however, a further point which cannot be ignored: philosophy, he claims is "inherently expansive." That is, direct "conflict between one man's faith philosophy and some other man's faith, and between one man's faith and some other man's philosophy" is possible; more strongly, "there is every likelihood" that such conflicts will occur (p. 29).

We have already argued that the philosopher's purely philosophical claims are generally based on overall philosophical perspectives and the latter supply answers to all, or many, of his 'professional' beliefs. The philosophical perspective, then serves as an organizing principle for those beliefs. Very often, therefore, one finds it necessary, if one disagrees with a particular philosophical claim, to disagree with the philosopher's entire approach. (As a striking example, to disagree with Hume's conclusions, it is almost always necessary to disagree with his presuppositions.)

But such principles also have implications beyond the realm of 'the academic'. A man's basic philosophical belief may "serve as an organizing principle for his entire way of life" (p. 30). That is, Wolterstorff is maintaining that the implications of a basic philosophical principle may be no less sweeping than are the implications of a religion. "It sometimes happens that those features of the universe to which the philosopher appeals in justifying his philosophical views are also quite clearly those in which he places his faith" (p. 31). In this case, one's entire life, one's actual religion, one's morality, one's attitudes are governed by his philosophical commitment. (Descartes, for instance, believed in God, but his ultimate appeal was to reason in the form of clear and distinct ideas. Presumably, he would have given up his belief in God had it not conformed to this criterion. Hence his basic 'faith' was in Reason, rather than in God.)

> What I wish to conclude from our discussion thus far is that a philosophical appeal is typically not neutral with respect to faith--meaning that, given any philosophical appeal, there are usually certain trusts and loyalties which conflict in one of the ways indicated with that appeal. And conversely, an ultimate trust and loyalty, is typically not neutral with respect to a philosophical appeal--meaning by this, that given any trust and loyalty, there are usually certain philosophical appeals which conflict in the ways indicated with that way of life (p. 31).*

It is not, however, claimed that there must be a conflict. "In principle at least it seems possible for a man's philosophical perspective and his way of life to be independent--for his philosophical appeal to be independent of his ultimate trust" (p. 32). It might be thought that this would require inconsistency, but it cannot be such in any strict sense. "The connections between the various elements of a man's philosophical perspective, and between the various features of his way of life, are rarely deductive connections" (p. 32).** Hence, if there is inconsistency at all, it can only be in a rather tenuous sense.

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* This should not be a surprising conclusion, since, after all, there are many issues which are typically raised both by religion and philosophy: "the origin of all things, the nature of man, the foundation of moral principles, the existence of supernatural beings, etc." (p. 30).

** Just as the connections between St. Paul's beliefs, actions, and attitudes were not 'strict' ones (cf. above, Chapter I).

So there may be conflict of a very important nature between faith and philosophy. But can we say, as suggested earlier, that in such a case faith must lose out, that it must be over-ridden by rationality? Wolterstorff's answer (as must now be apparent) is a resounding No.

> What is left to consider is whether in cases of conflict between philosophy and faith, or in cases where a man's faith exercises a formative influence on his philosophy, or vice versa, we have a contrast between reason on one side and faith on the other. Can these be viewed as cases of rational objectivity versus bias? It is clear by now that they cannot. It may indeed be the case that Reason, interpreted let us say as "clear and distinct ideas" can serve as man's ultimate appeal in philosophy, and even his ultimate trust; but in such cases, too, we have a conflict between two trusts, or a conflict between an ultimate appeal and an ultimate trust, and not a conflict between bias and objectivity. For we have seen that no conclusive "rational" defense can be given for a man's ultimate philosophical appeal. In cases of conflict between philosophy and faith a man will have to choose; but this choice, in the last resort, cannot be represented as a choice between rationality and irrationality, or rationality and nonrationality (p. 32).*

Wolterstorff then has added two important points to the overall argument: First, he emphasizes that philosophical methodology (and hence, the conclusions derived therefrom) is ultimately unjustifiable, that it depends, in the final analysis on an assumption. Second, he argues that philosophical and religious 'faiths' may well conflict. The latter point may be put differently by saying that philosophy is by no means 'neutral' with respect to the acceptability of a given religion.

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* There may seem to be serious disagreement here between Wolterstorff and MacIntyre since (as we saw above, p.206) MacIntyre seems to say that metaphysics (i.e., what he thinks of as a philosophy which might rival religion) cannot really be a candidate to replace religion. I find his argument ([59], pp. 210-11) quite unclear; however, apparently he means that since metaphysics is based on argument, it cannot take the place of religion whose content makes it necessary that it not be based on argument, but rather on conversion. If this is what he means then his point is effectively undercut by Wolterstorff's argument that philosophy depends on an ultimate commitment no less than does religion. (MacIntyre says that science and ethics require ultimate assumptions but does not seem to see that his argument , that every train of reasoning must have a starting place, applies equally to philosophy itself.)

Since the main concern of this essay is whether or not it is possible to justify having faith, religious faith, the fact that such faith may conflict with 'philosophical faith' may seem beside the point. And, indeed, perhaps argument that there may be conflict *is* beside the point. What is *not* beside the point, however, is that if such conflict should arise, then it should not be considered as a straightforward conflict between rationality and irrationality, for, once again, philosophy, says Wolterstorff, is no less based on faith than is religion.

* * * * *

There is one very important point that our authors are concerned with which, so far, has not been discussed at all. This may be characterized, following MacIntyre, as the problem of the 'difficulties in Christian belief'. We have alluded to this problem at various times in the foregoing, but, each time, it seemed better to postpone the major discussion of it until a later point. We now have sufficient 'background' to take it up in the manner that will prove most fruitful for our over-all purposes.

We have seen that MacIntyre admits that there are 'meaning problems involved in the acceptance of a theistic framework but that, he says, in spite of such problems, it is justifiable to accept a religion 'on authority'. In his Difficulties in Christian Belief [57], some of the difficulties he discusses seem to center around meaning; others do not seem to do so.* At any rate, there is, he admits, a plethora of difficulties.

MacIntyre's project in this book is to survey the 'difficulties' and to examine what might be done to avoid them. He does not claim to be able to solve completely all of the problems raised; rather, his conclusion is as follows:

> If we cannot solve them, ought we to abandon our religious belief? Or can we safely put them on one side and forget about them. Both these courses seem to me mistaken. Certainly, if we can see no way at all through the intellectual problems raised by the Christian religion, we ought to abandon it. But we do not need more than a limited amount of light to see that what we have here are matters of difficulty, not matters for doubt. A thousand difficulties, as Cardinal Newman pointed out, need not add up to one doubt (p. 8).

A distinction is apparently being drawn between an insuperable obstacle and a 'mere' difficulty. There could, conceivably, be grounds for deserting Christianity, but 'difficulties' do not make up such grounds. It is, however, not easy to see just what constitutes the difference between such an insuperable obstacle and a mere difficulty. Perhaps we can gain some idea by considering what he actually says about concrete cases of 'difficulties'.

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* There is it should be noted, a very thin line between that which is false and that which is meaningless for philosophers.

In the first chapter he considers the problem of evil. Here he argues that the three premises (God is omnipotent; God is good; Evils occur) which give rise to the problem are premises which one cannot give up and still remain a Christian. Thus the simple 'solution', abandoning one of these premises,* is not one which the Christian may embrace.

In Chapter two, MacIntyre considers and rejects, several of the traditional solutions to the problem (e.g. evil is a punishment for our wickedness). Only the last 'solution' is particularly relevant here. This simply states that evil is an incomprehensible mystery which must be accepted on faith. The author objects to this because it admits an _actual_ contraction into Christian doctrine. But from a contradiction _anything_ follows, "so that to introduce a contradiction is to introduce into one's system of thought a license to say anything. But theology claims to be concerned with truth...Hence, the theologian is as committed an enemy of contradictions as is the natural scientist or the logician" (p. 27).

In Chapter Four, MacIntyre offers what he considers to be to some extent, an adequate solution to the problem of evil. His solution, like so many before him, depends upon the notion of free will. God wished to make beings who

> were to be capable of moral achievement and of moral growth; and the necessary concommitant of this is that

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* In a sense, of course, this could not be called a 'solution' at all, but rather a denial of the premises of the problem. Compare Kuhn above: Denying the premises is not a solution to the puzzle.

> they had to be capable of moral failure and refusal to grow...God could not have made free beings capable of moral achievement unless he had made a universe in which there were evils to be struggled against and overcome. How does this solve the problem of evil? It shows that the porposition 'Everything happens by the will of God' is ambiguous and misleading. For God wills that men should do what they will, even if it is not what God would wish them to do...And this is so great a good that he cannot be held evil for willing it..." (p. 36).

In short, free will requires(apparently, logically requires) evil. But free will is the greatest of all possible goods, so God cannot be called evil for willing it.

It would not be to our present purpose to examine this purported solution for adequacy. What is to our purpose is to notice MacIntyre's own attitude concerning the solution, to consider his misgivings concerning its adequacy.

The most obvious objection is that "God could have created free and responsible beings who had to cope with evils, without creating as much evil as in fact exists" (p. 39). Animal pain seems clearly to be an example of superfluous evil, i.e. evil which in no way is required for human free will. MacIntyre attempts to give an answer to this objection, but he realizes his answer is not adequate (pp. 40-1). Therefore, he continues:

> We cannot understand why there is quite so much evil. whether one allows this remaining consideration to be a decisive one in making up one's mind whether Christianity is true or not will in part depend on how far one thinks that one should expect all the difficulties in theology to be capable of solution (pp. 40-41).

'Some sort of sense' has been made out of one of the central affirmations of theology; this is all that is required. "If one believes that the universe is essentially mysterious..., one does not expect to be able to tie up all the ends into a neat package of consoling doctrine" (p. 41). One can now see that evil has a proper place in the Christian scheme of things, and so we are not faced by a stark contradition at this point. To embrace a contradiction would be 'intolerable and irrationalist" (p. 41).

MacIntyre's discussion of other problems follows the pattern given above. That is, he finds himself unable to give complete answers to the problems raised but does hold that he has given *enough of an answer* to show that the problems may rationally be regarded as 'difficulties' (which do not add up to doubt) rather than as outright contradictions. For instance, he says that miracles are essential to Christianity, but is not certain that the concept makes sense; or, at least, he is not certain one can rationally hold that such extraordinary events do take place (Chapter 5). And he concludes with the following 'confession'.

> At this point my discussion of miracles stops short, largely because I do not know how to continue it. This is a common predicament in the philosophy of religion and the only apology that I can offer for writing so incompletely and inclusively is that it is preferable to writing conclusively and mistakenly (p. 50).

The final difficulty raised is the problem of survival after death (Chapter 11). Here MacIntyre concludes, first, that the arguments which have been given to show that survival does occur are through and through fallacious; second, it is not at all clear that it even makes sense to talk of 'non-bodily survival' ("our normal concept of personality is closely linked to the notion of bodily continuity" [p. 113]. He does not, however, advocate that this belief be dropped from Christian dogma; it is much too central for that ("without belief in survival Christian theology would not make sense" (ibid.). It is considered a 'difficulty'.

Christianity, then, is not provable and is fraught with 'difficulties'. Nevertheless, this does not amount to reason for rejecting it.

* * * * *

It is certainly not easy to know what to make of this argument, what actual difference MacIntyre sees between 'mere difficulties' and crucial objections. On miracles and 'life after death' no contradiction seems (unequivocably) to be involved, but he finally admits that the 'belief' may be incomprehensible.

But if we consider the existence of evil, the problem is even greater. For he concludes with the admission that animal pain is completely unexplained. Does this not create as much of a contradiction as did the moral evil which he has 'explained away'? If there are three apparent contradictions involved in a given claim, to show that only one is really a contradiction does not show that the claim does not involve a contradiction.* To say that we have "a limited amount of light" (p. 8) seems to be little better than taking refuge in a vague manner of speaking in the hopes that the remaining contradiction will not be noticed.

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* Having discussed the traditional proofs of the existence of God, MacIntyre says, "One occasionally hears teachers of theology aver that although the proofs do not provide conclusive grounds for belief in God, they are at least pointers, indicators. But a fallacious argument points nowhere...and three

The most sense that it seems can be made of what he is saying is that a manifest contradiction cannot be accepted but that which just seems to be a contradiction (but which we suspect may be resolvable) or that which, for whatever reason, does not seem to make much sense through vagueness or other reasons (e.g., miracles) may be tolerated as a mere difficulty. In short, he seems to be relying on his intuitions to determine the difference between a definite contradiction and a mere difficulty. But he has done nothing to give any clear distinction.

Ferré presents a no less puzzling discussion of basically the same problem. As we have seen (above, p. 208) he is explicit on the point that 'the language of theology' can contain no contradictions. But we must go slowly to see exactly what he means, for he also says that one may accept two statements, the formal notation for which would be 'C' and 'not-C'.

> It is by no means clear that all expressions of the abstract form "C and no-C" are self-stultifying contradictions, though on the strictly formal level they undoubtedly are nothing more. The informal logician will recognize that even explicit formal contradictions are not always self-stultifying but sometimes may be occasions for growth in thought ([18], p. 153).

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fallacious arguments are no better than one" (p. 63). But the converse also would seem to hold; i.e., three contradictions are really no worse than one.

Contraditions which really are contradictions are not acceptable; but merely apparent contraditions are acceptable and may very well be important.

How these are to be distinguished, however, is no more clear than it is in MacIntyre. Ferré considers the apparent contradiction which results from two demands of the religious adequacy of God: "God cannot be completely apart from the world and unrelated to change," and "God cannot be merely a conditioned part of the world and subject to change" (p. 153). How is this to be treated?

First he gives some analogies, examples of apparent contradictions: "It's raining and it's not" and "She's pretty and she's not." These are useful and serve to say what is not easily put in a more straightforward manner.

> If, on an unpleasant day, I describe the weather by saying, "It's raining and it's not," I am uttering a formal contradiction, but it may be the best possible characterization of the day. If it is, it will not be so merely because I use a form of words which seems to contradict itself but because the expression I use acts as an incentive to increased conceptual precision. Perhaps the English language is not yet equipped to indicate the more-than-drizzling but less-than-sprinkling condition of the atmosphere (ibid.).

The preceding situation is the same as is the siutation in the theological case.

> Likewise the apparent contradiction "God is involved in change and he is not" is an indication that further investigation of our own concepts of "involvement" and "change" are in order so that we may discover more precisely their logical powers for inferences which, in theology, hinge on them (ibid.).

I cannot see that this argument is at all helpful. First and least important, the comment about the weather hardly "acts as an incentive to increased conceptual precision."

(How in the world could it do that?) Rather, it is simply a a brief way of characterizing the weather which in most contexts would be understood.

The important point, however, is that such an expression is clearly not intended to express a real contradiction. This is obvious from two considerations: First, the meaning of what I say can be made clear by simply having you look out the window. You can see what it is that I am trying to describe. Second, it is not necessary to describe the weather in this way. While it might not be easy to give an accurate description of what it is like out, it could be done if one were clever. (Ferré's sentence, "Perhaps the English language is not yet equipped to indicate the more-than-drizzling but less-than-sprinkling condition of the atmosphere," is almost comical. It is reminiscent of the little boy who refuses to tell you his name on the grounds that he "can't say 'William'.")

The point here is that there are paradoxes, and there are paradoxes. On the one hand, there are seeming-contradictions which are stated because that is an easier way or more striking way of saying what could be said in consistent terms. On the other hand, there are paradoxes which are apparently 'irreducible', where the paradox itself "is in a certain way the essence of what is to be believed" (Williams [90], p. 192).*

What we want Ferré to tell us is how to distinguish an apparent contradiction from a genuine one, how to decide when the difficulty is resolvable and when it is not. Talk about ordinary 'paradoxical' ways of speaking contributes not one whit to such a problem. Merely to adopt the blasé assumption that the paradox of God being both involved and not involved in change calls for further analysis is completely unhelpful. Using this assumption, one could justify accepting any paradox (contradiction) whatsoever.

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* Williams here (pp. 191-2) makes a distinction similar to that I make above.

In sum, neither MacIntyre nor Ferré has helped us with the problem of how the 'difficulties' in Christianity should be treated. And yet this is an important, a crucially important, question. For only the most naive of believers would deny that there are 'difficulties' and that they pose a threat to the man who wishes to be a believer without eschewing his rationality.

Actually, I think that it is possible to explicate the difference between a 'mere difficulty' and a 'falsifying objection'. However, I do not think that either MacIntyre or Ferré makes even a promising beginning toward doing so. Therefore, we shall return to this problem shortly.

* * * * *

The totality of arguments discussed in this chapter and in Chapter III might be described as "variations on a theme by William James." What James (and Kierkegaard, in his own way) was trying to show is that in some limited range of cases, what is essential, what is necessary, is not evidence but decision. We have seen this repeatedly emphasized by

Hick, Hare, etc.

But let us start 'at the beginning' and notice each of the most important points on which we have found general agreement. The first four points were discussed separately above, so we need only a reminder of them.

> (a) The existence of God cannot be demonstrated, but this is not a theological misfortune, since such demonstration would not be in accord with the content of the belief.
>
> (b) God cannot be represented as an explanatory, theoretical entity on a par with electrons. Such 'theories' do not work and also would not be appropriate for the manner in which the belief should be held (i.e. they are theologically unsatisfactory).
>
> (c) Historical and scientific beliefs do not constitute an essential part of religious belief.*
>
> (d) Faith cannot be represented just as belief, but it does involve belief. To attempt to construe it as a combination of attitudes, motives, actions, etc. does not do justice to it in its entirety.

* * * * *

As we discussed each of the authors, we saw that the type of argument mentioned in (a) and (b) was generalized and used at a variety of points. The claim is that the content of a belief determines (or helps to determine) the manner in which it should be held. In particular, it was argued that the manner in which 'framework' principles are (and should be) held is appropriate to the content of religious belief.

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* We saw, though, that this is a somewhat dubious claim, since certain minimal historical beliefs do seem to be a necessary, although not a sufficient, condition of any analysis of religious faith which purports to show faith to be a cognitive state. (We shall discuss this point further in Chapter VI.)

This brings us to the most crucial contention that all of the authors have in common:

> (e) In any given area of knowledge, whether it be ethics, science, philosophy, or religion, at some point it is necessary to accept some principle(s) in terms of which to argue and in terms of which the 'contents' of that 'area' are to be understood. This can be put in terms of Carnap's notion of adopting a 'framework' if one adds the proviso that, pace Carnap, the 'better' framework is that which is 'most true of the world'; it is not just a matter of choosing a convenient way of speaking.

This claim was put in a variety of different ways by the different authors since each has his own distinctive approach. But the summation just given clearly applies to each of them. Once one has accepted such over-all principles, then

> (e') there are relatively straightforward ways of answering questions which arise within the accepted framework. This situation again is analogous to science and philosophy. In philosophy one might appeal to the categories of common sense; in science one would appeal to a particular type of experimentation; in religion one might appeal to the literal words of the Bible.

The ultimate presuppositions, while not rationally 'coerced', are rationally 'respectable'; i.e. it is not correct to say that a person is irrational for accepting them. Two slightly different reasons are given for this contention:

> (f) Since everyone, in whatever capacity (scientist, philosopher, or 'ordinary man indulging in his everyday business of life') makes them, one cannot criticize the religious believer for making ultimate assumptions.

> (g) Some assumption is necessary. An 'agnostic' attitude is impossible from a practical point of view. Refusing to make an ultimate commitment in religious matters is itself an ultimate commitment, for, whatever is to be gained or lost by one 'positive' commitment or the other will likewise be subject to gain or loss if one attempts to remain 'aloof'.*

(f) and (g) clearly are distinct arguments. Often, however, they are treated as a single argument by saying simply that commitment is a practical necessity (f) in any area of knowledge (g).

In spelling out this position a basic dichotomy is drawn between scientific theories and over-all frameworks. While science must assume some framework principles (e.g. the future will be like the past), these are logically prior to the acceptance of the actual theories of science.

> (h) Scientific theories are accepted or rejected by straightforward confrontation with the facts. There are crucial experiments which allow one to know whether a theory is true. Therefore, the bases of religion and the central theories of science differ radically in their logical structure.**

Since there cannot be crucial experiments which dictate the decision in the case of religious (or metaphysical) principles, then

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* As we saw, each of these arguments is given by James. Our authors, however, do not want to say that we should choose, the side that 'offers the most' (as James seems to imply). Such an approach, they believe, makes choosing a religion merely a 'prudent gamble'. Therefore, they emphasize experiencing the world as 'God's world'.

** The claim in (b) that "if God is represented as a theoretical entity, then one has a very bad theory" is based upon the assumption contained in (h), that a 'good' (a 'genuine') theory is to be accepted or rejected for the reason given there.

> (i) at some point everything either falls into place or it does not. One must come to see that a certain principle is or is not adequate.* There may be criteria for evaluating such frameworks (Ferre) but these are 'flexible', they do not dictate a decision (at least not to us, in our present state of knowledge).

And finally,

> (j) while no acceptable framework can include actual contradictions, "a thousand difficulties need not add up to one doubt."**

This 'itemized' summary of the position defended by our authors makes clear that several of their contentions must be considered to be incorrect as they stand, if we assume the validity of the general Quine-Putnam-Kuhn theses of Chapter IV above. In particular, (b) and (h) seem incorrect, while (e) and (f) need some re-interpreting. Further, (i) and (j) are greatly clarified in terms of this analysis.

Generally, my point is that the arguments of Hick, et.al. are strengthened if they are emended in the light of the view of knowledge that resulted from Chapter IV. In particular, the point is that the basic analogies they draw between science, philosophy, and religion are closer in important ways than they appeared to be when the absolutist distinction between internal and external questions was assumed.

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* It is Hick, of course, who most emphasizes the 'coming to see' aspect of faith. This, apparently is what Hick would take to be the most crucial point of difference between himself and James. James' argument, Hick says, advocate such a gamble (in spite of the absence of evidence). Rather, faith is not a gamble since it is a matter of 'coming to see'. In short, Hick is concerned to avoid the seeming arbitrariness of adopting or rejecting faith by use of his construal of 'significance'.

** We saw, however, that it is far from easy to understand this distinction (as drawn by Ferré and MacIntyre), between contradictions and 'mere difficulties' and that it, therefore, needs further discussion.

(b) and (h) must be revised, for once it is seen that the 'absolutist' version of the analytic-synthetic distinction is untenable, there seems to be no way to make an absolute distinction between a conceptual framework and a theory. It was a further part of the claim of Chapter IV that the central scientific theories are not subject to refutation by isolated experiment.

This means that it is not possible to say that the status of God in a religious framework is totally unlike the status of, say, kinetic energy, in a scientific framework. But, far from weakening the central claims of our authors, it strengthens them considerably. For a basic reason for saying that talk about God must be meaningless is that such talk is totally unlike scientific talk; i.e., it is claimed that if beliefs about God purport to be at all like beliefs about the theoretical entities of science, then they simply fail to measure up to the criterion of being what they purport to be, and, hence, collapse into meaninglessness.

But, now that it no longer seems that the central theories of science must be falsifiable by 'crucial experiment', it is not possible to say that believing in God as something like a theoretical entity automatically results in a meaningless theory. Therefore, the 'epistemological' reason which our authors gave for denying that God could be anything like a theoretical entity turns out not to be a good reason.*

The above, no doubt, will seem at first glance to be a 'gift' of highly dubious value to our authors. This is because they do, after all, have also a theological reason for asserting that God cannot be a theoretical entity. They say that if our knowledge of God did depend on anything like a theory then it must be held in the provisional manner appropriate to scientific beliefs but completely inappropriate for religious beliefs. This would be, if correct, a very strong reason for resisting my revision of (b) and (h), but, as should now be apparent, it is not correct. We shall, however, return to this shortly for discussion.

(e) and (f) need only slight revision. It is still possible to make some distinction between 'framework' and other principles, but the distinction is no longer absolute; rather, framework principles are simply to be construed as those crucial principles which are fruthest from what Quine calls the 'experiential periphery' (whether they seem, intuitively, to be logical truths or empirical theories).

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* In effect, the authors in question simply granted too much to the positivistically inclined sceptic.

(i) is clarified in that we have discussed the way in which the Gestalt quality of seeing functions in science. (j) also makes sense now for the first time. The distinction which MacIntyre and Ferré attempt, unsuccessfully, to draw between a 'mere difficulty' and an intolerable contradiction is seen to precisely parallel Kuhn's distinction between anomaly and counter-example. The difference is not one of the inherent nature of the problem-case (as MacIntyre and Ferré seem to think); rather, *it depends upon the system to which it is an objection*. If the system is strong enough in other respects, the difficulty is *only* a difficulty; one continues to hold the system in the faith that resolution of the problem can someday be achieved. If the system, however, is weakened on other grounds as well, eventually a point is reached at which the difficulties become intolerable, and the system is seen as refuted, a conversion takes place.*

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* This paragraph, with its talk about the 'strength and weakness' of a theological system must be taken very generally. That is, no attempt is made to *prejudge what* makes such a system strong or weak. (Ronald Hepburn [*Christianity and Paradox*, [34], Ch. II] presents an argument in many ways similar to that presented above; i.e., he argues that the meaning-problems which Christianity seems to entail may be tolerable if it is sufficiently firmly based on other grounds. His presentation of the point does not seem to me to be particularly persuasive, however, for while he does give an analogy to science, he does not have so powerful an account of the nature of science as that given by Kuhn at his disposal.)

If we look at the results of these revisions, the central claims of Hick, et.al. seem to be strengthened. In particular, the claim that there are important analogies between philosophy, science, and theology is substantiated. Most important, is the fact that they no longer seem to be being made analogous by showing that science and philosophy are as *irrational* as theology; rather, now it appears that theology is as *rational* as science and philosophy. For once it is seen that the assumptions of science and philosophy are parts of the integral whole which is our knowledge, it no longer appears that such assumptions can be properly described as 'gratuitous'.

In particular, this seems to be the case if one considers that the net result of a Kuhn-type analysis of science is to widen the scope of the class of 'framework' principles. For the basic *theories* of science take on the characteristics of external statements. They are not subject to falsification by 'crucial experiments'. Rather, they are *assumed* throughout the course of normal science. In short, the basic principles of religion are seen to be analogous *not only* to such 'philosophical' principles as "the future will be like the past" and "there is an external world," but also to principles which everyone would agree are 'scientific'.

It may appear, however, that at some points the case is weakened. In particular, if one can make no absolute distinction between theories and conceptual frameworks, are not all of these subject to revision? For we must remember that while Putnam and Kuhn emphasize that some central elements (paradigms) will not be in question at a given time, the reverse side of the coin emphasized by Quine, also holds: any statement may be revised if the circumstances warrant it. Does not the knowledge that this is the case automatically result in holding even the paradigms in at least a slightly tentative manner, a manner inappropriate for religious beliefs? How do these two apparently near-contradictory characteristics of scientific procedure fit together? And how can the latter ("any statement may be revised") fail to destroy the analogy with religious faith?

Putnam supplies us with an answer to both of these questions.

> To say that an intention is to do something permanently is not the same as saying that the intention is permanent. To marry a woman is to legally declare an intention to remain wedded to her for life; although the bride and groom know perfectly well that there exists such an institution as divorce, and that they may avail themselves of it. The existence of divorce does not change the fact that the legal and declared intention of the persons getting married is to be wedded for life (p. 387).

As we have seen, Hick rejects the analogy between the 'faith' of the scientist and religious faith on the grounds that the latter is 'provisional', whereas the religious believer's faith "is an unshakable dogma, able to absorb and reinterpret all adverse or seemingly contradicting circumstances" [38, p. 69). The answer to this claim that they are basically different is now explained: Each holds to his basic principles unswervingly; he never questions them. But each might, under extraordinary circumstances, give up such principles. The latter is quite compatible, however, with holding the principles as 'unshakable dogmas'. Hick's supposed difference, that Christian principles are able to absorb all adverse evidence, is seen not to be a genuine difference, since the scientists' principles also can absorb any anomaly. If the 'strain' becomes too great, however, most scientists will eventually give up the principles. But, then too, many Christians eventually find the strain too great, and therefore give up their 'unshakable dogmas'. In sum, while, intuitively, there seem to be some important differences between the cases, an actual disanalogy seems to defy being drawn.

If one looks carefully at this over-all position; it is clear that Hick's characterization of what it attempts to do is exactly right: the claim is that faith "is a state which it is rational to be in, but which philosophical reasoning cannot put one in." Our authors have, in effect, elaborated and refined James' claim that it is all right, it is intellectually respectable, to believe what reason cannot entail must be believed. In doing this, they attempt to avoid two extremes: the extreme of traditional natural theology which held that the most crucial religious beliefs are provable to any rational man--this, they assume was invalidated by Hume and Kant; in addition, it would, at best, be religiously unsatisfactory. The other extreme is that of Kierkegaard, which also takes for granted that Hume and Kant have triumphed and claims that the only alternative open is the extreme irrationalism of revelation.

Our writers, instead, attempt to walk the thin line between these alternatives. For them, choice, without the guidance of reason, is a necessity, but the choice is not, as it is with Kierkegaard, between reason and something else. Rather, reason is assumed but it shows its own limits when one reaches the final level of questioning, the level of framework principles. Clearly, such an attempt is of inherent interest and importance.

This type of analysis, presenting religion as a basic way of ordering the world, as a way of seeing the world, has a further importance which can best be brought out by considering the type of argument which frequently takes place between the theist and the sceptic: the sceptic points out evil in the world, the variety of religions that exist, the lack of positive reasons for any one of them, but the theist remains unmoved through it all. The sceptic, he believes, has 'missed something'. In such a situation typically each party comes to have a feeling of frustration, even a feeling that the other is hopelessly irrational.

But without denying that there could be a certain irrationality involved here somewhere, we are now in a position to understand that it is not just a matter of irrationality, if it is that at all. For each party literally sees the world in a way in which the other is incapable (at the time) of seeing it. Each accommodates 'the facts' in his own way into his own world-picture. More strongly, they are not even aware of the same facts. Rather than being a matter of rationality versus irrationality, what one has is more like a case of blindness or hallucination versus a whole-sighted man. But each maintains that he is the whole-sighted one and that the other is either 'blind' or 'hallucinating'.

At this point, the analyses of science and philosophy given above become crucially important. First, the believer has, as Hick says, a direct awareness of God working in the world in exactly the same sense that Tycho has a direct awareness of the sun disappearing over the horizon. That what one sees depends on his beliefs, his concepts, does nothing to undercut the claim that he sees these things, since that is the pattern of all of our seeing.

Second, the frequent intractability of the disagreement between the sceptic and the believer is not surprising when one considers that the basic framework principles of each seem, from his own point of view, to be analytic. The same is true of a philosophical system. The basic categorical statements of a system

> Are analytic in that system; they point it up in some respect and so could not be false (or invalid or illegitimate) without disruption of it. Within a system you do not say things that disrupt it... (Hall, p. 16).

But these same sentences

> are often taken to be synthetic, not analytic. And this has truth in it, too. If one views from the outside the categorial system in which they occur, that is, as oneself free of its commitments yet recognizing them as commitments, then material categorial sentences, by formulating these commitments, appear not to be analytic nor even, perhaps, true (or valid or legitimate); in any case they are clearly not necessary, for the system is not necessary...(p. 17).

We have seen, also, that exactly the same is true of science. The basic commitments of one time (e.g., to the principles of Euclidean geometry) can appear only as analytic; prior to the development of non-Euclidean geometries, any questioning of these principles would have been quite incomprehensible. At a later time, however, when, after the development of alternatives, it became possible to step outside the system, those principles which previously appeared as analytic appeared to be false.* It is no wonder then that in science, philosophy, and religion, there often seems to be a vital lack of meaningful communication. The point to be emphasized here, however, is just that this phenomenon is not peculiar to religious controversy.

The sense in which 'vision' or 'interpretation' enters into one's viewpoint is dramatically illustrated in the following passages.

> Christianity sees God's self-disclosure in Christ as the claims of a long process of revelation taking place through the events of Jewish history, as this was interpreted by the great prophets. In the story of the Hebrew people...the prophets saw a clear and momentous religious significance...Jesus came, according to his own claim, as the expected Messiah--expected, and yet not expected, for he reinterpreted the Messianic idea in relation to the divine plan for Israel, viewing himself as the spiritual servant, and not the earthly lord, of humanity. He came to "heal the sick, give sight to the blind, bind up the broken-hearted, and preach to the poor the good tidings of the kingdom,"

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* For the believer, the difficulties in his position can be seen only as difficulties, since, to him, his basic claims seem analytic. The sceptic sees the difficulties as counter-instances and the 'analytic' principles as false.

> and to give his own life for the salvation of mankind (Hick [38], p. 197).
>
> Why should God have so ordered the world that all men were headed for everlasting damnation and that he was unable to help them except by begetting a son with a woman betrothed to Joseph, and by then having this son betrayed and crucified and resurrected, by having him fetch Abraham and few of the damned out of hell while leaving the rest to their lot, and by saving only that small minority among men who first heard this story and then believed it? (Kaufmann [47], pp. 143-4).

Could it be possible that Hick and Kaufmann are talking about the same basic story? And yet they are; they are talking about a story the essential 'facts' of which they would generally agree on. One can imagine a person suddenly changing from seeing the story in one of these ways to seeing it in the other. But such a change could hardly be entailed by some new 'fact' which is pointed out. Rather, the sceptic, say, must do more than say "but there is evil in the world." He must make the believer see the evil differently; he must try to 'bring it home to him' as a monstrous injustice if it has been perpetuated by A Being. The believer, on the other hand, must do more than point out the virtues of Jesus (virtues which are quite compatible with his being only a deluded human); he must 'bring home' to the sceptic the full force of the personality of Jesus, a personality which, for him, illuminates the world and determines his vision of it.* Only in such ways can either effectively bring about change in the other. And, finally, it must now be clear, the only appropriate word for such a change is the word which is indeed used in such contexts, a word which brings to mind the sort of overall switch in vision our authors have made so much of, the word 'conversion'.

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* As we have noticed before, this process is like that which must be followed by one man attempting to make another see a duck where now he sees only a rabbit. In addition, one can, I believe, go further with this visual analogy and say that religious (as well, indeed, as philosophical and scientific)

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argument is best explicated by analogy to the sort of argument one encounters in *art criticism* (cf., e.g., V. Aldrich, *Philosophy of Art*, pp.50-1). Notice that this, in effect, supplies a 'program' for the sceptical philosopher who wants to do more than contribute one more 'difficulty' to Christian belief. If he genuinely wishes to affect the intelligent believer, he must not only point out that, e.g., it is, at best, difficult to make sense of 'necessary being'; rather, he must point out such logical difficulties, question the morality of Christianity, quarrel with the attitudes it inculcates, and, most important, at least indicate along what lines a satisfactory alternative world-view could be developed. (In saying this, I am in effect saying that a philosopher must take a 'wider' view of his job than is generally done today.) Among recent authors, I can think of only three who have attempted such a wide-scale program: Bertrand Russell, in his many essays which do, collectively, add up to such a program; Ronald Hepburn, who, although he concentrates on pointing out purely logical difficulties, makes a serious attempt to aketch an alternative, an alternative which, while sceptical, would have appeal to the 'naturally religious mind' ([34], Chapter XI); finally, and most importantly, Professor Kaufmann, whose *Critique* (as well as some of his other writings) is best described as a systematic attempt to make the reader change his 'vision'. This book launches frontal attacks on the logic, the morality, and the attitudes of the believer, and indeed offers an alternative world view. Needless to say, the believer must follow the same sort of path; certainly, if he is to do more than 'preach' in the crudest sense of this term, he must attempt to overcome the 'difficulties', but he must also present his religion in a way which will bring out the 'appeal' which he finds that it has.

CHAPTER VI

Further Questions

So far we have 'come the long way round' in attempting to formulate the strongest possible case in favor of the general strategy for justifying faith which is considered so important by a large number of contemporary philosopher theologians. There remain, however, many questions and possible objections which might be raised. In this chapter, we shall first discuss and attempt to answer some of these objections. Next, questions will be raised to which no definitive answers will be attempted; it will remain an open question whether or not satisfactory answers could be developed.

A large part of the Hick-MacIntyre type of argument depends on an analogy between the necessity of accepting certain 'bed-rock' framework principles in science, philosophy, and everyday life in spite of the absence of evidence and the necessity of accepting the 'first principles' of religion in a similar way. Therefore, if it could be shown that there are important dissimilarities between the basic principles of the other areas and those of religion, that the former beliefs are indeed more adequately based (although not directly evidenciable) than the latter, the over-all strength of the argument would be considerably diminished.* First, then, are there such dissimilarities?

Hick has recently discussed such a possible objection and has acknowledged some differences "between taking religious experience as cognitively veridical and taking our perception of the world, including our awareness of other persons, as cognitively verdical"* and has then argued that the differences do not discredit the analogy.

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*In effect, this would show that, contra Hick, the 'knowledge' that we have in religious matters is not dependent on a pattern which is "the pattern of all our knowing." However, since it has been argued above that no absolute difference in principle can be drawn between theories and conceptual frameworks, it may seem that it is not essential to draw an analogy between religious beliefs and, say, the existence of the external world, since the religious beliefs would be analogous to the central theories of science. In spite of the plausibility of this possible claim, however, I think that the analogies are still of importance. For it might be thought that whereas even, say, the law of the excluded middle could be revised in the face of scientific demands (and, therefore, must have more than 'conventional' import), the same cannot be said for, e.g., the existence of the external world. The latter, it might be said, could never be revised because it could make no difference to our behavior whether it were revised or not. This can be put briefly: the 'beliefs' which Hick, et.al. put forth as analogous to the belief in God are not 'genuine beliefs' at all, for they are so far from the 'experimental periphery' that accepting or rejecting them not only can make no difference for particular predictions but cannot possibly make any difference in our behavior and/or expectations in any sense. Hence, these 'religious beliefs' are neither like the law of the excluded middle, nor like "There is a brick house on main street," nor like other significant belief because they simply have no practical effect in any situation whatsoever. (Note: I am not endorsing this objection. With Quine, I should think that virtually any statement which is not a manifest self-contradiction might be 'cognitive', might have sufficient import to be subject to revision in some extraordinary circumstances, and therefore might make a difference to our understanding of and actions in the world. Nonetheless, if it can be shown that the beliefs which seem prima facie to be most closely analogous to religious beliefs are indeed meaningful, then the argument of Hick, et.al. will be strengthened.)

Before discussing the differences, he explicitly lists the similarities. First, in both cases there are data which are interpreted but which we are not aware of interpreting. One may even say that, for the most part, the basic data are the same in both cases.

Second, "in neither case can we prove demonstratively, or even show it to be probable, that the object of our 'cognition' exists independently of those states of mind in which we suppose ourselves to be cognizing it " (p. 244). We have already seen his argument for this.

Nevertheless, it seems immediately plausible that there would be some differences between the two cases. Hick attempts to anticipate such disanalogies and to show systematically that his basic point stands even in the face of such an objection.

> First, sense perception is coercive. The perceived world has an objective character and structure and impresses itself upon our consciousness whether we like it or not. When we open our eyes in daylight we cannot help seeing what is before us. If we try to ignore the perceptable world, for instance by treating a brick wall as though it were not there, we quickly learn that we must take account of the actual features of our physical environment, or be eliminated from it (p. 245).

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*"Sceptics and Believers" [43], in Faith and the Philosophers, John Hick (ed.) [39], p. 242.

The same cannot be said of religious perception. One may or may not be aware of God in the environment. In fact, contemporary theology teaches that it is crucial that we should be free to become conscious of God or not.

Second, "sense perception is universal amongst mankind, and the world which it reveals is public to all men." Neither is true of religious perception, and the religious perception of men in different cultures cannot "easily be correlated as reports of the same religious reality" (p.245).

Third, sense perception exhibits a kind of coherence which religious experience lacks. Unlike the former, the latter does not seem to be governed by discernable laws which allow prediction.

If these differences could be shown to be genuine and as stark as they seem, Hick acknowledges that they would constitute a fatal objection to his position.

> In view of these striking differences, it might well be said, reliance upon sense experience stands justified, whereas reliance upon religious experiences requires further justification. Our reality terms---'real', 'exists', 'fact'---are modelled upon the kind of reality exhibited by the material world, and it may well seem that these terms are not properly applicable to the supposed object of theistic religious experience (p. 246).

Hick, however, holds that, in part, the dissimilarities are only apparent.

To begin with, religious experience is coercive, although it is not for everyone. "At the top levels of intensity, religious experience is coercive. It gives rise to the situation of the person who cannot help believing in God" (ibid.). The difference then is not primarily that one is less coercive than the other, but rather one is only sometimes coercive, while the other is always so. "Whereas everyone is compelled to have sense experience, no one is compelled to have religious experience" (ibid.). In sum, a person may not have religious experience at all, and if he does it may not be sufficiently intense to be coercive. Nonetheless it can be coercive.

The lack of universality arises from the same source: "Since the apprehension of God is not forced upon mankind it is perhaps not surprising that many are entirely or almost entirely without it" (p. 246). Finally, the lack of coherence is a "corrolary of the variation in degree of the form of experience both from person to person and from time to time in the same person" (ibid.).

Thus the three apparent differences can be explained by two, more basic differences which cause them.

> (I) That although the awareness of God is coercive to one who has it in the highest degree, no one is coerced into having it, and (II) that short of this coercive (but not coerced) awareness of God there is a long descent of degrees of religious consciousness, dwindling down to zero (p. 247).

Do these differences entail that religious experience is not to be trusted while sense experience is? Admitting this is a difficult and complex question, Hick suggests that the believer is entitled to claim the right to trust his religious experience if the following two points can be extablished: (a)these two epistemological differences can be seen to arise out of a prior difference in the natures of the objects of cognition posited in each case, namely the world and God;* and (b)this prior difference, although sufficient to account for the differences in modes of cognition, is nevertheless not such as to remove God altogether beyond the scope of the cognitive uses of human language (p.247).

The Christian though maintains that the first condition is easily satisfied. Man, a finite personal being was created at an 'epistemic distance' from God in order to preserve his autonomy in the face of God, the infinite personal being. This 'epistemic distance' makes possible man's existence as a free and morally independent being, and therefore makes it possible for him to enter into a truly personal relationship with God. Thus, God has made it possible for us to know him, but He has not made it necessary that we do so. For the latter would take away man's freedom and therefore the personal quality of the personal relationship between man and God.**

Hick's answer to (b) is simply that whatever problems of meaning may arise by putting such a 'distance' between man and God it cannot be maintained that belief in God is meaningless. Rather, it is strictly speaking a factual belief in that it is verifiable, not verifiable in this life but after death. As we shall see below, while, on the surface, Hick here seems to be 'mixing' a total interpretation and a straightforward factual belief in an illegitimate way, he can, by relying on certain salient points of scientific procedure, answer such an objection. But, even further, our analysis of science in Ch. IV, with its emphasis on the inadequacy of conclusive verifiability or falsifiability as necessary conditions for beliefs being cognitive, tends to indicate that, even without Hick's claim of verification in the afterlife, there is no particular reason for denying that talk about God may be within "the scope of the cognitive uses of religious language." Therefore, the 'epistemic distance' of God from man does not seem to be a very great difficulty.

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* This is the manner-content argument again.

** As we have seen above, p.196.

The answers to the foregoing objections seem to me to be adequate, but these disanalogies are not those which make up the strongest form of objection to the argument. For it might be argued that the strongest objection would run as follows: "You say that the religious sceptic accepts his most basic beliefs on faith just as much as does the believer. But this is not so. For, what beliefs do you have in mind? That there are other minds? that, indeed, the external world exists at all? that the future will be like the past? that memory is reliable? Most of these have, indeed, been mentioned at one point or another above by some believer intent upon showing that we 'all live by faith'. But in none of these can you really make out your claim that this actually is the case, for, if I am accepting my view on faith, then there must be some conceivable alternative to my view, some sensible alternative which might make a difference in my behavior. If there is not, then, needless to say, I haven't chosen one view over another. I have adopted the only possible view and have acted in the only possible way. And by this I do not mean that my view is so 'coercive' to me that it is a psychological impossibility for me to reject it (that was the counter-argument you have considered, Professor Hick). I mean that there is no stateable, sensible alternative to the future being like the past, there being an external world, etc."

The basis of this objection is, then, that to accept one genuine interpretation rather than another is to do something that would make a difference in our behavior and that there simply is no way to act on the solipsistic and the other hypotheses. The question then is: What possible difference could it make to our behavior to say we accept or reject one or the other of these purported beliefs?

Hick mentions such a possible objection and attempts to counter it.

> The difference caused by a genuine assent to solipsism would be akin to the sudden realization during an absorbing dream that it is only a dream. If the solipsistic interpretation were to be seriously adopted and wholeheartedly believed, experience would take on an unreal character in contrast with one's former non-solipsistic mode of experience. Our personal relationships in particualr, our loves and friendships, our hates and enmities, rivalries and co-operations, would have to be treated not as trans-subjective meetings with other personalities but as dialogues with oneself ([38], p. 124).

Now against this it might be argued that "this comparison with dreams and with 'talking to oneself' does not meet the objection. For these two phenomena are what they are by contrast with normal phenomena of waking experience and talking to others. In a solipsistic world, one would think, certain experiences would be dreams and self-conversations, and others not, just as before."

I am not quite certain how an objection of this type should be interpreted,* but the obvious point is that even if I suspected that I were 'alone in the universe' the fact would remain that in this (imaginary) universe it would be necessary to act just as I do now, since if, for instatnce, I were to walk in front of a car the effect of it hitting me would be the same as it is when I consider it to be 'real'. Therefore, I must act, within my self-proclaimed 'dream world' just as I do at this time.

Now I must say that I do not find such an argument very convincing, and yet I cannot do much more than elaborate what Hick has already said. Let us go back and consider that he says that it seems to make a difference if one realizes "during an absorbing dream that it is only a dream." Ordinarily when this happens one wakes up immediately. But this does not necessarily happen.* That is, a person occassionally dreams on and yet is aware that he is only dreaming. When this occurs things continue to happen, but their 'quality' is, as Hick says, unreal. For instance, in a nightmare-type dream one still feels a discomfort but no longer an actual if one bears in mind that it is only a dream. One wishes to wake up but in the meantime makes the best of the situation. If such a dream continues long enough the dreamer might finally 'stop running' and tell the pursuing monster to go to hell. That is, within the dream, one's attitudes and even his actions may be different due to his knowledge that it is a dream.

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* There is a possibility that the point of such an argument is that, since we have learned to distinguish between dreams and wakefulness in terms of the 'present level' of our experience, then it is nonsense to say 'everything is a dream' since 'this world' is just what we mean by reality. This seems to me to be one of those arguments which is only about language and hence not very interesting. At any rate, if there is something important about it, I think it is met in what follows above.

The question is whether this can be applied to the level that all 'sane' persons call 'reality'. There are two possible cases here. First, consider a person who lives a pleasant enough life until he reaches middle age. At this point he begins to suffer misfortunes that make Job's lot seem idylic by comparison. At some point, he might decide that everything that seems to have happened for the last few years must be a terrible dream. As a result, his attitudes and actions change in ways precisely analogous to the ways in which those of the actual dreamer change (he ceases to worry about his incurable ailment, he ceases to try to make it to work, etc.*). In sum, it does not seem that the fact that he happens to be wrong about his conviction that he is dreaming has anything to do with the situation. In each case, one's total interpretation has changed.

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* That in fact a person often does not wake up when having such a dream is not necessary to my argument, but it will probably strengthen it for those who have had such an experience.

More radically, I would contend that even the belief that one's whole life has been a dream is sensible, may make a difference in behavior, and could even be true. For suppose in some far-off '1984' it became possible to 'create a baby in a test-tube'.** Suppose further that scientists created one such child and blocked all of his sensory apparatus. However, through control of his brain they gave him a 'life' quite like that of children who are growing up today, i.e. his body remained immobile with no sensory connection with the outside world except through stimulation of his brain cells.

Bear in mind that the life he led was to him just that of a child growing up in the 1960's. He played, cryed, and learned a language. He also dreamed and was able to distinguish his 'dreams' from his 'real life'.

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* The fact that he may eventually die of his disease, or go on relief, or whatever happens, of course, is quite compatible with his conviction that 'it is all a bad dream'.

** I do not think it is necessary to consider the objection that might be forthcoming at this point from some 'neo-Wittgensteinian' to the effect that a 'baby', by definition, is not created in a test-tube. If anyone did claim this, the only thing to do is to refer him to Putnam.

Unfortunately, however, through mismanagement of the experiment, he becomes morose, and even mentally ill. At this point he becomes convinced that his whole life has been a dream. He then reacts to 'events' in just the way that the dreamer in the preceding case did. The difference is that he is right; his whole life has been a dream. At this point, the scientists rehabilitate his sense organs, take him out of his sleep, and he enters the real world.

The point I take it, is obvious enough. The conviction that one is dreaming, even that he has always been dreaming, may make an actual difference both in one's attitudes and in his behavior. But if this is the case, it is not possible to say that there is no difference between a solipsistic and a non-solipsistic interpretation.*

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* The examples also seem to show that the alternative interpretation of the objection cannot stand. That is, if the thesis is not only about language but is meant to show that the solipsistic hypothesis is inconsistent and therefore actually impossible then it cannot stand. For the only way I can see to argue that it is inconsistent is to say that since the distinction between dreaming and reality is learned in terms of this world being reality, then it must be inconsistent to say that this world is not reality. But what a priori grounds can be given for asserting the impossibility of extending a distinction to another level. That is, once one has learned the distinction between dreaming and reality one can extend it 'forward' to understand the (perhaps unexperienced) phenomena of a dream within a dream; why then can it not be extended 'backward' to the level of deciding that this is a dream? To put this briefly, the assumption that one can learn the difference between dreaming and reality only at the level of reality seems to me to be an unjustified dogma. At most what can be said is that one can only learn such a distinction at the level of what one believes to be reality. Whether it is or not is quite irrelevant.

One final comment is in order here. It may be said that the above argument depends upon there being 'another world' into which the dreamer can enter upon waking up. But the argument does not actually depend on that, for whether there is such another world or not, the attitudes and actions of the person who believes that he is dreaming will be just what they are whether he is actually (a) living alone in the universe, (b)living in the 'dream world' of the second example, or (c)living in the only real world and suffering the delusion that he is dreaming.*

As a second example of a common sense belief which must be taken 'on faith' if it is to be believed at all, let us consider the proposition, "The earth did not come into existence five minutes ago." Certainly on the surface it seems to be meaningful to assert that in fact the earth did come into existence just five minutes ago. For, after all, could not some god, bored with his Olympus, have decided to create a world which appeared to be very old to its own inhabitants?* It might be a very amusing bit of diversion for a playful god. (I have know of Fundamentalists who indeed believe that the earth is only some six thousand years old. When questioned about fossil remains, etc., they simply say that these were created with the earth in order to 'test our faith'.)

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* Nor does the argument concerning the meaningfulness of the belief that 'one is alone in the universe' (discussed in previous notes) depend on this dichotomy. For one may 'learn' (in quotes since there is no teacher) the distinction between dreaming and reality in a 'dream', i.e. in a universe in which one is completely alone, and then come to believe that what was thought to be properly described as 'reality' actually may not have the characteristics of reality. (This is the 'paradigm case' argument. This argument assumes that one learns to apply a word by being told not that an 'x' is something with certain characteristics, but only is told that an 'x' is something like 'this thing here'. [The result of which would be that if we were all first taught to tell time by means of a cardboard clock, which was called 'a clock', then it would be 'logically impossible' to ever say, "But that is not a real clock." "You can't say that. You were first taught 'clock' by having that shown to you. Hence, that is the paradigm case of something's being a clock. Hence, it is meaningless to say that that is not a real clock."])

As in the preceding case (the case of the 'external world') one might say that the hypothesis is meaningless since it is neither verifiable nor falsifiable by experiment, due to the fact that it entails neither any discoverable evidence about the past nor any particular future event not entailed by the common sense belief. As a result of this, it can make no difference to action whether or not one accepts it. Hence, it is not a genuine alternative.

But actually this furnishes us with a clear example of a 'hypothesis' which does not entail any specific expectation concerning what the future will be like but which would have a great affect on our lives, on our attitudes and our behavior. As Putnam says:

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* Supplying these inhabitants with a 'memory' of events which 'took place' prior to this recent creation. Note here that while none of our authors specifically mentions just this question ("Is the earth more than five minutes old?") as being one which must be answered 'on faith', Demos does mention the related (but in some ways more general, and in other ways just different) question: "Is memory reliable?" (see Ch.III above). I have not taken up Demos' question because the one I have chosen seems to me to be both more interesting and more manageable.

> We could accept the hypothesis that the world came into existence Jan. 1, 1957, without changing the meaning of any word; but to do so would have a crimping effect on many sciences, and on much of ordinary life. (Think of the ad hoc hypotheses that would have to be invented to account for the "creation." And consider the role played by data concerning the past in, say, astronomy--not to mention ordinary human relations!) ([69] p. 365).

Putnam does not spell out what sorts of 'ordinary human relations' he is thinking of, but it is easy enough to think of examples: Consider the person whose marriage is only bearable now because of the sweet memories he (or she) has of the very satisfactory relationship with the spouse prior to 1957; consider the prisoner convicted to life imprisonment in 1956; consider the position of the World War II hero, venerated by all, who, now it is found, did not fight in that universally-imagined war. If one takes the hypothesis seriously, there is no 'foundation' for any of the above states of affairs. (Should the prisoner be released? Should the medals be taken from the hero?) Such chaos would result in such a change in human relations that it is difficult to even consider what should be done.*

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* As in the preceding case (the 'external world'), it might be argued that "the world came into existence five minutes ago" is linguistically impossible; i.e., that it involves a contradiction (cf. Putnam, p. 362). Here, again, the proper reply is simply to refer a person giving such an argument to Putnam, since the argument assumes that any

Thus, again, it seems that we have an example of a meaningful question which cannot be answered, even theoretically, by straightforward evidence; in short, a case in which ultimately one must make a decision, in which one must choose.

We shall consider one further common sense belief which, it is sometimes said, must be believed 'on faith', if it is to be believed at all. This is the belief that gives rise to the notorious'problem of induction'.

For the purposes of convenience, we shall put the problem this way: "In science and everyday life we reason from what has been true in the past to what will be true in the future. But how can we know this? It is not an *a priori* truth that the future will be like the past; nor can that belief be established by experience. For all arguing from experience involves the assumption that the future will be like the past. That is, experience can only show that *in the past* the future was like the past; to infer that *in the future* the future will be like the past

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statement not falsifiable by isolated experiment must be merely a 'rule of language' and hence, its opposite, a self-contradiction, according to the present set of rules, rather than a statement with import concerning 'the way things are'. It might be added though that if one takes seriously the claim that "The world came into existence five minutes ago" is self-contradictory, then, it would seem the same would be true if the statement said 'ten minutes ago', or 'yesterday' or even '5000 years ago'. Where does one draw the line? Surely it cannot be claimed that the world is just as old as science says it is and that that is true 'by the meanings of words'.

is invoking the very principle that is in question."*

A.J. Ayer is among the recent philosophers who have taken the problem reasonably seriously (who have not claimed it can be simply 'dissolved', or that the question is, from the outset, based on confusions).** The sceptic, says Ayer, "makes his point"; induction cannot be justified. On the other hand, it is a "bloodless victory" for the sceptic; for, his argument

> does not mean that the use of scientific method is irrational. _It could be irrational only if there were a standard of rationality which it failed to meet_; whereas in fact it goes to set the standard: arguments are judged to be rational or irrational by reference to it.... _When it is understood that there logically could be no court of superior jurisdiction, it hardly seems troubling that inductive reasoning should be left_, as it were, _to act as judge in its own cause_. The sceptic's merit is that he forces us to see that this must be so (p. 75, italics mine).

The fascinating point about this argument is that what Ayer says is precisely parallel to what MacIntyre says regarding the acceptability of a religious framework (i.e., there are no 'higher standards' by which to judge the principle in question). Certainly Ayer would have no sympathy with one who argued, as MacIntyre does, that the religious framework should be accepted, but the question is, what reasons can he give to distinguish his argument from that of MacIntyre?*

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* I say that I put it this way for the purposes of convenience because the reference to the future is not a necessary condition of the argument. It can be put in terms of "the unexamined cases being like the examined cases." The problem follows in an analogous way (cf. Anthony Flew, _Hume's Philosophy of Belief_ [22], p. 72).

** _The Problem of Knowledge_ [3], pp. 71-4. Ayer, at the time of the publication of this book, no longer held to the strict positivism he espoused in _Language, Truth, and Logic_ [2].

There is, though, one obvious distinguishing feature in the way the arguments are put, a feature which may result in Ayer's argument appearing at first glance to be quite different from that of MacIntyre. MacIntyre is explicit that one chooses one's ultimate standard (the Bible, the Pope, etc.) and that it is only after this that the standard functions to justify a particular belief, action, or attitude. On the other hand, there is no hint in Ayer of having to _choose_ induction as the standard. Even though induction is not itself justifiable, in fact "it goes to set the standard /of rationality/" (p. 75). The similarity between Ayer and MacIntyre is, then, that each says that the ultimate standard is not justifiable; the difference is that MacIntyre says that therefore one must choose, while Ayer says that induction just _is_ the standard. But Ayer's statement is puzzling. What does he mean when he says that induction _is_ the standard?

Bartley sees that there is something decidedly odd in such a claim:

> Ayer's argument--just like Barth's**--would be valid only _if_ the standards to which he is committed are assumed to be the correct ones. _Yet that is just what is at issue_. The most important historic criticisms of Ayer's standards have been precisely _whether_ they

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* Striking as the analogy is, it has, to my knowledge been noticed only by W.W. Bartley /47/ (_Retreat to Commitment_, pp. 124-131).

** Barth, at least according to Bartley, presents Christianity as a self-enclosed system in just the way that MacIntyre does.

> were correct...([4], pp. 129-130).

Bartley's point may be put: "You say the sceptic's victory is 'bloodless' because there can be no more ultimate standard. But to say that induction just is the standard is to obscure the fact that there are other possible standards which are equally 'ultimate'. Induction is not the standard; it is a standard. The sceptic has shown that your choice of induction over other possibilities is essentially arbitrary. Put this way, he can be seen to have drawn more blood than you would make it appear."

I do not think that Ayer can give any adequate reply to this. He might have meant (by saying that induction is the standard) that it is the standard which, in fact, everybody uses. But this simply raises again the problems we discussed earlier in connection with Moore: Why should the 'agreement of peoples' be taken as a standard? (Ayer certainly would be appalled at the idea that this would be a reasonable standard in religious matters.*)

Two other replies to Bartley's point might be given, but neither seems to be open to Ayer. First, one might say that it is somehow an analytic truth that induction is the rational procedure. Second, it might be argued that there

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(I qualify this statement ('at least...') not because I have any particular doubts about the reliability of Bartley, but because my acquaintance with Barth's writings is so slight that I do not think that any more definite statement would be in order

*Kaufmann notes that Plato rejected such a standard "without argument as obviously insufficient" ([47], p. 99).

is, logically, *no alternative* to using the inductive method. Ayer could not make either of these claims, however, for, if completely successful, they would entail not that the sceptic's victory is *bloodless* but that he has not scored a victory at all. Induction would be *proven* to be a justified procedure.

Strawson makes both of the claims just alluded to in his attempt "to show that the demand for a justification is mistaken."* First he says that

> It is an analytic proposition that [i] *it is reasonable to have a degree of belief in a statement which is proportional to the strength of the evidence in its favour*; and it is an analytic proposition, though not a proposition of mathematics, that [ii] *other things being equal, the evidence for a generalization is strong in proportion as the number of favourable instances, and the variety of circumstances in which they have been found, is great*. So to ask whether it is reasonable to place reliance on inductive procedures is like asking whether it is reasonable to proportion the degree of one's convictions to the strength of the evidence. Doing this is what 'being reasonable' *means* in such a context (*ibid*., italics mine).

Notice that Strawson is here claiming to have discerned two quite distinct (although related) analytic statements (designated above as [i] and [ii]). From these, a third statement follows trivially: [iii] "It is reasonable to have a degree of belief in a generalization in proportion as the number of favourable instances, and the variety of circum-

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*P.F. Strawson, *Introduction to Logical Theory* [80], p. 308. The relevant section is reprinted in Edward H. Madden, *Structure of Scientific Thought*. Page references are to the latter.

stances in which they have been found, is great." Thus we have, all told, three analytic statements concerning what it is 'reasonable' to believe.*

There are a variety of questions which might be asked about this argument. Considering [i] first, how does Strawson know that what he thinks is reasonable is "what 'being reasonable' *means*"? In discussing, say, James' or Hick's arguments to the effect that choosing in the absence of evidence in any straightforward sense *is* the reasonable thing to do in some cases, somehow it certainly does not seem they are 'misusing words'; it is anything but *self-evident* that it is unreasonable to believe in some cases in the absence of evidence if enough may be gained by doing so (as James argues). But if 'proportioning one's degree of belief to the evidence' *just is* the definition of being 'reasonable', then it *should be* self-evident to any intelligent speaker of the language.**

Turning to [iii], what Strawson is claiming is analytic is actually false from the point of view of the Kuhn-Putnam-Quine view of science. For, the 'reasonableness' of a statement of science depends on a large number of factors, *not* simply on "the number of favourable instances..." Very generally, exactly *how many* 'confirming instances' for a generalization are known is less important than how well the generalization fits with the accepted central theories of the science.* It would be pedantic to be-labor this now after the extensive exposition of Ch. IV; suffice it to say that Strawson's claim that "the more instances, the more reasonable" the law, is just one example of the way in which today's analysts have taken over the dogmas of the positivists whose philosophy they so vociferously claim to have 'out-grown'.**

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* I *am* assuming that Strawson would grant that if [i] and [ii] are analytic and logically imply [iii], then [iii] likewise is analytic.

** Further, imagine the consternation that James would have exhibited if someone had told him, as he was seriously attempting to wrestle with the question of what we have a right to believe, that he was just mis-using words. Surely, he would have replied that he was concerned, not with *words*, but with *rights*. (cf. below, p. [illegible])

In short, not only can it be doubted that Strawson's three statements concerning what is necessary for a belief to be 'reasonable' are analytically true, but it may even be questioned whether the statements are true at all.

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* Actually, it would seem, it will be supported by a potentially infinite number of favourable instances, since, for instance, *every* flight of an arrow is a 'favourable instance', a 'confirmation', of say, impetus theory. It should be added that my argument here does not, as it may seem, ignore the fact that Strawson does not just depend on the number of favourable instances, but also depends on "the variety of circumstances in which they have been found." For, according to Kuhn, it is not really a matter of *how many* different sets of circumstances are involved, but, rather, a matter of *how crucial* the circumstances are; e.g., Copernicus' astronomy may have solved fewer problems than did Ptolemy's by the year 1600, but it solved one or two that had proved quite intractible for the older theory (a 'problem' here of course, refers to an observation in a particular set of circumstances). 1a

** The positivists, however, never, to my knowledge, claimed that their theories as to what is reasonable (or, even meaningful) were analytically correct and, hence, *unarguable*.

We have, indeed, considered cogent arguments to the effect that, in fact, they are not true.

This brings us to the second point concerning Strawson's 'definition'. We can introduce this by considering what Strawson might say about the preceding point: "If Kuhn (or anyone) says _that_ about 'reasonable', then he is simply changing the definition of the word. But the original problem was concerned with its ordinary meaning, so what Kuhn says is not to the point."

This claim depends on two others: (a)the existence of (non-trivial) analytic statements in ordinary language, and (b)Strawson's ability to find out what they are. We have already questioned (b), but Strawson might say (on what grounds I can't imagine) that he has indeed found _the_ ordinary-language definition of 'reasonable' and, therefore, claim that Kuhn has simply 'changed its meaning'. Therefore, (a) becomes crucial, and (if we are to reach a decision on Strawson's claim to have found _the_ definition of 'reasonable') (b) seems now to depend on (a).

Actually, though, we have already discussed (a) at length when considering Putnam's arguments. What is needed, first, is to show that the word 'reasonable' does not fit the criteria for being a word which has _necessary_ conditions for its application.* Clearly 'reasonable' does not meet this condition. A 'reasonable' belief that one's wife is faithful does not depend on the number (and variety) of instances on which she has been faithful; a 'reasonable' belief that I have two ears does not depend on the number (and variety) of instances on which I have had two ears; the belief that I am writing with a pen does not depend on the number (and variety) of instances that I have written with a pen.

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* Putnam's criterion #3: "The criterion is the only one that is generally accepted and employed in connection with the term." (p. 393).

Hence, the claim that 'reasonable' (as applied to beliefs, rather than persons) is a word of which one can never say that it is analytic that "the belief is 'reasonable' if and only if it is..." That is, there are many criteria for applying the word 'reasonable', and, therefore, one can never say (without arbitrary 'legislation') that such and such a type of belief is unreasonable by definition. For, a belief may be 'unreasonable' for so many different reasons, in so many different contexts that one can never say a priori that to believe that must be 'unreasonable' unless you are changing the definition of the word.*

But, turning to a third point of criticism, let us grant that it is analytic that a 'reasonable degree of belief' is one which is "proportional to the strength of the evidence in its favour." "Faced with such a definition, a critic can only refuse to be persuaded by the prestigious title and ask: Well, if what you are doing is 'being rational,' is it right to be rational?" (Bartley, p. 131).*

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* It might be said that my criticism above misses Strawson's point, since he has only said that a generalization is to be judged "according to the number and variety of instances," and my examples are not examples of generalizations. But, unless Strawson would say that 'reasonable has a completely different meaning when it is applied to different types of statements (i.e., the word would be simply equivocal, having one meaning when applied to generalizations, another when applied to theories, another when applied to particular matters of fact, etc.), then the examples given above are relevant. Instead of making the intuitively implausible claim that the word is equivocal in the above way, it seems much more (dare I say?) reasonable to regard it as a 'cluster-concept'; i.e., sure different criteria for its application are relevant in different contexts, and these criteria may be regarded as making up a part of the meaning

It might be said that it is, of course, right to be rational, for this is analytic in just the way that "one ought to do what is right" may be said to be analytic. But I cannot see how one can have it both ways: Either it is analytic that what is rational is right (i.e., that both 'rational' and 'right' are essentially 'praise words') or 'rational' has a definite substantive content; both cannot be the case unless one wishes to commit something very much like the Naturalistic Fallacy. To see this, let us look at some remarks by Hare.

Hare believes the 'Naturalistic Fallacy' really is a fallacy.**

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of the word; but no one of the criteria could be regarded as a necessary condition of its application.

*Bartley is clearly using the word 'rational' in just the way that I have been using the word 'reasonable'.

** The Language of Morals [30]. He puts his point, first, in terms of the evaluation of a picture: "If 'P is a picture and P is C' [where C is any definitely recognizeable aspect of the picture, i.e., any non-evaluative aspect (cf., p. 84)], then it will become impossible to commend pictures for being C; it will be possible only to say that they are C.... Whatever defining characteristics we choose, this objection arises, that we can no longer commend an object for possessing those characteristics"(p. 85).

several words dropped out here

> Value-terms have a special function in language, that of commending; and so they plainly cannot be defined in terms of other words which themselves do not perform this function; for if this is done, we are deprived of a means of performing the function (p. 91).

Hare's point is that it is indeed a mistake to attempt to define commending terms purely 'naturalistically' (i.e., in terms of what just is the case), for, if this is done, then one no longer has commending terms (loosely, terms by means of which to praise the object) at one's disposal.

This applies directly to Strawson's argument that there is an analytic relationship between 'reasonableness' and 'being in accordance with the evidence'. Either 'reasonableness' is a commending term, or it is a purely descriptive term (descriptive of the fact that a given belief is in accordance with the evidence). If the former is the case, then it cannot be necessarily true that to hold a 'reasonable' belief is to hold a belief as strongly as (and no more strongly than) the evidence warrants (since one would then have lost the commending aspect of 'reasonable').* On the other hand, if the latter is the case, if 'reasonable' is taken as a purely descriptive word from the outset, then there is no error in asking Bartley's question, "Why be reasonable?"

But perhaps one can have it both ways--the word 'reasonable' is a 'commending term'; it commends for holding beliefs in proportion to evidence in just the way that

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* Thus, committing the Naturalistic Fallacy; i.e., construing a commending word, an evaluative word, purely descriptively.

Strawson says they shouldbe held. But this seems to commit the Naturalistic Fallacy no less than, and in an even more serious way than, the preceding construal did. For here one is saying that no matter what the grounds on which a belief is held, it is to be commended only on those which are built into the word 'reasonable'. That is, this seems to be a flagrant example of going from what is the case to what ought to be the case. For instance, given this type of argument in ethics, if a given practice (e.g., cannibalism) meets the criteria of the society for being 'good', then one cannot say that it is not good, one cannot condemn the practice, 'without mis-using language'. What is approved and thereby is built into the language, is *eo ipso* right (for to deny its rightness is to mis-use language).

Similarly, for Strawson, it is 'built into language' that a belief held on the basis of certain types of evidence is 'reasonable' and, therefore, is right. One cannot deny, then, that one ought to believe in this way, since to do so would 'mis-use language'. It has simply become 'logically impossible' to say that it is not good (or right) to think in a certain way. But since this claim is based entirely on the way language is used, and attempts to establish on what grounds we ought to believe it quite clearly involves the Naturalistic Fallacy.*

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* It attempts to make a transition from "These are the criteria on the basis of which we commend" to "These ought to be the criteria on the basis of which to commend."

In sum, Strawson can (plausibly or not) say that the word 'reasonable' as applied to beliefs necessarily entails, if we are not to be arbitrarily changing the meaning of the word, that we have a certain sort of evidence for those beliefs, or he can say (plausibly or not) that we ought to be reasonable. He cannot say both at once. His claim that it is analytic that it is 'reasonable to use induction' hence, cannot stand.*

Turning now to Strawson's second point, there is, he says, "something a little odd about talking of 'the inductive method,' or even 'the inductive policy,' as if it were just one possible method among others of arguing from the observed to the unobserved, from the available evidence to the facts in question" (p.309). He is suggesting that there is no alternative to the inductive method, that no sense can be given to the claim that there are alternative methods.

Strawson realizes that this is counter-intuitive.

> Someone might object: 'Surely it is possible, though it might be foolish, to use methods utterly different from accredited scientific ones. Suppose a man, whenever he wanted to form an opinion about what lay beyond his observation or the observation of available witness, simply shut his eyes, asked himself the appropriate question, and accepted the first answer that

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* I am not denying here that the meaning of 'reasonable' or, say, 'good' as applied to apples, commends on the basis of certain criteria being met. Nor, even, am I particularly adverse to saying that calling a belief reasonable (not only implies but) states that the criteria are met. What I am denying is that the accepted criteria can be considered sacrosanct, that one can prohibit the use of other criteria merely 'on the basis of the ordinary usage'. It is the last step that involves the Naturalistic Fallacy.

> came into his head. Wouldn't this be a non-inductive method?' (pp. 309-10).

He says, though, that it would not be a non-inductive method. For, if this 'method' is seldom or never successful, "one might then be inclined to think that it was not a method of finding things out at all" (ibid.). On the other hand, if the method were to be successful,

> then, by the very fact of its success, it would be an inductively supported method. For each application of the method would be an application of the general rule, 'The first answer that comes into my head is generally (always) the right one'; and for the truth of this generalization there would be the inductive evidence of a long run of favourable instances with no unfavourable ones (if it were 'always'), or of a sustained high proportion of successes to trials (if it were 'generally').
>
> I am saying...that any successful method of finding out about the unobserved is necessarily justified by induction. This is an analytic proposition. The phrase 'successful method of finding things out which has no inductive support' is self-contradictory (ibid.).

Let us grant that any method which has proven itself successful has necessarily done so on inductive grounds; does it follow that there is no alternative to induction as a method for reaching decisions?

On the contrary, Strawson's argument depends on his claim that one must (to be 'rational', on his definition of the word) use a method which has previously been successful. In the disjunction he sets up, the basic question is whether the method has or has not been successful in the past. But it is just this--the relevance of the past to the future--that is in question in the problem of induction. So, even granting that any 'successful' method is necessarily (by definition) inductive, one can still ask why he should follow the method that is 'successful', since that means 'the method that has worked in the past', and the entire point of the problem of induction is that there seems to be no reason to follow (in the future) the method what has been successful (in the past).*

But, still, one may ask whether there is actually any way of imagining a world in which induction would not work; or, to put this somewhat differently, can we imagine a way to act which would not assume induction? Strawson himself grants that the premise that the world could become 'chaotic' is meaningful: "Chaos is not a self-contradoctory concept" (p. 311).** But could one act on such an hypothesis?

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* Strawson's man who 'intuits' the future, then, can reply: "But the fact that my method has never worked so far, and yours has worked, shows absolutely nothing about which method will work tomorrow."

** What would such chaos be like? Obviously this has to be an unanswerable question in some respects. If it were describable in advance in detail, then it would not be chaos. Sartre's Roquentin, however, has a vision of what sort of state it would be: "What if something were to happen? What if something suddenly started throbbing? ...Then what good would their dykes, bulwarks, power houses, furnaces and pile drivers be to them? It can happen any time ...For example, the father of a family might go out for a walk, and, across the street he'll see something like a red rag, blown towards him by the wind. And when the rag has gotten close to him he'll see that it is a side of rotten meat...dragging itself along by crawling, skipping, a piece of writhing flesh rolling in the gutter...And someone else might feel something scratching in his mouth. He goes to the mirror, opens his mouth: and his tongue is an enormous, live centipede, rubbing its legs together and scraping his palate. He'd like to spit it out, but the centipede is a part of him and he will have to tear it out with his own hands....Yes! Let it change just a little...(Nausea [78], pp. 212-13). Notice that in this description not everything

> The chaotic universe...is simply one in which it would be impossible to form rational expectations to the effect that specific things would happen. It might be said that in such a universe it would at least be rational to refrain from forming specific expectations, to expect nothing but irregularities. Just so. But, this is itself a higher-order induction: where irregularity is the rule, expect further irregularities (p. 311).

Even though the last part of this quote represents Strawson's mistaken idea that acting as if the universe is irregular depends on the prior finding that the universe is irregular, the passage as a whole shows that he thinks that it is perfectly clear that, first, it makes sense to talk about an irregular universe, and, second, one can act on such an hypothesis (by not forming any expectations).

Are there any reasons for thinking, though, that the 'chaos hypotheses' does not make sense? One might argue that it does not long the following lines: "Suppose that, tomorrow, counter-examples to most of our scientific theories were found. This would not show that there is anything wrong with induction. It would only show that the theories were not as well-grounded as previously had been thought. It would not show that the order of the universe no longer held. In short, no matter what the world were to be like,

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has changed (mirrors still 'work', etc.). The world has changed 'just a little'. But this 'little change' is sufficient to make some of the best-established inductive conclusions (e.g., a tongue is not a centipede; it has no legs) false. One no longer knows what to expect. There is no way of knowing which 'laws' will fail next. One guess is as good as another.

we would never characterize it as 'chaotic'. Rather, we should continue to search for regularities, just as we do now." But, while I agree that we would (and should) react in this way for a while, as more and more theories seemed to be unjustifiable, one would begin to think that _something had changed_; one would begin to think that _this_ 'future' (i.e., now), indeed, is not 'like the past' (i.e., the time when the laws worked).

If we concentrate on fairly 'central' theories of science, I am not certain that a point would ever be reached at which the only thing to do would be to say, "Well, induction just doesn't work anymore." But, if, one day, many non-theoretical, observational laws (basically, 'pre-scientific' laws) ceased to hold, then clearly, after some point, the _only_ rational conclusion would be to say that "induction just doesn't work." For instance, if lead weights began to fly upward or horizontally, if tongues often became centipedes, if people turned into giant cock-roaches, etc., what other conclusion could be reached?*

In sum, then, I think it does make sense to talk about a world in which the inductive method just would not work. And, second, we can imagine acting on the hypothesis that induction does not apply: One simply acts randomly, having as few expectations as is humanly possible. So again, Demos, Hare, Hick, et. al. seem to be 'on the right side'. There are genuine alternatives to the beliefs dictated by common sense. Choice is necessary as it is in the case of religious beliefs

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* Let me re-emphasize, however, that I am _not_ saying that, were this situation to come about, it would then be rational to 'form no expectation'. This would not be correct, for, as Strawson says, this would be an application of induction. The point here is simply that chaos is a clearly imaginable state of affairs. But the fact remains that it has not been shown that it is even likely that "the future will be like the past." Therefore, having (somehow) lived with such

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The second criticism of the basic analogies is quite different. In the case of the moral realm it is granted that there are genuine alternatives and that it is correct to describe the choice between them as a matter of accepting one or the other interpretation. The point, however, is that there does not seem to be any difference between consciousness of moral responsibility and consciousness of God. The challenge is to explain what behavioral difference there would be between the person who accepts only the ethical realm and the person who accepts that and also accepts the theistic interpretation. Or, to put this only slightly differently: Why should one 'accept a religion', since religion gives him nothing more than an ethical system can give him? More strongly, what could it mean, what significance could it have, to accept a religion, if religion can give us nothing more than can an ethical system?

The average believer would have no trouble with this question. For, after all, does not the crucial difference

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chaos for a day, a week, or many years, one still has no grounds for inferring that the future will be chaotic.

between the theist and the sceptic lie not in what each does, but in their beliefs? "Theistic religion, in claiming that the world mediates a divine activity, must also claim that God exists as a real Being, transcending our world as well as meeting us in and through it. This ontological claim is the final point of distinction not only between religion and aesthetics but also between religion and ethics" (Hick [38], p. 188).

If the significance of this 'belief' is questioned, the average believer would most likely say, if pressed, that it has to be significant since it is verifiable after death. And, indeed, we have seen that Hick himself says this. But this reply, as we mentioned earlier, seems to create a serious problem even while it is solving one. That is, it clearly solves whatever problem there might be concerning the difference between the moral and the religious interpretation, but does it not do so at the cost of making religion turn on an empirical belief (about what will happen after we die), and therefore make it subject to the same sort of tests that any other empirical belief is subject to? If so, it would seem that we should suspend judgment, as we should have on, for instance, the exact orbit of Venus, prior to the time when we had sufficient evidence. (This may be put: Since empirical beliefs are to be examined by the 'methods of science' are religious questions not then internal questions of science rather than framework questions of religion?)

I am not sure what kind of solution Hick can give to this in his own terms, but granting the modifications which we have made in his position, there does seem to be a solution. In particular, we are no longer committed to an absolute distinction between conceptual frameworks and scientific theories. He can, therefore, say that the religious interpretation is like a scientific theory which is at the furthest distance from the 'experiential periphery'. As such, it is very difficult to 'compare it directly with nature'. In fact, this can only be done after death.

But, still, to keep the analogy, would it not be necessary to wait until such experiential confirmation is forthcoming before committing ourselves? Given the analysis of science in Ch. IV above, this emphatically is not the case. For we saw there that, contrary to positivistic preconceptions, paradigms are not typically accepted because they are 'proven to fit the facts' more neatly than did the older paradigm. For instance, "Atwood's machine, first invented almost a century after the Principia, [gave] the first unequivocal demonstration of Newton's second law..." (Kuhn [54], p. 26). Such direct checkpoints* are typically rare for paradigms.

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* To avoid misunderstanding, it should be noted that even these direct checkpoints are not quite 'crucial experiments'. in the traditional sense, since adjustment could be made somewhere else in the 'old system' to account for the observations. But since the 'new system' clearly implies such results, they are taken as important 'verifications' of the new (which generally will have already been accepted anyway). (I think that those who have objected to eschatological verification have fallen into the trap of demanding a kind of certainty of religion which not even science can supply. For they say that even if one lives on after death, it is

The only important difference between such cases and the case of the religious interpretation is the obvious one that if there is, in fact, verification of the religious view, it must be done by each individual. Since death is a prerequisite, there is no such thing as 'public' verification, at least not for those who are among the living. (If there were such verification, then, of course, Hick's conception of religious adequacy would not be met. The need for decision would no longer be present.)

In this essay, however, the primary concern has been with discussing the meaningfulness and justifiability of religion without relying on the possibility of an afterlife. Therefore, the obvious question here is whether or not a genuine, a significant, difference between religion and ethics can be established without a belief in an afterlife.*

Turning, then, to 'theism without an afterlife', can one show that there is any significant difference between such a set of 'beliefs' and an ethical system? The first reply that comes to mind is that, while we granted the criterion in the foregoing criticism, this criterion

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still possible that God does not exist. The answer to this is: Even if light rays do bend when going past the sun, it is still possible that Newton was right, Einstein wrong.)

* But why do this? Why not assume that theism does entail a belief in an afterlife? The answer to this is simply that, since there are today a number of 'liberal' theologians and thoughtful laymen who call themselves Christians (and no doubt are in some sense) but do not accept the belief in an afterlife, the overall importance of the claims contained here-in is greater, insofar as they would apply both to

(there being an actual difference in behavior) may be too strong. For if one accepts it, he may be forced to say that there is no genuine difference between the astronomies of Kepler and Tycho (there was no particular phenomenon that one expected and the other did not); or, more clearly, one may be forced to say that the person who sees the arrow being pushed along by impetus does not differ from he who sees it as simply continuing its motion. But, as was argued by Hanson, Feyerabend, etc., such differences do reflect a difference in the organization of the world; each sees a different world. And while the differing organization may not result in different actions in a direct sense, it may result in very different attitudes toward the world. For instance, a Tycho, with the earth unmoving in the center of the universe may have felt a sense of security not possible for a Kepler whose abode was hurtling around the sun. Similarly, theistic parents whose child is dying of leukemia may not act differently from atheistic parents in the same situation, but their attitude may be far different. (Underneath their genuine and externally manifested grief, they may feel that ultimately it is 'all right' since it is God's way, and be able to say this and have it be more than the empty cliché that it so often is.)

Further, at this point it is appropriate to refer back to Wolterstorff's description of the changes which took

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versions of theism which accept an afterlife and those which do not.

place in St. Paul when he was converted on the Damascus road. We mentioned earlier that it would be a travesty to claim that *only* the 'attitudes' of the Christian-persecuting Saul were changed. Similarly, it would be a travesty to claim that, at that point, all that he did was to adopt a new set of ethical principles. From that time on, he not only acted differently: he felt differently; he believed differently; he saw the world differently; *and*, his actions were changed. The beliefs that changed were, to be sure, not subject to straightforward verification or falsification, but, as we have seen, these are not necessary conditions of a belief being 'genuine'. In short, the changes that were made, unlike in the case of just adopting an ethical system, were made because they seemed to be appropriate to the new way in which he saw the world, the new beliefs that he adopted.*

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* It might be objected that adopting an ethical system could involve some or all of the above-mentioned aspects of adopting a religion, that it need not be just coming to a decision to act in certain ways. I think this is correct, but it is not a very serious objection to the above claims. What it shows is that they are borderline cases, cases in which it is not clear whether to call a given set of beliefs, attitudes, etc. a 'religion' or an 'ethics'. (In particular, one often hears it said that Confusionism is not a religion, Confucianism but only an ethics. The answer to this, I should think, is that Confusionism is an ethics with religious aspects *or* that it is a religion which de-emphasizes the supernatural and emphasizes the ethical. I fail to see that it makes a great deal of difference *what* we say in such a case. The present contention is simply that religion involves more than acting in certain ways or even seeing other people as beings with respect to whom it is *appropriate* to act in certain ways; it is more than these but it does include these.)

Again, we might put this in still a slightly different way. To adopt a set of ethical principles is to decide to act in a certain way in the future, and, perhaps, to adopt a new attitude towards, and a new way of viewing other persons (e.g., to see them as ends, not as means). But to adopt a religion is to do more than this; it is to change one's entire 'life-orientation'. For instance, it may be, as Braithwaite maintains it is in the case of Christianity, to completely re-orient oneself towards oneself and the world, to make one's whole existence revolve around agape, in Christian terms, to become a 'new being'. But, and here we are running counter to Braithwaite, such a re-orientation does not, normally, take place without a positive change in the way we believe the world is, without, for instance, seeing the world as working towards certain ends, whereas before we saw it as working in a hap-hazard, albeit orderly, manner and 'going nowhere in particular'.*

So far, then, I have tried to make a case for the claim that, even if the actions it dictates may be just those dictated by an ethical system alone, it is legitimate to say that religion is more than ethics, that if one has an ethics he may not have everything he needs. But, further, it might be claimed that theism does make a difference to action, that it makes demands which are not made by the ethical alone.

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* To the very likely charge that the last three paragraphs above are (a) vague, (b) unclear, and (c) confused, I can take exeption only to '(c) confused'. Once it has been argued that the 'metaphysical beliefs' of religion need not be seen as non-cognitive, any further attempt to describe what religion has to offer that an ethics alone cannot offer must, inevitably, I think, be both vague and unclear. For, as we have so often emphasized above, it is a matter of viewing the world in certain ways, of holding certain beliefs the exact consequences of which may not be clear. But here again, the analysis of science given above seems to be crucially relevant: How easy, after all, would it be to explain, to really make clear, to, say, a logical positivist that there is a difference between Tycho's and Kepler's world-view even though neither has any particular

> Not all the moments of life mediate equally the presence of God to the ordinary believer. He is not continuously conscious of God's presence..., but conscious rather of the divine Will as a reality in the background of his life, a reality which may at times emerge to confront him in absolute and inescapable demand... Often a more important kind of significance will summon us from a relatively trivial kind [as in the case of] a woman...playing a game of bridge when she hears her child crying in pain in another room...But the final significance, which takes precedence over all others as supremely important and overriding, is (according to theism) that of our situation as being in the presence of God. At any time a man may be confronted by some momentous decision, some far-reaching moral choice either of means or of ends, in which his responsibility as a servant of God intrudes upon and conflicts with the requirements of his earthly "station and its duties," so that the latter pales into unimportance and he acts in relation to a more ultimate environment whose significance magisterially overrules his customary way of life (Hick [38], pp. 131-2).

It is not easy to see what Hick is referring to here. What sorts of actions does he have in mind? Judging from this passage alone he could mean situations in which there is a 'teleological suspension of the ethical', in Kierkegaard's phrase, as for instance when God commanded Abraham to kill Issac.* This interpretation, however, would not be in

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expectation that the other does not have.

* Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling [50], passim.

accord with Hick's overall position. In general, it seems much too 'irrationalistic' for his tastes. Instead, what he might have in mind (at least, what would make sense here) is that the theist may find himself called by God to perform supererogatory tasks, such as leaving his wife and family and going to minister to the poor. In short, it may be the hero and the saint that Hick here has in mind.*

In sum, I have argued that there may be genuine and important differences between an ethical system which dictates a certain set of actions and religion whose ethics would dictate the very same set of actions. For, religion would generally include, not only the actions, but also a set of attitudes, beliefs, etc. And, second, it seems plausible that a religion might, in some circumstances make more stringent demands on the individual than an ethical system is likely to (and, perhaps, than any ethical system should). Failure to act as a hero or a martyr would not (except, perhaps in *very* rare instances) be grounds for ethical condemnation, but it might be grounds for ethico-religious condemnation. Therefore, the claim that, "If one has an ethics, one has everything any religion can offer," does not seem to have been established.

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* It might be objected that such above-and-beyond-the-call-of-duty action might also be performed by the nontheist. This is correct, but in reply two points may be made. First, virtually any beliefs, in the right circumstances, could produce virtually any action. A thoroughgoing egoist, for instance, might act in what seems to be a highly altruistic way if he thinks the 'returns' would be high enough. So there are no moral decisions which could be made _only_ in the light of theism, but there may well be some (as Hick seems to say) which are more likely to be made in the light of theism (or which that individual _would_ not have made were he not a theist). Second, in general, ethical theories do not imply that the actions of heroes or saints are obligatory. It is, in fact, a fairly popular _objection_ to utilitarianism that it might imply that we should be heroes and saints. That is, it is generally taken that we are not normally _obliged_ to act in such an extraordinary manner. The implication is that we need some

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If* we look back now at the gound that has been covered from Chapter I until this point, we can see that the believer can present a tolerably strong case for the justifiability of his faith by bringing out the *general* necessity of making some ultimate assumptions. If one is to be ethical he must *decide* to accept an ethical system;** if he is to believe that he is not alone in the universe, that he is not dreaming, he must *decide* to accept the existence of what seem to be the objects of his experience; even, we have seen (going

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unusual justification and/or motivation for taking such actions as obligatory. A religious orientation, the backing of a supreme being, would seem to supply just such a justification and backing.

* This concluding section should be regarded much as should the concluding section of Ch. IV, i.e., as a set of suggestions for further thought on the problems. The primary suggestions that follow are, on the whole, rather similar to the argument put forth by MacIntyre, after his 'conversion' to scepticism, in "Is Understanding Religion Compatible with Believing?" ([58], in Hick's [39]). There are, however, definite respects in which I am *not* in agreement with MacIntyre (e.g., I make no claim that Christianity is less *understandable* today than it was previously. My concern is with its *acceptability*). Finally, I should add that the immediate stimulus for this final section was less MacIntyre's negative considerations concerning the place of Christianity in the world today than Kuhn's 'positive' claims concerning the role of Christianity in the pre-scientific-world (see Kuhn's [53]).

** Or, alternatively, he must come to *see* that this system is 'fitting'.

beyond Hick, etc.), if one is to accept Einsteinian physics over Newtonian physics, some ineradicable element of decision is present. Such an element of decision cannot be eliminated because, in any of these areas, what is ultimately in question is the acceptance or rejection of an entire framework and the framework itself determines what shall count as good or bad reasons for a particular belief that falls within the area of that particular framework.

But is it then the case that we must regard any religious framework as completely self-enclosed? that it is, indeed, totally invulnerable? that, 'from the outside', nothing can be said about it? If we take very seriously the idea that such a framework is completely self-enclosed, then it seems to follow trivially that nothing in the way of logical evaluation of the framework could be to the point. As Kierkegaard says, if reason attempts to evaluate such a 'closed system', it merely proves itself to be a "blockhead and a dunce."

If religion is construed in this way, there seems to be little that one can do or say. Since the rules that have been laid down prevent even the necessity of consistency, one may as well remain silent. Matson, for instance, says,

> If, then, someone says that theism is irrational, but that he does not care, in a sense there is nothing to say to him. We may ourselves think that he should care, but there can be no question of proving to him that he should. On the other hand, it is quite proper to point out to him that he is obliged to accept the consequences, one of which is that his belief must remain a private conviction; he has no warrant to recommend it to anyone else on grounds of truth ([63], p. 244).

And in a note to this passage, Matson adds: "I doubt whether more can be or need be said to....Neo-Tertullianists".* In effect, then, it seems that nothing of consequence can be said to the irrationalist, to the man who cares nothing for consistency. One can point out that he is irrational, but, presumably, he knew this all along.**

But, if we look back at the over-all position developed in Ch. V, it seems that, in spite of the way in which, e.g., MacIntyre, puts his point, our authors do not in the final analysis, want to present religious systems as completely self-enclosed. For none of them wants to go as far as Kierkegaard and say that logical consistency is completely irrelevant to the system.***

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* cf. Martin /62/, p. vi.

** Nonetheless, occasionally someone undertakes the Herculean task of refuting the irrationalist. Most recently, such an attempt has been made by W.W. Bartley, III (Retreat to Commitment /47/). He plunges into what would seem, on the surface, to be a logically impossible assignment with tremendous zeal. His basic ploy is to admit that it is not possible to justify some beliefs because they are 'ultimate', but, he claims, every belief may be criticized. On the surface, this strategy would seem to have little chance for success since criticism, no less than justification, must involve commitment to a certain set of standards, standards which dictate what is to count as relevant criticism. Bartley's argument attempts to counter this obvious point but it would be beside our present purpose to examine these arguments, since our concern is not primarily with authors who would completely discard rationality in the sense of simple logical consistency, etc. (As a final comment, I should like to note that while I think that Bartley's argument against the 'irrationalists' is unsuccessful, Bartley is, so far as I know, quite alone in having realized how easily the arguments of Ayer, etc., can be taken to support the claims of such philosophers and theologians as Barth, MacIntyre, etc.)

*** Although it must not be forgotten that difficulties

Therefore, there is an 'overlap' between the framework of logic and that of a religion.

Further, it would seem that there must be a similar overlap between the realm of historical inquiry and that of the religion. We have examined arguments (Ch. V), to the effect that historical inquiry (as against Historical belief) is not relevant for religion, and, in particular, for Christianity, but those arguments did not seem to be compelling.

And, finally, still in order to avoid irrationality, our authors will accept no belief which might seem to be dictated by the religion which conflicts with well-established scientific beliefs.*

What is being said, then, is that a religious framework is self-enclosed in that it cannot be established, or even made probable, by 'facts' which are outside the framework, but that it is not self-enclosed in the sense that it may conceivably conflict with the rational propositions of history, science, or logic. And, further, such conflict, if it occurs, may not be ignored.**

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may be tolerable, that many difficulties may not add up to even one objection.

* Somewhat more strongly, I think that they would, for the most part, agree that not only should one reject (as literal belief) any proposition which does conflict with science, but even any doctrine which could conflict with science. The former is a dangerous position since it seems to put religion constantly on the defensive, withdrawing one belief after another as science makes new discoveries.

** For instance, one may find the over-all framework 'Roman Catholicism' compelling, although neither the framework nor the particular 'internal' propositions can be established

If we take the line that I have argued for previously (Ch. I), and say that only a minimal number of historical beliefs are required for Christianity, then the overlap with the framework of historical inquiry need not cause any particular problems. Historical research could conceivably tend toward the conclusion that no such person as Jesus ever lived, but the mere abstract possibility of this need not cause the believer to hold his beliefs 'tentatively'. In particular, this seems to be the case since, as we have seen, the believers' faith that certain events have occured in the past does not depend on strictly straight 'historical' evidence.*

Nonetheless, we must consider not only what is logically required for religion, but what we might describe as the 'pragmatic' requirements of a theistic religion for being genuinely significant in today's world. First, we must bear in mind what has just been said, that, if we are to avoid irrationalism, the religion must be 'purified' of historical and scientific claims which are not acceptable according to today's standards. And, second, we must not forget that, logically, there are indeed many 'difficulties'

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by means of historical inquiry, science, or logic. Rather, the 'internal' statements are accepted (to over-simplify) because of the authority of the pope. But, were the pope to decree today that the sun goes around the earth, (a) he would be misunderstanding his own religion, and (b) no Catholic would be obliged to accept such an absurdity.

* Although, an overwhelming amount of 'negative' historical evidence should be conclusive even for the believer, if he wishes to remain in the area of rationality.

involved in any adequate theistic religion*.

Ultimately, the question of the acceptability of theism becomes the question of whether or not there are adequate grounds for regarding the difficulties merely as 'difficulties'.** And it is here that the 'pragmatic' considerations become crucial. Two related questions are now relevant: first, to what, if any, extent is religion necessary for life in today's world? second, how well do religious beliefs 'fit' with other beliefs which we all, as a matter of fact, accept today? If a case could be made that theism is basically superfluous today, that it actually offers nothing essential and meaningful for our lives which cannot be gained by other means, and if it could be shown that, in some sense, theism does not 'fit' with our other beliefs, beliefs which we (somehow) are simply unable to reject, then the only possible conclusion would seem to be that the 'difficulties' are, in fact, decisive objections.

How could one present an anti-theistic argument based on the questions just mentioned? First, it would seem to be quite obvious that religion has today been stripped of many of the functions which it has had at various periods in history. Religion 'purified' in the ways mentioned above no longer is explanatory of why things happen as they do in the world: if Jones' crops grow while Smith's wither and die, we are not likely to attribute this to Jones' virtue and Smith's evilness. Rather, such factors as fertilizer and irrigation are likely to be mentioned, and Smith will be referred to his local agricultural agent.*

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* I am using 'adequate' here in the sense in which Findlay defines an 'adequate' object of worship ([21]).

** The difficulties, of course, arise from the fact that our authors do not want to be irrational, that they accept an overlap between the frameworks of religion, science, logic, etc.

It is a serious matter if God is not taken as the cause of particular physical events in the world, if He is no longer a being whose favor is necessary for worldly prosperity. Nonetheless, it was not too long ago that God, if He was not often invoked in such cases, was, it was thought, still necessary if one was to make sense of, and to change, certain kinds of human behavior. It was not just that an epileptic was 'possessed of devils', but, more generally, any person suffering from a serious neurosis, or even a vague unhappiness, was advised to 'turn to God'. Today, one is more likely to be advised to turn to a psychoanalyst (or, if to religion, religion as thought of more as a form of therapy than as an opportunity for 'God to intervene in one's life').

The point is too well-known to require further elaboration. In general, it can be summed up by saying that whereas religion once had a crucial function in the explanation of certain particular events, it no longer seems to be *required* for such purposes.*

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* Williams ([90], p. 201) puts this point with just the right amount of dryness: "If anyone believes that the best way to prevent natural disasters is to live a better life, he appears to be in error."

Perhaps more important than explanations of particular events in terms of God's will is the fact that at one time there was at least an implicit reference to God in *any* explanation whatsoever, no matter how commonplace the event. In general, prior to the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, causality was understood essentially as final causality; the structure of the universe was understood in terms of the 'great chain of being';** and man's relations to society, to the world around him, and to God were inextricably connected.

> The most important fact about...the Middle Ages, was its essential purpose as the scene of the great drama God had prepared for the human race. However limited the man of the Middle Ages may have been in his knowledge of the great world, one thing he never doubted: that the earth and the heavens and all things therein had been created solely that he might work out his life and destiny.***

The world as a whole had its purpose and each individual had a purpose. The Medieval man "saw the whole of existence as an infinite number of types striving to realize themselves each in a single definite way, and when these prefigured goals were not reached they saw failure, error" (pp. 99-100).

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* This is not to say that one does not find such explanations being given on occasion today. But when this does happen, most people seem to find the procedure a little embarrassing and turn to searching for physical or psychological causes.

** The classic work on this topic is, of course, Arthur Lovejoy's *The Great Chain of Being* [56]. For a briefer (and incredibly dull) account, cf. E.M.W. Tillyard, *The Elizabethan World Picture* [82], Ch. IV & V.

*** J.H. Randall, Jr., *The Making of the Modern Mind* [74], p. 18.

In short, prior to the seventeenth century, Christianity played a crucial role in the everyday life of all men, even in his concept of causality, of his understanding of *why* anything occurred. At that time it could hardly have appeared as a genuine possibility that it could be worng, that one might give it up (paralleling the attitude of scientists to Euclidean geometry prior to the development of non-Euclidean geometries). As a result, the difficulties in Christian belief could, indeed, be seen as no more than difficulties.*

If we contrast the situation of today's world with that of the Middle Ages and consider the two questions asked just above, clearly the answers to these questions are significant. First, Christianity is quite obviously not a *necessity* in the sense in which it once was. Our explanations of everyday events, our ethical principles, and our society do not (contrary to the rhetoric of some politicians) actually *depend on* the truth of any religious principles. In short, it is not at all clear how religion does actually function for today's believer, and, and this is the most important point, it certainly does not seem to be necessary to be a believer in order to make sense of today's world; our explanations, our ethics, and our social and political lives are, on the whole, quite independent of any religious beliefs. This is in sharp contrast with the situation of some 400 years ago when there was no practical (or even conceivable) alternative to the Christian world-view.*

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* I think that it can be said, without too much oversimplification, that it was Copernican astronomy that gave the initial impetus to the scientific revolution. And this astronomy was long resisted for reasons which were *not* primarily astronomical. Rather, the new astronomy failed to fit (a) with the particular physical principles held at the time; and (b) with the over-all vision men had of themselves: their ethics, their society, their destiny as a whole. Would it have been *rational* to give up all of this for the sake of an astronomical theory which was (perhaps) somewhat more elegant mathematically than their present theory? Actually, it was only after the development of a new physics *and* the weakening of the old 'vision of man'

The answer to our first question, then, is that religious beliefs are not necessary in today's world. The second question is, in effect, "but are they possible?" I do not think that a definitive answer can be given to this question. To begin with, they clearly are possible in the sense that many people do today profess them. But this misses the real point of the question which might be brought out by putting the question in either one of two ways: (a)Are they rationally possible? (b)Are they possible without adopting an attitude which can only be described as schizophrenic? What I mean by the latter can best

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through social and economic causes that the new astronomy, and hence a whole new Weltanschaung, become predominant (again, for a brilliant account of the inter-relationships between the various elements of the change from the Medieval to the 'modern' world-view, see Kuhn, [53], passim).

* The last paragraph may seem to contradict what I argued in the above, that is, that religion does offer something more than 'an ethics'. I do not, however, think that there is any real

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be elucidated by taking an extreme case.* I once was acquainted with an extraordinarily good graduate student in philosophy who was an ardent Roman Catholic. In, say, an Aristotle seminar, he propounded the theory of natural law with all the vehemence of one whose very life depended upon that doctrine (as, indeed, I suppose he thought it did). On the other hand, he was a specialist in the philosophy of science and logic, and when discussing these fields, he exhibited all of the convictions of a logical positivist to an extent that would have made, say, Schlic~~h~~, /k proud to have such a pupil.

Now no doubt in his private thoughts he had some way of reconciling these seemingly contradictory doctrines, but, no matter how anyone might reconcile them, there must remain, I think, an irresolvable _tension_ between the two. And it is just such a tension that seems to be prevalent among contemporary believers. For all of us, necessarily, accept the modern scientific world-view: we trust our automobiles to start in the morning and to get us safely to work; we watch our scientifically designed television sets; we eat our scientifically improved strain of beef; etc., _ad_ _infinitum_.**

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contradiction involved here (as I shall attempt to make clear shortly: below, pp. 305-6).

* I.e., a case which is extreme but which is certainly not approaching the level which we would intuitively think of as 'insane'.

** As a result of the 'life' we lead today, scientific precepts appear to be self-evident to us. We can 'stand back' and see that, indeed, such precepts are not self-evident in themselves, but it does not follow that we can, or should, I certainly do not want to suggest that there is any logical incompatibility between belief in science and belief in a theistic God. Indeed, I have generally agreed with our authors when they have gone to great lengths to show that no such incompatibility exists. Instead, what I am suggesting is that _any_ form of belief in a Supreme Being does not 'fit' with our everyday lives which inevitably seem to be, on the whole, independent of that belief, and that, therefore, a milder form of 'schizophrenia' than that described above is a necessary condition of religious belief today. At the minimum, this schizophrenia involves adopting beliefs, and a 'Sunday-morning attitude', which do not fit with one's beliefs, attitudes, and actions during the rest of the week.*

And yet, it may be objected that I have admitted, indeed, I have positively _argued_, that religion _may_ make a genuine difference in one's life. And I _have_ done that. And, further, I really believe that it can. Nonetheless, I also believe that such religious belief today must inevitably involve the sort of schizophrenia I have described above. For there seems to be a radical, albeit

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attempt to divest ourselves of them, any more than a scientist of _circa_ 1800 should have attempted to divest himself of the assumption of Euclidean geometry (since no genuine alternative was available) (cf. above, Ch. III).

* The incompatibility is a 'loose' one in much the way Wolterstorff says that the inter-relationships between the various aspects of faith are 'loose'.

not logical, incompatibility between everyday life in today's world and genuine religious belief. The two simply seem to have no relationship to one another, and seem, further to be so different as to fail completely to 'fit together'.*

And this brings us to the final point: the necessity of such a schizophrenic attitude towards the world seems more then sufficient to turn the 'mere difficulties' in Christian belief into fatal objections. Such difficulties are tolerable only if the system is otherwise very firmly grounded. But it does not seem to be so in today's world.

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According to Hick, there are those who 'cannot help' seeing the world theistically. For these people the difficulties are just that, difficulties; they are not fatal objections. The above considerations will not, of course, convince such people; nor can it be said that they necessarily should convince them. For, I cannot see any grounds on which it can be said, unequivocally, that such people are irrational.** All that can be said is that they should reflect on what they now see as only difficulties in their faith, and that they should attempt to 'switch their vision' so that they can see the world as the sceptic sees it, just as the man who sees only the duck should try to see the rabbit if he is not to avoid missing one, perhaps enlightening, experience. If they can do this, then they are like the man who can see both the duck and the rabbit, and, eventually, they may come to wonder why they ever saw the duck in the first place.

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* cf. Thornton Wilder's, Heaven's My Destination [89] for an interesting fictional account of the way in which the person who genuinely attempts to live by Christian principles fails to fit into today's world.

** Not, at least, any more than Tycho was 'irrational' not to accept the Copernican system.

On the other hand, they may find that the duck is a better, a clearer, picture. And, if they do, if in spite of the difficulties, the distortions of the duck's bill, the mis-placement of his eye, what they see is still more 'duck-like', I do not see any conclusive grounds on which we can say, "but that's not a duck at all."

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RELIGIOUS FAITH: SOME CONTEMPORARY VIEWS

David A. Conway

In the late 19th century, William James argued that, since the basic doctrines of religion are neither capable of proof or disproof, we have a right to believe them. Many contemporary theologians and/or philosophers put forth a similar argument: In practical matters, they say, it is necessary to believe or not to believe; furthermore we do (as a matter of fact) do so in all walks of everyday life even though we may not realize it; even the scientist (and, indeed, the philosopher) makes "unjustified" assumptions (e.g the assumption that the "future will be like the past"). Ultimately, we must either believe or not believe in the existence of God, but our own decision is no more based on "hard and fast evidence" than is our decision concerning whether or not to treat other people as "ends rather than means," or to believe that "the future will be like the past." The over-all aim, then, is to show that there is a "middle ground" between claiming to prove a religion to be true and resorting to the sort of irrationalism espoused by Kierkegaard.

Such arguments have recently been put forth by R. M. Hare, Raphael Demos, Frederick Ferré, Nicholas Wolterstorff, Alasdair MacIntyre, and John Hick. They claim that all areas of human knowledge require some ultimate assumptions and, hence, the ultimate assumption of the existence of God cannot be criticized. But in order to avoid the seeming "arbitrariness" of just "some" ultimate assumption, they say that what we assume finally depends on how we see the world. Either one sees the world as "God's world" or one sees it as a world "just there" (as, in a puzzle-picture, one either sees a duck or a rabbit). Which one sees is not the result of "evidence" in any normal sense of that term.

Perhaps surprisingly (and, indeed, apparently unknown to the "believers" just cited), recent accounts of science (e.g. such as that given by Quine, Putnam, and Kuhn) lead to much the same result in that discipline.

Science's basic theories are not verifiable or falsifiable by means of crucial experiments; central scientific theories act as unquestionable presuppositions in much the way that the premises of religion do. Philosophy, likewise, has its ultimate presuppositions. In short, science, philosophy, and religion are all ultimately dependent on how we see the world. None is a matter of straightforward confrontation of theory with "the facts."

In today's world, however, a world in which it seems that we must accept the framework of science, we may question whether or not religion can have any function, whether or not that function is one that "fits with" the scientific modes of thought. In short, it is not clear that it is possible to be a Christian in today's world, if that world is properly understood.